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EUROPEAN AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY 
AND JUSTICE – COMMON VALUES AS THE 
GATEWAY FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
Malin Brännkärr
Twenty years ago, Finland, a relatively new member state of the 
European Union, held the Presidency of the Council of the Euro-
pean Union for the first time. At the time, European integration 
had reached a new stage and the Tampere European Council held 
an important meeting in which a groundbreaking decision was 
made. This decision profoundly changed the European Union and 
subsequently created a Union of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
In 2019, the Finnish Presidency coincides with the 20th anni-
versary of the adoption of the Tampere Milestones in the European 
Council Conclusions of October 1999. Since the very beginning, 
it was clear that the European area of freedom, security and jus-
tice could only be built based on a shared commitment to human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, the same basis 
serves as the foundation for any future development of EU Justice 
and Home Affairs. 
After Tampere, Justice and Home Affairs soon became the 
fastest developing policy field in the union, and fundamental 
rights, stable institutions and well-functioning justice systems 
became more and more important during any ongoing accession 
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process. For two decades now, the area of freedom, security and 
justice has been built with remarkable achievements. Simultane-
ously, the European Union has expanded by way of the accession 
of new Member States. In the multi-annual programmes of Tam-
pere, The Hague and Stockholm, the European Council has guided 
further steps to be taken in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. 
Once again, we are at a crossroads, and I thank CEPS and the 
European University Institute (EUI) for taking this opportunity to 
jointly discuss new milestones and paths to follow. 
The Finnish Presidency in 2019 also coincides with a new insti-
tutional set up. We decided to use the opportunity to invite EU 
Justice and Home Affairs ministers to identify and explore key 
issues for future development, based on the new Strategic Agenda 
adopted by the June 2019 European Council. Moreover, the new 
European parliament started its work and the President-Elect of 
the new Commission has published her political guidelines for 
the future.  I myself approach the future from the perspective of 
common European values. For the development of Justice and 
Home Affairs, a strong foundation of our common values is per-
haps more important today than ever before. Therefore, the first 
priority of the Finnish Presidency was to strengthen the toolbox 
that contributes to strengthening the protection of fundamental 
rights, democracy and the rule of law in the Union.
With a view to the new strategic agenda and the political guide-
lines of Ms Ursula von der Leyen, it seems clear that European 
leaders have also recognised the particular importance of our core 
values. Common values are the basis for mutual trust and confi-
dence between Member States, and European cooperation in the 
field of Justice and Home Affairs relies heavily on mutual trust 
between Member States. 
The Tampere European Council endorsed the principle of 
mutual recognition to become the cornerstone of judicial coop-
eration meaning that our focus has been, and still is, on smooth, 
direct and effective cooperation between authorities within the EU. 
There is no need for cross-checking human rights compliance due 
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to the fact that we have trust in one another. For the past decade, 
EU-legislators have established an impressive set of common min-
imum standards for criminal procedural rights in order to further 
strengthen trust between Member States. 
This has truly been a remarkable achievement. The importance, 
as well as the effects, of mutual trust and common values reaches far 
beyond just the area of Justice and criminal law. Mutual confidence 
and the presumption of compliance, by other Member States, with 
EU law and fundamental rights has also been, for instance, at the 
core of all efforts to build a Common European Asylum System. 
At the same time over the years, in the field of civil law, the EU has 
taken decisive steps towards abolishing the exequatur, thus abol-
ishing barriers hampering mutual recognition.
However, in recent years, the European Court of Justice has 
been asked, on a number of occasions, to interpret the bounda-
ries of mutual confidence and mutual recognition. For the future 
development of the area of freedom, security and justice, it is cru-
cial that the aforementioned balance between mutual confidence 
and mutual recognition is maintained. The Court has repeatedly 
confirmed that the rebuttal of the principle of mutual trust should 
only occur in exceptional circumstances. In reality, today, mutual 
trust between Member States has been challenged in many ways.
In the area of Justice, the Court has identified important issues 
that entail the potential to challenge mutual trust and mutual rec-
ognition – we have to keep a close eye on these warning signs. 
For instance, poor prison conditions can become an obstacle 
for mutual recognition, and thus, weaken cooperation between 
Member States. During the Finnish Presidency, discussions have 
continued on ways to tackle the aforementioned problem. The EU 
can be an important forum for sharing best practices in this field, 
both in regards to detention as well as to its alternatives. This ini-
tiative has received a positive response in the Council and there 
seems to be genuine support within the Member States in further 
discussing the increased use of alternative measures. 
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One important manifestation of our common values is the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Charter’s influence has been 
significant in the field of Justice and Home Affairs and the evolving 
case law of the Court of Justice has been of great relevance to fur-
ther development, for instance as regards any initiative affecting 
everyone’s right to the protection of personal data. The rapid devel-
opment of digital innovations has largely reshaped our society and 
economies in the 21st century, and we have every reason to believe 
that the said development will continue to develop going forward. 
Simultaneously, for instance, this evolution has created new legal 
issues relating to the processing of our personal data. The Court 
has tackled these questions in a number of landmark cases, many 
of which are now reflected in the EU’s recently modernised legal 
framework on data protection.
Particularly, in the field of freedom, security and justice, we 
need better understanding of both the advantages as well as the 
challenges that come with digitalisation. For instance, we need to 
take into account artificial intelligence and other automation when 
planning the future. Furthermore, we need to take into account 
digitalisation as a whole with all of its manifestations, for example, 
in relation to new technologies, 5G Networks and hybrid threats. 
We need to consider how we can most effectively utilise digitali-
sation and respond to the challenges that arise with it, while at the 
same time maintaining our common values.
Therefore, the Charter is not only an important expression of 
our common values; it also continuously confirms the commit-
ment of the EU to uphold these values. The Charter needs to be 
effectively implemented so that all Europeans can fully enjoy their 
rights. Thus, more work needs to be done to give the Charter 
greater visibility and to enhance its active use and application at 
national level as well. This has also been one of the topics on the 
Presidency agenda of Finland and was on the agenda of the EU 
Justice Ministers meeting on 7 October 2019 in Luxembourg. Fur-
thermore, Finland considers it important that the work towards 
the EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights 
continues.  
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Overall, it can be said that the protection of our common 
values concurrently means the protection of the system of mutual 
recognition in the EU, and at the core of our common value base 
is the rule of law. The rule of law can be described as the backbone 
of the modern constitutional democracy and a prerequisite for 
the protection of all fundamental values listed in Article 2 of the 
Treaty on European Union. In other words, the rule of law acts as 
a conjunctive glue that holds the Union together as well as affects 
every aspect of the Union’s work, from fundamental rights to a 
well-functioning single market. 
We need to reinforce the EU’s existing rule of law toolbox. 
Although we can proudly proclaim all the significant leaps forward 
we have taken since the Tampere Milestones, we must be careful 
not to take any steps backwards. Thus, inaction is not an option, 
if we truly are to stay true to our common values. I therefore wel-
come the Commission’s recent commitment to strengthen the rule 
of law and to establish a new annual reporting mechanism. 
Freedom requires a genuine area of justice – this was also one 
of the key messages of the Tampere Milestones. A genuine area 
of justice is real when people feel comfortable approaching courts 
and authorities regardless of the Member State. Moreover, it is real 
when criminals cannot exploit differences in the judicial systems 
of Member States. Furthermore, it is real when judgments and 
decisions from all Member States are respected and enforced. In 
a genuine European area of justice, individuals should not be pre-
vented or discouraged from exercising their rights. We always have 
to remember that we are building a Europe not for institutions, not 
for Member States, but for our citizens. The effectiveness, inde-
pendence and quality of national justice systems are key aspects 
of the rule of law, and they play a key role in the European area of 
freedom, security and justice. 
The necessity of our common value base is multidimensional. 
Take for example the field of security. We need to set our sights on 
a comprehensive approach to ensuring security. Internal security 
is a product of a chain of actions and actors. In order to combat 
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cross-border crime, this chain must work effectively. Security 
requires an efficient chain of criminal proceedings, thus well-func-
tioning cooperation in criminal matters between Member States is 
essential. In 2002, as requested by the Tampere European Council, 
Eurojust was established to improve judicial cooperation in the 
fight against serious, cross-border crime. Today, we can proudly 
proclaim that Eurojust has truly become an important security 
actor and has helped to build mutual trust between Member States. 
Therefore, we must continue developing Eurojust, particularly; we 
need to ensure that Eurojust is ready for the Digital Age. Next year 
the European Public Prosecutor’s Office will join the action along-
side Eurojust with a strong authority to protect the Union’s budget 
from fraud. 
In conclusion, the aforementioned and its key message can be 
divided into three equally important points.
First, our initial objective has been to strive for proper func-
tioning of our societies and the policies of the Union. Thus, from 
the get-go, European integration has been firmly rooted in a shared 
desire to commit to human rights, democratic institutions and the 
rule of law. Therefore, our original driving force for a better future 
needs to be continuously reinforced.
Secondly, we can note with contentment the aftermath of the 
Tampere Milestones, but we also need to remind ourselves of all 
of the Milestones yet to be achieved. In other words, we need to 
constantly reinforce cooperation within the European Union by, 
among other things, fostering the mutual trust between Member 
States. As mentioned before, the protection of our common values 
concurrently means the protection of the system of mutual recog-
nition in the EU.
Thirdly, we should not view our shared common values only 
as historical building blocks, but as the necessary components for 
future development, as well as, the enabling forces to build a sus-
tainable Europe and a sustainable future.
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I am not sure anybody could have foreseen the current devel-
opment of the area of freedom, security and justice some 30 years 
ago. Moreover, even 20 years ago when the area was established, 
I do not think anybody could have foreseen all the achievements 
of today. Maybe all the progress achieved today were only dreams 
back then, or alternatively, maybe all the achievements of today 
were perceived to be impossible.
The truth is that we have, in fact, achieved many unimaginable 
things in this area. Therefore, I hope that over the next 20 years, 
we will continue to achieve more things that are currently unim-
aginable. Alternatively, at least, I hope our current goals are exces-
sively pessimistic. However, we have to continue to work hard 





SETTING THE SCENE 
Sergio Carrera, Deirdre Curtin and Andrew Geddes
2019 corresponded with the 20 year anniversary of the adoption 
of the Tampere Programme at the European Council Conclusions 
of October 1999 under the auspices of the Finnish Presidency of 
the EU. After the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
Tampere Programme laid down for the first time the multi-annual 
policy priorities to guide the development of EU Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA) policies. 
The end of 2019 also coincided with the 10 year anniversary of 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which constituted a mile-
stone in European integration. The Treaty of Lisbon rebaptised 
the EU JHA policies as the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AFSJ). It brought AFSJ policies under democratic scrutiny of the 
European Parliament, and judicial oversight of the Luxembourg 
Court. Of particular importance for the AFSJ was the incorpora-
tion of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights into EU primary 
law, on an equal footing with the EU Treaties. AFSJ cooperation 
is now established and functions on the premise of ‘mutual trust’, 
which is rooted on and dependent upon the full respect of EU’s 
core values and legal principles of the rule of law, democracy and 
fundamental rights.  
The ‘Lisbonisation’ of the AFSJ sought to ensuring inter-insti-
tutional balance and liberalising the ownership on the multi-an-
nual policy programming and agenda-setting on AFSJ policies. 
2 Introduction
The new AFSJ decision-making setting was meant to no longer 
allow for an exclusive prerogative of the JHA Council and national 
Ministries of Interior, but ensuring the involvement and equal 
weighting of the European Parliament. The European Council was 
also transformed into an EU institution, and subject as such to the 
EU constitutional framework. 
This Collective Volume examines and takes stock of the main 
policy and legislative developments, achievements and progress 
made during the last 20 years on AFJS cooperation. 
The various Chapters review the current facets and latest steps 
in AFSJ policies. They critically assess the main achievements, 
unfinished components and challenges. Special focus is paid to 
the different types of ‘Europeanization’ dynamics, narratives and 
processes witnessed during the last 20 years, their novelty or con-
tinuation, and the ways in which they relate to the EU rule of law, 
democratic and fundamental rights principles laid down in the 
Tampere Programme and the EU Treaties.
The Volume is based on the presentations and contributions 
delivered in a two-day Conference co-organised by CEPS, the 
Migration Policy Centre (MPC) and the Law Department of the 
European University Institute (EUI), in cooperation with the 
Finnish Permanent Representation to the EU on 3 and 4 October 
2019 in Brussels. The Conference was an official event part of Fin-
land’s Presidency calendar which run during the second half of 
2019. 
The Volume is structured into five main Parts. Part I (The Lis-
bonisation of EU AFSJ Policies) examines the main institutional 
and political AFSJ developments, and their implications, since the 
Tampere Programme and the ‘communitarisation’ of JHA domains 
by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. The various Chapters address 
the impacts of politicization and ‘depoliticiation’ dynamics and 
‘crises’ in these policy domains. They examine the constitutional 
importance of the common guiding principles and fundamentals 
outlined in the Tampere Programme and the Lisbon Treaty, such 
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as those of inter-institutional balance, solidarity, human rights and 
the rule of law. Particular attention is paid to the ways in which 
these legal principles, and the democratic credentials of the EU 
towards its citizens, have been affected by the increasing role 
played by crisis-labelling AFSJ politics.
The Parts that follow are AFSJ theme-specific. Part II (Borders 
and Asylum) assesses the main developments, open issues and 
future priorities in relation to EU border and asylum policies. The 
Chapters study the state of play of the Schengen area as well as EU 
external borders policies, with particular focus on Member States’ 
reintroduction of internal border controls and the increasing role 
of EU agencies such as Frontex. In the area of asylum, the Chap-
ters examine the scope and impacts of the EU Hotspot model, 
as well as EU informal arrangements with third countries (the 
2016 EU-Turkey Statement), and among few EU Member States 
(the 2019 Malta Declaration on disembarkation and relocations), 
and their relationship with the UN Global Compact on Refugees 
(GCR). Particular attention is given to the implications of new 
legal and policy developments on EU Treaty principles. 
Part III (Irregular and Regular Migration) covers the major 
developments and main issues on EU irregular and regular immi-
gration policies. The Chapters examine the EU and national 
approaches and narratives in countering irregular entries and 
stay in the Union, as well as expulsion policies, including of EU 
policies on the expulsions of irregular immigrants. Specific atten-
tion is given to the consequences of policies of criminalisation of 
irregular immigration, search and rescue at sea and of humani-
tarian assistance, as well as the legal techniques used. The Chapters 
critically examine the assumptions of EU anti-human smuggling 
policies as mechanisms for addressing irregular immigration, and 
third country cooperation arrangements as remote control and 
delegated containment. On the other hand, Part III also includes 
an assessment of the EU legal migration acquis since the Tampere 
Programme and its relationship with the UN Global Compact 
on Migration (GCM) and international human rights and labour 
standards.
4 Introduction
Part IV (EU Criminal Justice Cooperation) first examines the 
main developments and achievements in EU criminal justice 
cooperation. Particular attention is given to issues characterizing 
EU mutual recognition instruments such as the European Arrest 
Warrant, the European Investigation Order and possible solutions 
to the challenges that the EU system of mutual recognition faces 
in light of the principle of mutual trust. The Chapters also discuss 
challenges such as the digitalisation of criminal investigations and 
the e-evidence proposals package, the role of criminal law in pro-
tecting the environment, the European Public Prosecutor Office 
(EPPO) as well as the increasingly pressing issues and funda-
mental rights challenges related to detention and suspects rights 
in the EU. 
Part V (Police Cooperation) explores EU’s internal security pol-
icies and their role and contribution to the fight against crime and 
terrorism. They pay attention to EU instruments of cross-border 
law enforcement (police) operational cooperation as well as to the 
priority given to information exchange (preventive justice) and 
the interoperability of databases, as well as the involvement of EU 
agencies such as Europol (and the role of JITs) and eu-LISA. EU 
law enforcement and data sharing cooperation and agreements 
with third countries for purposes of fighting crime, and their 
impacts and compatibility with EU privacy and data protection 
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1. TAMPERE AND THE POLITICS 
OF MIGRATION AND ASYLUM 




“Immigration has Europe in a pickle. With ageing populations 
and low birth rates, the European Union needs more people. 
But EU countries are already taking in plenty of foreigners, and 
many struggle to integrate. Popular resentment of immigration is 
increasing, and may rise further as economies slow and unemploy-
ment climbs. Meanwhile hundreds of illegal migrants risk life and 
limb on leaky boats to get to Europe every week”.2 
While these words could have been written in 2020, they 
actually appeared in The Economist in October 2008 in an article 
that explored progress made since the Tampere and Hague Pro-
grammes of 1999 and 2004 and argued that these had struggled 
to achieve their objectives, not least because of an unwillingness 
to consider pathways for regular migration to EU countries. The 
1  This chapter draws from research conducted as part of a European Research Council 
Advanced Grant awarded to Andrew Geddes for the project Prospects for International 
Migration Governance (MIGPROSP), award number 340430. 
2  The Economist, ‘Letting some of them in’, 2 October 2008.
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article concluded by stating that ‘For now, the illusion of tighter 
immigration controls confers domestic political benefits, even as 
its failings are ignored’. 
This Chapter looks more closely at the politics of immigration 
both pre- and post-Tampere to show that policy and institutional 
developments since the 1990s have been powerfully shaped by 
events understood or represented as crises. These crises have often 
centred on numbers of migrants and concern about the potential 
for large scale migration. In addition to this, since 1999 it is also 
clearly the case that immigration has become a more important 
political concern across the EU. There is compelling research 
evidence that there is a heightened politicisation of migration, 
meaning relatively high issue salience combined with polariza-
tion.3 It has also been shown that immigration and European inte-
gration now form part of a new dividing line in European politics 
with the capacity to shape elections and governments.4 
The Tampere Programme itself was not the driver of these 
important political developments that have more profound roots 
in social and political change in EU member states. The point is 
that that Tampere and subsequent efforts to develop common 
migration and asylum policies at EU level, have occurred at a time 
when immigration has become politicised and also an issue that 
divides both EU citizens and, of course, the member states. 
2. The Constraining effects of Crises
Five distinct elements of the post-Cold War context after 1989 
shaped the political context from which emerged the Tampere 
Programme: greater intensity of migration flows to and within 
the EU; all EU member states becoming to some extent countries 
of immigration and emigration; a growing policy role for the EU 
3  S. Hutter and H-P Kriesi, European Party Politics in Time of Crisis, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2018.
4  L. Hooghe and G. Marks, ‘A post-functionalist theory of European integration: from 
permissive consensus to constraining dissensus’, British Journal of Political Science, 
39(1): 1.-23, 2009.
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after the Maastricht Treaty came into force in 1993; ostensibly new 
manifestations of the immigration problem, for example growing 
concern about irregular flows, people-smuggling and human traf-
ficking; and, finally a more intense politicisation of migration at 
both member state and EU levels combining both increased issue 
salience and increased polarisation.5
An immediate and specific effect in the early 1990s of the end 
of the Cold War was to generate concern about the potential for 
large-scale migration flows to western European from the ex-So-
viet Union and its former satellite states in central Europe. In an 
academic account of these events, it was written that since the late 
1980s security actors in national interior ministries and associ-
ated state-level agencies had already begun to connect their secu-
rity concerns to potential large-scale flows from eastern Europe. 
What is more, they began to understand potential flows in terms 
of a crisis or potential crisis while taking at face value the idea of a 
‘flood’ of immigrants moving to the EU: 
The primary component of the crisis was the fall of the Iron 
Curtain and the subsequent flood of immigrants into the 
EC, and especially into Germany, which became the chief 
protagonist in institutionalizing justice and home affairs 
cooperation in the EU. What made a new EC policy space 
appear necessary and appropriate was that the two contex-
tual changes coincided. The abolition of national frontier 
controls within the EC raised concerns about controlling 
migration and transnational crime, just as several EC states, 
especially Germany, confronted an immigration crisis.6
The break-up of former Yugoslavia led to increased flows of asy-
lum-seekers, again with Germany as a preferred destination. Just 
over 1.5 million asylum seekers moved to Germany between 1989 
5  A. Geddes, L Hadj Abdou and L. Brumat (2020) Migration and Mobility in the Europe-
an Union, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan. 
6  W. Sandholtz and P. Turnbull, ‘Policing and Immigration: The Creation of New Policy 
Spaces’, in A. Stone Sweet, W. Sandholtz and N. Fligstein (eds.), The Institutionalization 
of Europe. Oxford University Press, p. 199. 
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and 1994. Framed by the idea of a migration crisis, the German 
government sought to ‘export’ the crisis to the EU level. Neigh-
bouring countries to Germany in central and eastern Europe with 
the carrot of EU membership dangling in front of them were incor-
porated within the EU framework for migration controls via their 
designation as ‘safe third countries’ to which asylum applicants 
could be returned if they had passed through them on their way 
to an EU member state. The Dublin Convention of 1992 became 
a key legal instrument within what is now known as the Common 
European Asylum System. 
By the end of the 1990s, the EU was beginning to elaborate 
measures on migration and asylum that, while dominated by inter-
governmental cooperation as the modus operandi, showed that 
member states were also thinking collectively about migration and 
that their thinking about the causes and effects of migration – and, 
of course, who was doing that thinking – was having important 
effects on actions. The field has become more densely populated 
since, but it was national interior ministries that set the direction of 
EU cooperation on migration and asylum. It has been difficult ever 
since to deviate from the course that was set. Emerging during this 
period we can see underlying knowledge of the causes and effects 
of migration that became embedded at EU level and associated 
with the understanding that there was a major challenge to the 
external borders of EU member states - some more than others, of 
course - posed by large scale flows.
Concern about large-scale flows rested on particular under-
standings of the causes and effects of migration that motivated 
actions. Before Tampere in the early 1990s we can see the emer-
gent shape of the EU ‘policy core’ with a focus on stemming those 
flows defined as ‘unwanted’ by member state policies.7 
The ‘normality’ of EU cooperation on migration and asylum as 
it developed after the 1990s has been shaped by responses to inter-
7  F. Trauner and A. Servent ‘The Communitarization of the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice: Why Institutional Change does not Translate into Policy Change’, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 54(6), 1417–32, 2016.
11TAMPERE AND THE POLITICS OF MIGRATION AND ASYLUM IN THE EU - A. Geddes
mittent crises that have centred on concern about real or potential 
migration flows and their controllability. This quote from an Aus-
trian government official interviewed for the MIGPROSP project 
(see footnote 1) reflected on conversations with Dutch colleagues 
and illustrate this point about the influence of past events on cur-
rent understandings: 
I didn’t have the feeling that there was really a new dis-
cussion […] I always remember my Dutch colleagues in 
Brussels, who had been around since the 90s, what we are 
discussing, what we consider as new ideas, they’ve already 
been discussing that in the early 90s ... The difference now 
is with the crisis and this global attention that is being given 
with the [Global] Compact, I think this understanding now 
is also being created on the political level (Interior ministry 
official, Vienna, January 2018).
Similarly an official from the German Interior Ministry put it to 
the MIGPROSP research team like this:
we also feel kind of, yes, confirmed in the certain premises we 
always made. Unfortunately, sometimes not the right conclusions 
were drawn from the actual knowledge which was available here 
at the level of experts so that this enormous influx could take place 
in the dimension we have seen. (Interior ministry official, Berlin, 
March 2018)
This quote exemplifies the importance of looking back not only 
to provide a frame of reference but also to provide confirmation 
of an account of the causes and effects of migration that affects 
current assessments.
3. Changes in Underlying Politics Dynamics
We now move on to examine some of the quite profound changes 
in the social basis of European and EU politics that have occurred 
since 1999 and that have shaped the development of EU migra-
tion and asylum policy post-Tampere. The events of 2015 and 2016 
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when hundreds of thousands of people made perilous sea cross-
ings were a massive humanitarian challenge and also a tragedy in 
terms of lives lost. The crisis, however understood, also conveyed 
to many EU citizens images of a loss of control, of disorder and 
as requiring measures to stem flows. As a European Commission 
official put it to the MIGPROSP project researchers:
Then you see the massive flows and then you see people 
walking on roads in Hungary, thousands of people walking 
and people get afraid, “what’s going on? What have we 
done?” Then that completely shifts the perception (Euro-
pean Commission official, Brussels, November 2017)
An Austrian government official observed to MIGPROSP 
researchers a change in attitudes from what he saw as an initial 
sympathy with the plight of migrants to a growing concern that 
things were getting out of hand:
I think you can definitely see a shift within the European 
public perception. The way the refugee crisis was seen in 
the beginning, it was overwhelmingly positive. In the end, 
everyone saw that it was getting out of hand and really was 
a risk to the overall system, straining everybody’s resources. 
(Austrian government official, Vienna, April 2018)
By 2016, migration had become a highly salient topic in European 
politics and, for example, played a key role in the UK’s Brexit vote 
in June 2016, the strong first round vote in the 2017 French pres-
idential elections for Marine Le Pen, the re-entry of the far-right 
Freedom Party into the governing Austrian coalition in December 
2017, the growth in support for the Lega in the March 2018 Italian 
elections, the anti-migration focus of the victorious Fidesz cam-
paign in the April 2018 Hungarian elections and the salience of the 
migration issue in the May 2019 European Parliament elections.8 
These kinds of events informed a particular understanding of 
8  J. Dennison and A. Geddes ‘A Rising Tide? The Salience of Immigration and the Rise 
of Anti-Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe’, The Political Quarterly, 90(1), 
107–16, 2018.
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public attitudes to migration that sees attitudes as becoming more 
negative and as potentially driving support for anti-immigration 
political parties that oppose European integration. As an example 
of this, the former European Commissioner with responsibility 
for migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos, gave a speech to the EU 
Migration Forum in 2015 in which he said that: 
We need to change the perception of the public opinion on 
migration. Our biggest concern is the rise of racism and 
xenophobia, fueled by populist movements across Europe. 
To communicate the positive contribution of migration, I 
intend to launch an EU-wide campaign to improve the nar-
rative about migration in cooperation with Member States 
later this year.9
The issue of perception and calls to ‘change the narrative’ have 
been central to the ways in which governance actors, particularly 
those in an official role, made sense of migration and of how and 
why public attention became focused on the issue as this official 
put it to MIGPROSP researchers: 
Yes, but where the light is on normally is also the problem in 
the sense that, if there is no public perception of a problem 
in the field of migration, there is no problem in itself. The 
problem is the public perception of the problem … You 
decide how you perceive that issue and what makes it a 
problem. I need to provide solutions to your perceptions of 
migration. (Commission official, Brussels, October 2017)
There was broad agreement - rightly or wrongly - that the problem 
was lack of control and that measures needed to be introduced 
to restore controls and, as a result, to restore public trust. Under-
standings of public attitudes to migration play an important role 
in policy-making as an official from the Austrian interior ministry 
put it:
9  Avramopoulos, D. (2015) Keynote speech of Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos at 
the first European Migration Forum. Available from: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_SPEECH-15-3781_en.htm. 
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You cannot deny that public opinion has an influence on what 
we do because of the interaction with the political level […] So, 
we must be close to public opinion. We must not follow it, but we 
must be aware of it and we have to reach conclusions which are at 
least compatible with public opinion. (Interview with civil servant, 
Vienna, January 2018)
The credibility of border controls is a key element of the 
response to public opinion, as understood. As an EU official put it:
Today I have minus 25 per cent arrivals on the Central 
Mediterranean route. Why? Because the borders are better 
controlled. So, in the short term it is a false assumption to 
tell me that the border controls do not work […] The entire 
point […] is we can discuss anything else once the border is 
up. (Interview, EU official, Brussels, October 2017).
There can be little doubt that this focus on controls has been a 
fairly constant component of EU migration governance since its 
inception in the late 1980s driven by concern about large numbers 
and also by fear of public backlash.
Given their important role, we now look at some key trends 
in public attitudes to migration. It is commonly assumed that 
anti-immigration sentiment across the EU is increasing, which 
can fuel support for anti-immigration movements and that efforts 
should be made to change peoples’ attitudes. Looking more closely 
at the evidence suggests that there is actually little to suggest that 
a tide of anti-immigration sentiment is sweeping across the EU. 
Opposition to immigration is linked to issue salience – the impor-
tance people attribute to the immigration issue and not to gen-
eralised anti-immigration attitudes. But research evidence also 
suggests that support for and opposition to both immigration and 
European integration may be coalescing into a new dividing line, 
or cleavage, in European politics.
First, there is little to suggest that there is a rising tide of 
anti-immigration sentiment sweeping across the EU. Attitudes 
to migration from outside and from within the EU became more 
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favourable in most EU member states even during the so-called 
crisis after 2015, as was notably the case in Germany, which was 
the main destination. We should not take for granted claims that 
attitudes to migration have become less favourable when evidence 
suggests greater favourability over time.10
If attitudes are not becoming less favourable then how do we 
explain the increased support for anti-immigration political par-
ties? Issue salience plays a powerful role in explaining the success 
of anti-immigration parties. Salience means the importance that 
people attribute to the issue. In the Autumn 2018 Eurobarometer 
survey, immigration was identified as one of the two most pressing 
concerns by 40 per cent of EU citizens. We shouldn’t assume that 
these 40 per cent were all anti-immigration. It is likely that some 
were concerned from a more pro-immigration stance. There is, 
however, a fairly strong correlation between issue salience and 
support for anti-immigration political parties.11 It isn’t necessarily 
the case that Europeans have become more anti-immigration, but, 
rather, that latent concerns about immigration among sections 
of the population were being activated. This helps to explain why 
at, an aggregate level, attitudes can become more favourable, but, 
among more specific sections of the electorate, can become more 
hostile. 
Finally, a wider point can be made about politicisation in 
relation to deeper-rooted patterns of political conflict in Europe. 
When an issue such as immigration becomes politicised it is more 
prominent in political debate, but it is also both more salient and 
there is greater polarisation between political parties on the issue. 
Research has shown how attitudes to immigration and European 
integration now form part of a new dividing line, or cleavage, in 
European politics. This has also been portrayed as a dividing line 
between the winners and losers of globalisation or as between cos-
mopolitans and communitarians. The key observation is that sig-
nificant research evidence suggests that opposition to European 
10  Dennison and Geddes, op. cit.
11  Ibid
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integration and immigration now form a durable component of 
political contestation in Europe and that they can also structure 
competition between political parties. 12
4. Conclusion
This Chapter has explored some of the underlying political 
dynamics that have prefigured and configured the efforts to attain 
the Tampere objectives and those contained within subsequent 
programmes and agreements. Two main points have been made. 
First, that concern about large-scale migration – whether actual 
or potential – have played a key role in policy development since 
the 1990s and this seems set to continue. Second, since 1999, it is 
clearly the case that immigration has become a much more conten-
tious issue in European politics and that this, because of the shift of 
competences to EU level, has also led to politicisation of European 
integration. While it is not the case that attitudes to immigration 
have become less favourable, it is also the case that immigration 
has now become a powerful dividing line in EU politics between 
citizens and between member states.
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2. THE APPEAL TO TAMPERE’S 
POLITICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
FOR THE EU’S AFSJ
Dora Kostakopoulou
1. Introduction
We stand at a privileged position between the past and future on 
the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Tampere Programme.. 
This position enables us to assess the progress of the EU’s Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) since the Tampere European 
Council (15 and 16 October 1999), which adopted the Tampere 
Programme, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty ten years 
later (1 December 2009) and the Stockholm Programme (2010) 
while, at the same time, looking forward in the light of the 2030 
Global Agenda on Sustainable Development. 
The Global Agenda has devised important priorities and tar-
gets with a view to ‘stimulating action over the next fifteen years in 
areas of critical importance for humanity and the planet’. Among 
them is Goal 16 which sets out the aim of creating peaceful and 
inclusive societies. This includes the provision of access to jus-
tice for everyone and the development of ‘effective, accountable 
and inclusive institutions at all levels’.1 Demonstrating exceptional 
insight and political leadership, the Tampere Presidency Conclu-
1  UN General Assembly, Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, 21 October 2015, A/RES/70/1.
Table of Contents
20 PART I - The Lisbonisation of EU AFSJ Policies
sions also addressed this twenty years ago. 
The Tampere European Council initiated an ‘agenda of con-
sciousness’ for the EU AFSJ. The timing was perfect. The Treaty 
on European Union (TEU), which metamorphosed the EU into 
a political union in 1993, had brought migration, asylum and the 
residence of long term resident through country nationals within 
the ambit of the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar of the EU, while 
it had introduced the institution of Union citizenship in the EC 
Treaty. The next Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty, partially ‘Com-
munitarised’ the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar of the TEU by 
bringing inter alia migration and asylum issues into the Commu-
nity pillar. The Amsterdam Treaty came into force on 1 May 1999 
– a few months before the Tampere summit. 
When the Heads of State or Government met at Tampere, they 
agreed that ‘the challenge of the Amsterdam Treaty was to ensure 
that freedom, which includes the right to move freely throughout 
the Union, can be enjoyed in conditions of security and justice 
available to all. It is a project which corresponds to the frequently 
expressed concerns of citizens and has a direct bearing on their 
daily lives’2. 
For this reason, the adopted ‘Tampere Milestones’ were of con-
stitutional importance for the European Union. They were also 
normatively important for building ‘inclusive and peaceful socie-
ties’ in line with Goal 16 of the Global Agenda mentioned above. 
Their normative appeal was heightened by the attempted depolit-
icization of migration and asylum in European societies and a call 
for the transformation of personal and collective identities in the 
EU. 
2. Tampere’s Politics of Consciousness 
Tampere’s Milestone 1 noted that ‘from its very beginning Euro-
pean integration has been firmly rooted in a shared commitment 
to freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions and 
2  European Council, Tampere Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 15-16 October, SN 
200/99, Milestone 2, pp. 2-3.
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the rule of law. These common values have proved necessary for 
securing peace and developing prosperity in the European Union. 
They also serve as a cornerstone for the enlarging Union’. And 
Milestone 3 continued: 
This freedom should not, however, be regarded as the exclu-
sive preserve of the Union’s own citizens. Its very existence 
acts as a draw to many others world-wide who cannot 
enjoy the freedom Union citizens take for granted. It would 
be in contradiction with Europe’s traditions to deny such 
freedom to those whose circumstances lead them justifi-
ably to seek access to our territory. This in turn requires the 
Union to develop common policies on asylum and immi-
gration, while taking into account the need for a consistent 
control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and 
to combat those who organise it and commit related inter-
national crimes. These common policies must be based on 
principles which are both clear to our own citizens and also 
offer guarantees to those who seek protection in or access to 
the European Union.
Such milestones emphasised that the long-term project of Euro-
pean institutional design is anchored on freedom, human rights, 
democratic institutions and the rule of law. Tampere highlighted 
the fact that the EU is a political community based on fundamental 
values long before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty which 
expressly refers to Union’s values in Article 2 TEU. In these mile-
stones we also witness the linkages between internal mobility and 
the EU’s openness to ‘Others’, that is, to third country nationals 
seeking ‘protection in or access to the EU’. 
The formulation of common policies on asylum and migration 
based on a just and compassionate relationship with the Other 
were not seen as self-standing; they were correlative with, and 
co-dependent on, the presence of democratic institutions, respect 
for human rights and rule of law-based constitutional frameworks. 
In other words, in Tampere the Heads of State or Government of 
the Member States awoke the EU’s self-consciousness through  a 
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number of reflections on its role in the world and its entanglement 
with ‘Others’, that is, third country nationals seeking entry, resi-
dence or recognition and equal rights in the EU. The priority of 
this interrelationship is striking even today; it subverted the lan-
guage of market integration featuring in European Union docu-
ments and other insular monologues. 
For the first time, we have had an explicit recognition on the 
part of the leaders of the EU Member States that ‘the Other’ cannot 
be excluded from the internal process of EU’s self-development. 
This interplay between internality and externality created a vision 
of a different political space. A political space that goes beyond 
gestures of giving visibility to the claims of migrants and to the 
plight of refugees and asylum seekers and even beyond declara-
tions of condemnation of their unjust and disrespectful treatment. 
It was a vision about sharing a political space and, thus, a vision 
of creating a shared, common, political space based on mutual 
respect and principled politics. 
As Milestone 4 stated, ‘the aim is an open and secure Union, 
fully committed to the obligations of the Geneva Refugee Con-
vention and other relevant human rights instruments, and able 
to respond to humanitarian needs on the basis of solidarity. A 
common approach must also be developed to ensure the integra-
tion of those third country nationals who are lawfully resident in 
the Union’. In sum, the Tampere milestones showed that the EU is 
not a self-bounded and self-referential entity; it achieves its pres-
ence and purpose through reflection on its aims, objectives and 
values and on its relationship with its internal and external citizens 
and subjects. This means that the European integration process 
cannot be viewed as prior to, and independent from, how the EU 
regulates the European socio-political space and the role of human 
beings within it. 
3. The Politics of Respect for Fundamental Rights
Ten years later, the AFSJ’s Stockholm Programme built on Tam-
pere and adopted a number of ambitious policy orientations and 
23THE APPEAL TO TAMPERE’S POLITICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS FOR THE EU’S AFSJ - D. Kostakopoulou
priorities in order to make the AFSJ a reality. It brought forth a 
clear ‘citizens-oriented’ and ‘rights-based’ perspective and re-bal-
anced ‘freedom’ in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
As the Commission’s Action Plan Implementing the Stock-
holm Programme stated: ‘The main thrust of Union’s action in 
this field in the coming years will be ‘Advancing people’s Europe’, 
ensuring that citizens can exercise their rights and fully benefit 
from European integration. …A European area of freedom, secu-
rity and justice must be an area where all people, including third 
country nationals, benefit from the effective respect of the fun-
damental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union’. And under Priority 2, entitled ‘Ensuring 
the protection of fundamental rights’, it noted: ‘The protection of 
the rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which 
should become the compass for all EU law and policies, needs to 
be given full effect and its rights made tangible and effective. The 
Commission will apply a “Zero Tolerance Policy” as regards viola-
tions of the Charter’.3 
Migration and asylum laws and policies had to operate under 
the shadow of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. As regards 
migration, the Commission observed: ‘robust defence of migrants’ 
fundamental rights out of respect for our values of human dignity 
and solidarity will enable them to contribute fully to the European 
economy and society. Immigration has a valuable role to play in 
addressing the Union’s demographic challenge and in security the 
EU’s strong economic performance over the longer term. It has 
great potential to contribute to the Europe 2020 strategy, by pro-
viding an additional source of dynamic growth’.4 In addition, the 
Action Plan’s Annex on ensuring the protection of fundamental 
rights included seven concrete actions which had to be imple-
mented by 2011. 
3 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Par-
liament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Commit-
tee of the Regions, Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s cit-
izens – Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, Brussels, COM(2010) 
171, p. 3. 
4  Ibid, p. 7.
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Both Tampere’s ‘politics of consciousness’ and Stockholm’s ‘pol-
itics of respect for fundamental rights’ made it clear that breaches of 
fundamental rights, rule of law and democratic standards were not 
purely domestic, that is, national, matters. On the contrary, they 
were, and continue to be, vital issues of common European con-
cern. Such issues need to be dislodged from the anchor of national 
sovereignty because illiberal practices, infractions in the operation 
of democracy and human rights violations detrimentally affect the 
Union, the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and 
the EU’s relations with its citizens and subjects. Any departure 
from the constitutional fundamentals affects both the concrete 
operation and the legitimacy of the European Union in addition 
to placing individuals in precarious positions and restricting the 
exercise of their rights in the European political space. 
Tampere and Stockholm, therefore, delineated a principled 
way forward for many relevant contexts by showing the corre-
lation of issues and their importance for meaningful European 
cooperation and solidarity and for the betterment of the life words 
of human beings in the EU. For this reason, I would argue that 
the present challenge facing the European Union is not so much 
one of devising new priorities and policy-goals for the AFSJ, but 
of realising the proclamations of Tampere and Stockholm and 
implementing the priorities decided by European leaders twenty 
and ten years ago. It is certainly the case that concrete advances 
have been made since 1999 and 2009; the EU has now its legally 
binding ‘Bill of Rights’ which complements, updates and advances 
the European Convention on Human Rights. But at the same 
time, as certain Member States’ commitment to liberal democratic 
values becomes weakened and endangered by the aggressive mani-
festations of populist neo-nationalism and authoritarian executive 
rule, Tampere’s and Stockholm’s explicit call for a pan-European 
convergence on human connectivity, respect for the rule of law 
and respect for values becomes pertinent. 
In the face of binary oppositions, polarisation and divisions 
in European societies, increasing manifestations of racism, xen-
ophobia and hate speech and the disrespectful treatment of EU 
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citizens in certain Member States, EU institutions need to uphold 
the values of democratic engagement and respect for human rights 
and the rule of law. This should be done as a matter of principle. 
For respect for democracy is not tantamount to mobilising con-
sent, mirroring public opinion, and delivering effective executive 
governance. It is about airing the values of fundamental rights, 
promoting connectivity among people, individuals, groups, socie-
ties and governments, and eschewing rigidly stratified hierarchies 
among ‘us’ and ‘them’ and ‘in-betweens’. It is about respect for 
human dignity and the promotion of open and inclusive societies. 
Through concrete deeds, the EU must resist the otherisation 
of humanity, that is, the tendency of national executives and priv-
ileged majorities to separate, discriminate and stigmatise people 
or to make them non-persons which is prevailing, and expanding, 
in other parts of the world. It has to do the right thing in all its 
actions. 
For example, every year approximately one third of the new-
comers are children – many of them unaccompanied, who are in 
need of protection and not detention. Some governments have 
closed their ports to search and rescue boats leaving migrants 
and refugees, including children, stranded on board often without 
drinking water and food. There is also a gap between the EU’s 
internal fundamental rights policy and its external commitment 
to human rights and even with respect to the former significant 
challenges remain. Tackling racism, discrimination, intolerance 
and xenophobia is an urgent challenge. 
Ensuring that the Member States implement the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in their administrative, legislative and judi-
cial procedures and that their actions are Charter compliant, in 
line with their legal obligation to respect, observe and promote 
the application of the Charter,5 is another significant challenge. As 
the Commission’s Action Plan observed in 2010, ‘in a period of 
change, as the world only starts to emerge from the economic and 
financial crisis, the European Union has more than ever the duty to 
5  Article 51(1) EUCFR and Article 54 EUCFR on the prohibition of abuse of rights.
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protect and project our values and to defend our interests. Respect 
for the human person and human dignity, freedom, equality, and 
solidarity are our everlasting values at a time of unrelenting soci-
etal and technological change. These values must therefore be at 
the heart of our endeavours.’6
4. Conclusion 
Evidently, the Tampere and Stockholm programmes take us 
beyond the festival of breaches of the rule of law and the desired 
untrammelled dominance of executive ideologues we have been 
witnessing since 2015. We understand where we stand today in 
comparison to where we stood in 1999 and 2010 and what needs 
to be done. As a critique of the present and a principled vision for 
intersocietal and interpolitical life in the future, the Tampere Mile-
stones continue to be impressive!
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3. THE AFSJ TWO DECADES 
AFTER TAMPERE: 
INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE, 




While the October 1999 Tampere European Council meeting can 
be regarded as one of the most important European Council meet-
ings ever in terms of its impact on the subsequent evolution of 
the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) the major 
impetus it has given would not have been possible – and had as 
its essential basis – another breakthrough for what previously had 
been called Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) just a few months 
before: The entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1 May 
1999 with its major JHA reforms under Title IV TEC and Title VI 
TEU. 
In spite of the limitations of the 1999 reforms in terms of deci-
sion-making procedures and ‘pillarisation’ no subsequent over-
haul of the AFSJ, that of the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon included, has 
come close to the constitutional innovation and opening up of 
Table of ContentsTable of Contents
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new political and legal potentialities engendered by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. It is the great merit of the Tampere European Council 
to have acted upon and seized at least some of these potentiali-
ties, and have done so rapidly after the entry into force of the new 
Treaty, and the Finnish Presidency of 1999 should be given full 
credit for having created the framework for the EU’s Heads of State 
or Government to exercise a leadership which today is all too often 
missing.
The aim of this contribution is selective, focusing only on three 
aspects of the evolution of the AFSJ since the momentous year 
1999 but each of which can be regarded as being of constitutional 
importance in both a legal and a political sense: The institutional 
balance, the relation to the citizen as a beneficiary and the progress 
made with the principle of solidarity between Member States.
2. The Evolution of the Institutional Balance 
The question of the institutional balance is one of particular 
relevance in the EU context, both constitutionally and for poli-
cy-making outcomes, as each of  the main policy-making institu-
tions – the European Parliament (EP), the Council, the European 
Commission and (only formally vested with a legal status as such 
since the Lisbon Treaty) the European Council -  represents a dif-
ferent section of interests and legitimacy.1 Any shift in the balance 
means a shift in the balanced interaction between representatives 
of different interests with their specific claim to legitimacy, ren-
dered all the more important as the EU system is not based on a 
conventional concept of separation of powers.
In formal terms both the EP and the European Council have 
been strengthened by Amsterdam and Lisbon reforms, both gen-
erally and specifically as regards AFSJ:
1  For a discussion of various aspects of the concept of institutional balance see this re-
gard the Governance (2002). Special Issue on the Institutional Balance and the Future 
of EU Governance. Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and 
Institutions 15(3): 309-41, and Moskalenko, O. (2016), “The institutional balance: a ja-
nus-faced concept of EU constitutional law”, Politeja, No. 45: 125-144.
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The EP has benefited from the extension of co-decision to 
nearly all AFSJ fields, extended “consent” powers regarding inter-
national agreements (218(6) TFEU) as well as the attaining of full 
co-decision with Council under the budgetary procedure.
The position of the European Council has been reinforced by 
its formal recognition as an EU institution, enhanced continuity 
and visibility because of its permanent President, a new quasi-leg-
islative role because of its possibility to intervene in the ordinary 
legislative procedure in case of the activation of the “emergency 
brakes” in the criminal justice domain (Articles 82(3) and 83(3) 
TFEU) and, last but not least, through the now formalized power 
to define “strategic guidelines for legislative and operational plan-
ning” regarding the AFSJ (Article 68 TFEU).
The European Commission’s position, much strengthened 
by the Amsterdam Treaty, has been less so much by the Lisbon 
Treaty reforms. While the Council (of Ministers) has not lost any 
of its previously existing powers, it can be regarded as a relative 
loser compared to “old third pillar” times, because of the relative 
strengthening of the positions of both Parliament and European 
Council, to a lesser extent also because of the reinforcing of the 
Commission’s right of initiative by both the Amsterdam and 
Lisbon reforms. 
Institutional practice never exactly mirrors treaty changes, and 
if we look at the evolution of the institutional balance since Tam-
pere the same can also be observed with regard to the AFSJ: 
The EP’s ascendancy has not been as substantial and extensive 
as the treaty changes might have initially suggested. While there 
was a surge of EP political and scrutiny activism after the passage 
to co-decision in the “communitarised” (Title IV TEC) AFSJ fields 
in 2004 – with a strong focus on fundamental rights protection 
and asylum standards – The Parliament’s changed composition 
in 2009-2014 legislative term often resulted in European People’s 
Party (EPP) centered majorities which adopted positions rela-
tively close to those of the Council (such as in the case of the 2013 
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asylum package). During the last term (2014-2019) the EP then 
ended up on more than one occasion be outmaneuvered and mar-
ginalized by the Council (and indirectly the European Council) 
such as in the case of the 2015 Council Decision on relocation2 
where it was left with the unpleasant choice of either insisting on 
its full legislative co-decision rights or saving the contested relo-
cation scheme. The EP was also sidelined with regard to the deci-
sion-making on the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 20163 on 
the Facility for Refugees, deprived of any real say regarding the 
cooperation an “readmission arrangements” (different from “read-
mission agreements”) with countries such as Afghanistan4, Ethi-
opia, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal) and was unable to prevail on the 
Commission to suspend the EU-US Privacy Shield5 because of 
the ongoing concerns within the EP about adequate fundamental 
rights protections of data-subjects. 
Even some of the apparent breakthroughs for EP priorities in 
the AFSJ domain, if looked at more closely, cannot be regarded 
as indicators for a substantial  shift of the institutional balance in 
favour of the EP: One such case was the initial rejection of the 
EU-US Swift agreement in February 2010 – heralded at the time as 
a major assertion of the EP’s new external relations powers in the 
JHA domain - which was, however, followed in June 2010 by the 
Parliament’s endorsement of an in substance largely unchanged 
revised version6, mainly because of a shift of position by the Group 
2  Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece OJ L 
248, 24 September 2015. 
3  European Council document: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-re-
leases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/. 
4  The “arrangements” in the case of Afghanistan, for instance, have taken the form of 
a negotiated but legally not binding “Joint Way Forward” document on readmission 
agreed with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in October 2016 (https://eeas.europa.
eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_afghanistan_joint_way_forward_on_migration_issues.pdf) on 
which the EP was not even consulted.
5 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 on the adequacy 
of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, OJ L 207, 1 August 2016.  
6  Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the 
United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, OJ L 195, 27 
31THE AFSJ TWO DECADES AFTER TAMPERE - J.Monar
of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). 
Another example is the inclusion of the  Joint Parliamentary Scru-
tiny Group (JPSG) in the 2016 Europol Regulation7 for which the 
EP fought hard, but which cannot be regarded as an unqualified 
strengthening of the EP in the (particularly sensitive) police coop-
eration domain as it has to share membership of the JPSG with 
representatives of national parliaments which do not necessarily 
share its concerns and priorities.
Compared to the Parliament the European Council appears 
much more as the ‘winner’ of the evolution of the institutional bal-
ance since 1999, and this less so because of the aforementioned 
treaty changes but because of political and institutional practice. 
Several factors can be identified:
The first is the European Council’s self-affirmed role in broad 
political and even legislative planning for the AFSJ, as shown first 
by the initial five-year programmes (Tampere, Hague, Stock-
holm) then by the 2014 Strategic Guidelines and finally – though 
in a much less detailed form – by the 2019-2024 “New Strategic 
Agenda” adopted on 20 June 2019.
Another is the European Council’s unchallenged – and argu-
ably even more and more reinforced role – as supreme crisis man-
ager. After Tampere this was first shown forcefully after the 9/11 
attacks, and since repeatedly, with the 2015/16 refugee/migration 
crisis probably marking the peak so far. 
Last but not least the European Council’s heavy weight on the 
institutional balance is also shown through both its active engage-
ment in using mechanisms/tools outside of the EU legal frame-
work – such as in the case of the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement – 
and in encouraging and covering the use of such practices by the 
Council – such as in the case of the “readmission arrangements” 
with certain countries of origin and the use of the “EU Emergency 
July 2010.
7  Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 
2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), OJ 
L 135, 24 May 2016.
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Trust Fund for Africa”, launched in 2015, with its mixed financial 
arrangements in the migration domain, bypassing in that way 
normal EP scrutiny procedures.
On a number of important issues – such as that of the Sep-
tember 2015 relocation decisions and the repeated authorizations 
of extensions of the temporary reintroduction of internal border 
control by several Schengen members subsequent to the 2015/16 
crisis – the European Commission has appeared in recent years 
like an executive agent of Member States’ interests negotiated in 
European Council sessions rather than an independent initiator 
and motor of AFSJ policies. Often enough also the Council (of 
Ministers) has been superseded in crisis situations by the European 
Council as the main centre of decision-making, being reduced to 
the role of a ‘super-COREPER’ in terms of either preparing com-
promises at the Heads of State or Government level or dealing with 
the ‘fall-out’ of their decisions (or non-decisions) as, again, in the 
2015/16 migration/refugee crisis situation.
If the European Council has thus emerged also in the AFSJ 
context as the institution most benefitting from the evolution of 
the institutional balance this is not necessarily in all respects a 
negative evolution – especially when it comes to the need to act 
decisively, as it was clearly the case in the aftermath of 9/11 and 
in the 2015/16 Schengen crisis. Given the relative weakness of 
the European Commission it is difficult to see where else decisive 
decision-making should come from in today’s EU. However, the 
ascendancy of the European Council can obviously also be a factor 
of paralysis in case of persistent failure to arrive at a sustainable 
consensus – as in the case of the reform of the Dublin system, soli-
darity in the asylum/refugee policy domain and the Article 7 TEU 
responses to developments in Poland and Hungary. Needless to 
say that the lead role the European Council has assumed in the 
AFSJ domain does also not help with the parliamentary democ-
racy credentials of the EU, at least as far as the EP’s position is 
concerned.
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3. The Relation of the AFSJ to the Citizen as Beneficiary
As a fundamental treaty objective the AFSJ has also the distinc-
tion of being so far the only of the fundamental objectives which 
is explicitly “offered” to the EU’s citizens (Article 3(2) TEU), and a 
strong reference to citizens as the AFSJ’s intended beneficiaries was 
also made in paragraph 2 of the Tampere European Council Con-
clusions and – ten years later - again in the 2009-2014 Stockholm 
Programme whose primary stated objective was to strengthen the 
AFSJ “for the benefit of the citizens” and therefore to focus its fur-
ther development “on the interests and needs of citizens”.8
There can be no doubt that within the context of AFSJ the EU 
is delivering real added value compared to what purely national 
measures of the Member States could provide in terms of enhanced 
cross-border freedom, cross-border security and cross-border 
justice. In spite of its recent controversies and partial suspension 
the Schengen ‘open borders’ system, which is at the core of the 
AFSJ, constitutes an important element of ‘freedom’ within the 
EU. Citizens enjoy a higher degree of protection because of EU 
internal security and external border management cooperation - 
with the agencies playing an important role in this respect. Last 
but not least cross-border access to justice within the EU has been 
much improved. It has been frequently criticized that EU deci-
sion-makers have focused more on internal security and (restric-
tive) migration management than on ‘freedom’ and ‘justice’ within 
the AFSJ, but given that migration management and internal secu-
rity challenges rank high on the list of concerns of EU citizens – as 
regularly shown by Eurobarometer opinion polls  – this focus is 
surely not without its justification.     
Yet, the delivery by the EU on the fundamental treaty objective 
of the AFSJ remains fragile, patchy and largely remote from the 
citizens as its designated beneficiaries: It remains fragile because 
Member States have retained primary competence as well as exten-
8  European Council: The Stockholm Programme - An open and secure Europe serving 
and protecting the citizens, OJ C 115, 4 May 2010. 
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sive safeguards protecting national interests under the Treaties. The 
Schengen system is the primary – though not the only - example 
for this fundamental fragility of the AFSJ as it has not only been 
affected since the beginning of the AFSJ by the opt-outs granted to 
Ireland and the UK but also came close to disintegration during 
the 2015/16 migration/refugee crisis with five Member States still 
today applying controls at internal borders. The Schengen ‘open 
borders’ system remains most visible “freedom” dimension con-
nected with the AFSJ but this visibility cannot any longer be taken 
as a universally positive one, with many EU citizens in a context 
of populist fear-mongering, especially since the 2015/16 crisis, 
regarding the Schengen open borders as a problem and even a 
threat rather than an element of freedom. 
The AFSJ also remains patchy because AFSJ related EU policies 
have in many cases left wide margins of autonomy to both national 
legislation and national authorities when it comes to achieve 
common objectives: While these margins of autonomy have been 
narrowed in parts of civil and criminal justice cooperation as well 
as in the asylum field they continue to be significant even in those 
and remain very large indeed in the internal security and migra-
tion management fields. 
Last but not least, the EU citizen remains – except in the case 
of a very limited number of legal instruments establishing enforce-
able rights (such as the 2003 legal aid Directive9) - very much an 
‘indirect’ beneficiary of the AFSJ as the above mentioned clear ben-
efits are largely provided to him via the national authorities opera-
tionally in charge. The latter can indeed be regarded as the primary 
direct beneficiaries of the AFSJ because of the extensive facilitation 
and support which AFSJ legislation, structures and mechanisms 
offer to the cross-border cooperation between national authori-
ties. This is surely not a negative result as such – quite the contrary 
when it comes to identify value added of the AFSJ – but it means 
that the AFSJ remains ultimately fairly remote from and invisible 
9  Council Directive 2002/8/EC of 27 January 2003 to improve access to justice in 
cross-border disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for 
such disputes, OJ L 26, 31 January 2003. 
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to the EU citizen, with the positive effects of EU legislation and 
cooperation being largely ‘hidden’ behind the primary delivery of 
‘freedom, security and justice’ by national authorities. With respect 
to the contribution of the AFSJ to the European construction as a 
whole this seems regrettable as the only of the fundamental treaty 
objectives with a constitutionally provided link to European citi-
zens appears in practice more like an ‘area’ for Member State coop-
eration than one for citizens. This makes it unlikely that that the 
AFSJ can help the Union much with its current challenges of con-
testation and questioned legitimacy.
4. Solidarity as a Constitutional Principle
If one looks at the Tampere European Council Conclusions today 
one of its most striking ‘blank spots’ is the absence of any explicit 
reference to EU “solidarity” with regard to the asymmetric pres-
sures Member States may be facing, especially as regards asylum 
and immigration policy and external border management. How-
ever, there  is a rather prudently formulated mentioning of at least 
one solidarity dimension in paragraph 16 where one reads that “the 
European Council believes that consideration should be given to 
making some form of financial reserve available in situations of 
mass influx of refugees for temporary protection”, and it should 
be mentioned that Article 41 TEU, introduced by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, had at the time just opened the possibility to charge 
JHA administrative and operational expenditure also in the “third 
pillar” domains to the EU budget. 
Yet these were still rather tentative initial steps at the time of 
Tampere, and the increasing recognition – and codification within 
the Treaties (especially through the Lisbon reforms, mainly Article 
80 TFEU) – of the principle of solidarity which we have seen since 
can arguably be regarded as one of the most significant constitu-
tional developments in the context of the AFSJ over the last 20 
years. Solidarity is, of course, not only a financial issue, and within 
the AFSJ solidarity is today provided by host of different mecha-
nisms (information sharing, deployment of experts, border guards) 
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and structures (Europol, Eurojust, the European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency and Corps, the European Asylum Support Office) 
well beyond the allocation of supporting financial resources. With 
major asymmetric pressures on Member States in key policy fields 
the AFSJ can serve as good indicator for the progress and the per-
sisting limitations of solidarity between Member States within the 
EU more generally:
On the one hand one can clearly conclude on a significant 
growth of solidarity instruments and mechanisms in the fields of 
asylum, migration and external border management. The finan-
cial and operational solidarity mechanisms also serve at least to 
some extent the purpose of providing assistance to the Member 
States which are subject most to asymmetric pressures, and the 
overall increase in volume of the financial solidarity instruments 
under the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 
at a time of prevailing austerity both at the European and the 
national level indicates a higher political priority for solidarity in 
the JHA domain. It is worth underling also that operational soli-
darity through the making available of national capabilities (in the 
context of “joint operations” and the sharing of joint capabilities 
through the AFSJ agencies) has not only become a very substantial 
dimension of solidarity within the AFSJ, but arguably also its most 
sophisticated and-compared to traditional financial assistance 
instruments-most original form. 
On the other hand, however, the limitations of solidarity within 
the AFSJ remain significant:10 Although the legal framework has 
been strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty reforms of 2009 (espe-
cially through aforementioned Article 80 TFEU) and recent leg-
islation and financial solidarity instruments have been expanded 
significantly there are still limitations to the duty to assist or the 
right to be assisted, and the content of the principle remains only 
vaguely undefined. The overall EU financial support volume also 
10  A critical review of different dimensions of solidarity within the AFSJ is offered by. 
in the special issue TD. Thym and E. Tsurdi (eds) (2017), “Searching for solidarity in 
the EU asylum and border policies: Constitutional and operational dimensions”, Maas-
tricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 24: pp. 605-762.
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remains rather modest in comparison with the extent of the asym-
metric challenges some Member States are facing, and it allows 
primarily only for ‘reactive’ short-term emergency and pilot 
scheme support-which makes it difficult to address more funda-
mental asymmetric challenges and structural capacity deficits of 
Member States. A further problem is the comparatively weaker 
development of solidarity instruments in the fields of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters relative, although major 
risk and capacity imbalances between Member States also exist in 
these fields.
Overall solidarity in the EU justice and home affairs domain 
can today clearly be regarded as a reality, which it was not yet 
in any substantive sense at the time of the Tampere European 
Council twenty years ago, but also as a still fragile and incomplete 
one. Its progress seems to depend more on pressures reaching the 
stage where they can put the sustainability of the AFSJ and hence 
the interests of most or all Member States at risk-as this was the 
case during the 2015/2016 migration/refugee crisis-rather than a 
permanent strong commitment to help Member States affected by 
serious pressures and capacity deficits. 
For solidarity in the EU more generally this means that in a 
policy domain where there are clearly identifiable solidarity needs 
an essentially functional rationale prevails: Solidarity instruments 
are primarily considered useful and necessary only to avert sys-
temic risks, and they are consequently mostly designed to address 
situations in which such risks can become acute. This does not 
only privilege short-term ‘reactive’ responses over more long-term 
‘proactive’ policies but also shows that solidarity in the EU is still 
more of an instrument to address certain functional challenges 
rather than a community value and constitutional principle. 
The next 2021-2027 MFF will largely determine to what extent 
the EU on its own can be become active (or not) on the solidarity 
side and thus be a crucial test for the Member States’ willingness to 
fill this principle, which is both of major constitutional and policy 
relevance, with more substance.
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4. TWENTY YEARS LATER: THE 
LEGACY OF THE TAMPERE 
CONCLUSIONS
Kimmo Nuotio
The Tampere Summit was a milestone as was the entering into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty ten years ago. It is the right time today 
to reflect on both what has been achieved as well as on what should 
be done in the years to come.1 In fact, when we read the Tampere 
conclusions today, we find surprisingly many ideas which con-
tinue to be relevant today. Tampere not only set the AFSJ high on 
the political agenda, but we find important references to a com-
mitment to European values as well: human rights, democratic 
institutions, rule of law.  
The development of EU in its legal dimensions has some inter-
esting features. There have been times of rapid development, and 
preceded or followed again maybe by years of slow progress. AFSJ 
has not been an exception. Often, in order to move fast, a sense 
of crises has been needed. The first years of the new Millenium 
were marked by a determination as regards AFSJ policies. The 
difference compared to the Maastricht era, when rather little was 
achieved, was significant. The fight against terrorism and the meas-
ures against organized crime, two high-profile criminal law topics, 
were suddenly very much in the focus. The framework decision 
1  As regards a first such review, please refer to Frände, D., Liukkunen, U., 
Sankari, S. and E. Storskrubb (2006).
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on Terrorist Offences and on the European Arrest Warrant were 
passed in 2002 as urgent matters. These negotiations were carried 
out under heavy pressures. The adoption of the two FD’s were a 
sign of that finally the EU was able to introduce measures which 
changed the entire legal landscape in the area of legal cooperation 
in the field of criminal law. The push for reform was strong, even if 
it was clear that this was not an easy exercise. 
Preparations for the constitutional treaty and drafting of 
Charter on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms were soon started. 
The Schengen law became part of EU regulations. Eurojust was 
launched. Both the pace and the level of ambition were breath-
taking. Even though the preparations for the Constitutional Treaty 
failed, the main contents of that draft were included in the Lisbon 
Treaty, which once again reorganized much of the legal frame-
works of this area, and become another milestone. 
If we now look back and search for ways to describe the (hi)
story of 20 years since the Tampere, what would be the words best 
to capture the essential about these processes of development? 
What is the legacy of Tampere?
Especially if we think about the justice and home affairs, we 
could talk about maturing. Before the Lisbon Treaty, the limits of 
the legislative mandates were unsure and the ECJ had to pass rul-
ings on disputes between the Commission and the Council. The 
Parliament only had a marginal role. A strong strategic push from 
the European Council was needed. The protection of the funda-
mental rights as well as the law-making ‘EU constitutional pro-
cesses’ were underdeveloped, which risked leading to imbalances.
The Lisbon Treaty created a much more coherent framework. 
The (formal) introduction of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms was particularly important since the developments 
of EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice concerned topics that 
were particularly sensitive as regards the protection of the rights of 
the individuals. The aim for the EU to join the European Conven-
tion of Human Rights deserves a mention as well, even though this 
process has faced some rather serious hurdles.    
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Since the Lisbon times, a legally more balanced approach 
has prevailed, but the home work of updating the FD’s of the 
Amsterdam era is still far from completed. Maturing thus also 
means taming of some of the excesses. The post-Tampere period 
was a period of strong political steering and also of experimenting, 
and this period become something special also due to the rise of 
security issues around the globe – a process which was, to some 
extent, a coincidence.    
There were, however, other signs of maturing as well than just 
the constitutional development: the discussions on the criminal 
policy principles for the EU should be seen in that light. The new 
principles that both the Commission and the European Parlia-
ment subscribed were also built on scholarly views and the long 
European legal tradition.2 The criminal law scholars had felt that a 
set of principles should be formulated so that the European law in 
this area would better fit the ways in which these things were dealt 
with within the spheres of the member states.     
In Tampere, the mutual recognition principle was recognized 
as the cornerstone principle. The EAW system replaced the bur-
densome and time-consuming extradition procedures of previous 
years. Mutual recognition principle was built on mutual trust, or 
rather, the presumption of mutual trust.
The problem today is, however, that this presumption of mutual 
trust may sometimes be contested. This is only logical: trust cannot 
be blind. Experiences of injustice are particularly informative. 
Amartya Sen has presented the idea that we do not need to know 
what perfect justice is since as long as we identify injustices, we can 
navigate our way further.3 We need to be careful in that we address 
issues of justice and injustice, if we wish to build trust.  
2  Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies 
through criminal law. Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions. Brussels 20.9.2011, COM(2011) 573 final; European Parliament resolu-
tion of 22 May 2012 on an EU approach to criminal law (2010/2310(INI). 
3  Sen, A. (2009).
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As regards the EAW, the European Parliament has in 2014 
invited the Commission to initiate a process of amending the FD 
on the EAW in order to fix a set of obvious problems of the original 
FD. The fix would include the inclusion of a proportionality test 
which would help avoid abuse of the EAW. Thus far, the Commis-
sion has yet not taken this further.4   
The issues regarding rule of law problems which have to do with 
possible interferences in justice in domestic legal systems have fur-
ther stressed the need to ensure that the rights of the individual are 
not at stake when the European systems are at work. One of the 
recent examples of such issues is the EUCJ case LM C216/18 PPU, 
a request for a preliminary ruling from an Irish court in a case con-
cerning surrender of the suspect to Poland on the basis of the EAW. 
EUCJ ruled in July 2018 that it is very central that independent 
courts are able to give full legal protection to the individuals that 
face a surrender. It thus confirmed the idea that trust cannot be 
blind, but the legal protection needs to be looked at in the circum-
stances of the individual case.5 In today’s Europe the issues relating 
to the rule of law have become real challenges. At the same time as 
the legal frameworks on the EU level have matured, paradoxically, 
the rule of law problems on the national level have become visible 
and are, for good reasons, receiving increasingly attention. 
The principle of mutual recognition has the advantage that it 
can be used even when the national norms have not been unified. 
Over the years it has, in any case, become obvious, that the core 
values need to be shared by all key actors in the field. Otherwise 
the principle of mutual recognition itself starts losing its ration-
ality. We have been experimenting, and we have learned a lot.     
This reminds me of the story of Billy Bixbee who finds a tiny 
dragon in his bedroom. His mom tells him, “There’s no such thing 
as a dragon!” This only makes the dragon get bigger. He grows, 
and grows, and grows, until he’s bigger than Billy’s house. Only 
when the mom admits that the dragon exists, it starts to shrink. 
We should be mindful of this lesson and not let the dragon grow 
5  Case C216/18 PPU, EUCJ, Judgement 25 July 2018 (Grand Chamber). 
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too big. 
The rule of law principle was the background presupposition 
behind much collaboration, and one which has become all the 
more important due to the wide application of legal instruments 
based on the mutual recognition principle. It has kind of come as a 
surprise that this principle, which never in fact was clearly legally 
formulated, no longer can be taken for granted, but requires dis-
cussion, explication, and attention.
Another catchword would be comprehensiveness, even holistic 
approach. This has become increasingly visible through the devel-
opments during recent post-Lisbon years. In the latest phase we 
have started speaking about sustainability, development, and cli-
mate change. The references to UN agenda 2030 are getting fre-
quent. European security is no longer an internal matter only, but 
also has to do with what happens outside of Europe; in Africa, for 
instance.  The links between the EU’s internal and external policies 
have become obvious together with a more global nature of the 
phenomena to be addressed. 
In the UN SDGs rule of law counts as one of the 17 goals. The 
interesting phenomenon is that in fact rule of law development 
serves many other goals as well. This is what we have learned from 
the law and development discussions more generally. So, we are 
not only seeing consolidation and progress, but we more and more 
understand the necessity of a holistic approach based on shared 
values and principles. The trust necessary for the AFSJ to work 
properly requires a commitment to several ideas at the same time. 
Rule of law needs to be complied with, but the legal protection 
requires more than just that: the rights of the individual need to be 
protected, regardless in which role we face the law. We need rights 
of fair trial and rights of the defense. But we need services and 
rights for the victims as well. We need a functioning democracy. 
There was an awareness of all that already in Tampere, but it all has 
become more clear over the years.  
There are no short term wins you could get by compromising 
44 PART I - The Lisbonisation of EU AFSJ Policies
the core values. Maybe this is the biggest lesson of the entire exer-
cise. There is no security without first making sure that the rights 
of the individual are effectively protected. We cannot trade off 
rights and freedoms against more security. There is something 
peculiar in the way AFSJ was introduced, since we actually started 
more with topics of security than on rights and justice. The meas-
ures against terrorism were leaning towards security, but if we look 
back, the measures were not that radical and did not change the 
balance of weights completely. It was still ordinary law, not any 
emergency legislation. The difference to the approach in the USA 
was significant.       
We find in the European Council Strategic Agenda references 
to the significance of the protection of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the people. It seems that the approach of the EU is 
today more strategic, and more visionary than before: EU operates 
in the world, and brings forward values of sustainability, resilience, 
development.6
When we look at Europe in a global setting, we also start rec-
ognizing its profile more clearly. Europe stands out in its commit-
ment to high legitimacy of law. This can be seen, for instance, in 
the measures against terrorism. The Charter, as well as the position 
of the European human rights law are renowned examples of the 
European approach. Europe is maybe even more internationally 
known for its values than for the individual measures of coop-
eration between the member states. It seems that the European 
Council which for long was the central strategic instructor of the 
policies in the field now already wishes to leave the details more to 
be dealt with on other fora.
New topics continue arising. The megatrend of digitalization 
concerns criminal justice as well. Issues of e-evidence are now on 
the drawing board, as well as e-justice more generally. The Finnish 
EU presidency has also introduced sustainability as the lead term. 
We read the following (emphasis, KN)7:
6  European Council (2019).
7  Sustainable Europe – Sustainable Future. Finland’s Presidency Program. Presidency 
of the Council of Europe 1 July – 31. December 2019, p. 11. https://eu2019.fi/doc-
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The EU has a key role in promoting a comprehensive approach 
to security in Europe. By combating cross-border crime and 
terrorism, and by efficient border management, the EU and 
its Member States can make the EU a safer place to live. This 
calls for a reduction in inequalities.
The overall internal security of the EU should be approached 
on a broad front, combining crime prevention with law-en-
forcement cooperation, judicial cooperation, border man-
agement, civil protection and other relevant sectors.
The EU Internal Security Strategy has provided a sustain-
able framework for concrete cooperation. Now is the time to 
evaluate its strengths and weaknesses. We need to identify 
possible threats to internal security in order to strengthen 
our response, keeping in mind the ever stronger nexus 
between internal and external security. 
Reacting to crime requires full commitment to rule of law. And 
much more, as inclusive policies, crime prevention, need to be in 
its place as well. I personally welcome a holistic, comprehensive 
approach. We need to see that development requires sensitivity as 
regards breaches or challenges to justice. Amartya Sen in fact has 
it. There may be a sense in which we are going towards under-
standing the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in terms of 
Senian human development. Even if this may sound a bit as exag-
geration, understanding the core values broadly rather than nar-
rowly seems to lead to more sound and balanced view, especially if 
we look at the long term development.      
A global perspective and an integrated and comprehensive 
approach to security has also been stressed by the president-elect 
Ursula von der Leyen of the EU Commission.8 It follows that 




8   A Union that strives for more (2019), p. 19.
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own solutions to challenges such as instability, cross-border terrorism 
and organised crime”. von der Leyen, also, among other things, 
proposes that the mandate of the EPPO should be broadened to 
cover terrorist offences. This proposal is interesting in that sense 
that they are rather few doubts concerning that fact the member 
states would not have actively investigated and prosecuted ter-
rorist offences.   
Anyway, I believe there is much sense in having a broad 
approach. It is highly important not to see that even many crime 
phenomena are closely linked with social issues of exclusion and 
marginalization. The first year of the new millennium took the 
security issues very high on the agenda. Professor Kaarlo Tuori 
has underlined that often one aspect has dominated the scene in 
the constitutional development of EU. Security constitutions tell 
about that; when security is the lead star, constitution gets weaker.9 
With the Lisbon Treaty the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
has got a more balanced frame, one which promises of a more bal-
anced relationship between the freedom, security and justice.
If 15 years ago it would have been rather strange to talk about 
anything like a shared European sense of justice, today we are 
seeing a development which has some potential in that regard. 
There are two reasons for that: 1) Europe, as part of the world. The 
European values seem strong and different, when seen in the global 
context. 2) The maturing of the EU in dealing with sensitive issues 
AFSJ, and the learning that JHA needs an approach different from 
the internal market. It needs an approach, a policy, which recog-
nizes the need for a non-instrumental approach. 
Criminal law is a product of enlightenment, and the EU pol-
icies should be informed by these traditions. And this is what is 
happening. EU AFSJ needs to be something which is working and 
effective, but which enjoys a high legitimacy and trust. Together 
with the high legitimacy and trust comes also the high effectivity.  
The same tension deserves notice also as concerns the relation-
9  Tuori (2010).
47TWENTY YEARS LATER: THE LEGACY OF THE TAMPERE CONCLUSIONS - K. Nuotio
ship between the EU policy-making and the UN sustainable devel-
opment goals.  The point is that the development goals are valuable 
even for countries which are more developed, since we all need to 
develop further. We need to be able to tackle new types of threats, 
security threats etc. Inequalities, poverty, climate change, all these 
are causing us security threats in the long run. We need to learn 
from the best practices of our member states how to tackle these. 
And we all have a lot to do. But we need to be clear about our 
values. We cannot support sustainable development of our socie-
ties, and other societies outside there in the world, unless we build 
on the values and principles that give the backbone for it all.    
The trio joint programme of Romanian, Finnish and Croatian 
Presidencies from December 2018 carries similar values. With 
respect to cooperation in the field of justice, the Trio underlines 
the importance of further advancing mutual recognition. The Trio 
commits to further promote e-Evidence and e-Justice. The Trio 
would also pay attention to the operationalisation of EPPO and to 
strengthening cooperation with OLAF.10 
Thus, in all, we start to see links between topics that used not 
to be that clearly connected. Rule of law and mutual recognition. 
Rule of law and trust. Rule of law and development. Rule of law 
and sustainability. Rule of law and human rights. Human rights 
and democracy and rule of law. Human rights and anti-terrorism. 
When we refer to an Area of freedom, security and justice, we 
do not wish to give a priority to any single of the three values. We 
need freedom and security and justice, all at the same time. If we 
adopt a development perspective, it is all about addressing injus-
tices, learning how to do this, for the sake of serving human devel-
opment, which means, finally freedom. Seeing AFSJ in the context 
of sustainability makes us see the connections better. 
I believe that this becoming visible in the EU documents is the 
true sign of maturing.  The law in this fields needs to draw on legit-
imacy and shared values as recognized by the member states legal 
10  Brussels, 30. November 2018, 14518/18, POLGEN 217. http://data.consilium.europa.
eu/doc/document/ST-14518-2018-INIT/en/pdf
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orders and the foundational documents of the EU and the Council 
of Europe. When building on that, when being seen in a context, 
it all becomes easier and clearer. A shared view on the basics helps 
all the actors to align their actions. 
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5. TAMPERE PROGRAMME 
20 YEARS ON: PUTTING EU 
PRINCIPLES AND INDIVIDUALS 
FIRST  
Sergio Carrera1
Respecting the ‘rules of the club’ and playing one’s proper part in sol-
idarity with fellow Europeans cannot be based on a penny-pinching 
cost-benefit analysis along the lines (familiar, alas, from Brexi-
teer rhetoric) of ‘what precisely does the EU cost me per week and 
what exactly do I personally get out of it?’ Such self-centredness is 
a betrayal of the founding fathers’ vision for a peaceful and pros-
perous continent. It is the antithesis of being a loyal Member State 
and being worthy, as an individual, of shared European citizenship. 
If the European project is to prosper and go forward, we must all do 
better than that.
Advocate General Sharpston Opinion, October 20192 
1  This Chapter is based on S. Carrera (2020), 20 Years Anniversary of the 
Tampere Programme: Securitization, Intergovernmentalism and Infor-
malisation, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, forth-
coming. 
2  Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Cases C-715/17 Commission 
v. Poland, C-718/17 Commission v. Hungary and C-719/17 Commission v. 
Czech Republic, EU:C:2019:917.
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1. Introduction: From Justice and Home Affairs to an Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice
The 1999 Tampere Programme Conclusions marked the start of 
a new phase for the EU. Since the entry into force of the Maas-
tricht Treaty in 1993, European cooperation on justice and inte-
rior portfolios fell under the label of ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ 
(JHA). EU JHA policies were placed under the EU’s former ‘Third 
Pillar’, which meant they escaped EC Treaties’ guarantees and were 
driven by, first, intergovernmentalism and nationalism; second, a 
lack of democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament and no 
judicial control by the Court of Justice of the EU; and third, a weak 
fundamental rights framework safeguarding individual’s rights 
(Guild, Carrera and Eggenschwiler, 2010). 
The Tampere Programme was anchored in a principled agenda 
grounded on a commitment to the European integration’s founda-
tions of ‘freedom’, based on the common values of human rights, 
democratic institutions and the rule of law. It set the objective 
of an ‘open and secure European Union, fully committed to the 
obligations of the Geneva Refugee Convention and other relevant 
human rights instruments’. The Tampere Milestones signified a 
first step towards the building of a common EU framework ben-
efitting from EU democratic rule of law and fundamental rights 
protections. A new label was used – instead of JHA – to better 
capture that aspiration: an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AFSJ). 
It took until December 2009, with the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, for that goal to find direct expression inside the 
Treaties, in what is now Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) (Articles 67-89). The Lisbon Treaty 
‘constitutionalized’ many of the principles and priorities enshrined 
in the Tampere Programme (Carrera, 2012). The ‘Lisbonization’ of 
the AFSJ brought a majority of these policies under the Commu-
nity method of cooperation and shared competence between the 
EU and Member States. 
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The intended goal was the liberalization and application of EU 
democratic rule of law checks and balances over all AFSJ policies, 
including those related to police and criminal justice cooperation 
(Carrera, Guild and Balzacq, 2010). This entailed limiting the role 
and discretion of Member States’ Ministries of Interior inside 
the Council, recognizing the European Parliament’s equal role as 
co-legislator (Carrera, Hernanz and Parkin, 2013), and granting 
full jurisdiction to the Luxembourg Court to interpret and review 
the legality of EU and Member States’ acts. 
The Lisbon Treaty brought another far-reaching contribution. 
It placed The EU’s foundational principles and their substance to 
the forefront in Articles 2, 3, 4 and 6 of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU). This led to the realization that the respect of prin-
ciples like the rule of law, fundamental rights and non-discrimi-
nation is a condicio sine qua non for mutual trust and legitimation 
in AFSJ policies, particularly in those relying on the principle of 
mutual recognition of decisions. 
This also resulted in the conversion of the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights (EUCFR) into the Union’s legally binding ‘Bill of 
Rights’, which, together with the citizenship of the Union and the 
AFSJ, aimed at “placing the individual at the heart of its activities”. 
Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty called for EU common policies 
on asylum, external borders and immigration to be based on the 
principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility (Article 80 
TFEU), and the fair treatment of third country nationals. Article 
78(1) TFEU subjects EU asylum policies to a benchmark consisting 
of an unequivocal compliance with the international human rights 
principle of non-refoulement and the Geneva Refugee Convention.
This Chapter argues that notwithstanding the principled guide-
book provided by the Tampere Programme, now enshrined and 
consolidated in the Lisbon Treaty, some of the most important EU 
legal and policy developments have directly and even consciously 
contravened and jeopardized these foundational principles. Some 
policy and legal instruments have been the result of disloyal, 
unconscious and self-centred ways of cooperation. They have also 
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meant displacing the individuals’ at the periphery of EU AFJS pol-
icies. 
Policy shaping and making in these policy domains have often 
been justified ‘in the name of crises’ affecting some EU Member 
States and, by association, the EU’s own legitimation. Most recent 
historical instances have included the so-called ‘EU 2015 humani-
tarian and solidarity refugee crisis’ or various terrorism acts in sev-
eral European cities. The politics of crisis utilized by home affairs 
and security actors can be read as strategies to reinvigorate or ‘rein-
jecting back’ ways of doing things at EU venues following similar 
long-standing logics of past EU JHA cooperation and consisting of 
securitization, intergovernmentalism and informalization. 
2. Securitization
‘Crises’ are well known to serve as political catalysts for the adop-
tion of previously existing and controversial ideas, offering new 
momentum for their expedited adoption in the name of emer-
gency (Carrera, Santos Vara and Strik, 2019). Crisis are productive 
and opportunistic. The EU AFJS has been particularly sensitive to 
‘crisis labelling’ and ‘events-driven’ politics. There is indeed little 
‘new under the sun’ when it comes to the role of ‘crises’ in policy 
making and more concretely EU AFSJ cooperation. 
It is by now well known that ‘crises’ have served as key catalysts 
or motors of Europeanisation dynamics. They have in turn secured 
continuation and reinvigoration of priorities set by Interior Minis-
tries and EU home affairs actors, which have continued pursuing 
an insecurity and policing rationale over areas as diverse, and het-
erogeneous from security, as migration, asylum and judicial coop-
eration in criminal matters (Carrera, 2018). 
Latest AFSJ developments show how this insecurity rationale 
has overtaken a traditional ‘judicial cooperation in criminal mat-
ters’ approach in countering crime. The resulting picture has been 
a blurring of the security and justice dimensions under the AFSJ 
rubric, giving preference to security over democratic rule of law 
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and liberty. Such blurred boundaries are of major concern as 
they pose profound challenges to the fundamental rights toolbox 
enshrined in Title VI of the EUCFR (Justice) and, more generally, 
to the principle of effective judicial and legal protection of indi-
viduals’ rights envisaged in Article 19(1) TEU. This last provision 
celebrates the key role of independent justice and judicial review 
in the AFSJ, which in turn lays at the core of EU rule of law. 
Recent legislative and policy developments lend support to this 
argument: the E-Evidence proposals (Section 2.1), the 2019 EU 
Interoperability Regulations (Section 2.2) and EU asylum policy 
(Section 2.3). 
2.1. E-Evidence 
In April 2018, the European Commission adopted two legislative 
proposals on the gathering and use of electronic information held 
by private companies for law enforcement and criminal investi-
gations (European Production and Reservation Orders, EPO-PR 
or ‘E-Evidence’). The proposals would grant Member States’ law 
enforcement authorities extraterritorial jurisdiction to have direct 
access to individuals’ data held by a company in another EU 
country. The EPO-PR would impose a legal obligation on these 
companies to allow access to the data sought. As opposed to the 
model envisaged in the European Investigation Order (EIO), the 
EPO-PR would operate without any systematic involvement by 
the judicial authorities in the Member State of execution, that is, 
where the company is located or providing its services.
The E-Evidence proposals are currently under inter-institu-
tional negotiations. Unsurprisingly, they are proving to be contro-
versial inside the European Parliament in respect of issues such 
as their overall necessity, lack of proportionality, and incompati-
bility with EU fair trial and privacy safeguards. The proposals have 
been presented as an instrument of EU criminal justice cooper-
ation. However, the proposals’ aim is one predominantly driven 
by a law enforcement focus on countering crime, therefore corre-
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sponding with ‘police cooperation’. Alienating the role played by 
independent judicial authorities in the Member State of execution 
while placing private companies at the epicentre of this model 
stands at odds with the EU principle of mutual recognition (Car-
rera and Mitsilegas, 2017). 
2.2. Interoperability 
Interoperabiltiy constitutes another case in point. The EU counts 
a broad array of information systems and databases holding indi-
viduals’ information for various purposes, under the management 
of the eu-LISA agency. These include the Schengen Information 
System II (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), Eurodac, 
the European Criminal Records Information System for Third-
Country Nationals (ECRIS-TCN), the Entry/Exit System (EES) 
and the European Travel Information and Authorisation System 
(ETIAS). The adoption of the EU Interoperability Regulations in 
2019 has represented another crucial step forward in EU databases 
policy making. 
The Interoperability Regulations aim at increasing the inter-
connectedness between all existing EU databases and significantly 
expanding accessibility by national police or LEAs in countering 
crime, as well as by the Frontex (the European Border and Coast 
Guard, EBCG) agency. The political goal attributed to the need of 
checking a person’s identity inside the EU involves expanding the 
instances in which EU and national security professionals respon-
sible for investigating, detecting and/or prosecuting serious crime 
or terrorism will have access to and use asylum seekers’ data. 
The legal complexity of these Regulations is staggering. Little 
consideration has been given to the implications of Interopera-
bility and the reframing of Eurodac database as a law enforcement 
tool over the criminalization of asylum seekers. This runs con-
trary to the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention benchmark, which 
expressly prohibits the penalization of people seeking international 
protection. The discrimination and stigmatization risks that can be 
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expected to affect certain groups in society, in particular those of 
non-national origin and people seeking international protection, 
have been equally disregarded. 
The Interoperability Regulations create an asymmetry in access 
rights by digital citizens. EU privacy and data protection confer to 
individuals – irrespective of their legal status – the ownership of 
their data (Carrera, 2020). The expansionism characterizing the 
policing of access to EU databases has not been accompanied by 
an equally expanded access by individuals to justice venues and 
independent complaint mechanisms in cases where their rights are 
violated during identity checks. A similar asymmetric gap exists 
in respect of the increasing operational roles played by Frontex 
and eu-LISA agencies, the mandates of which should be revised 
to ensure higher legal, democratic and judicial accountability and 
an interoperable justice framework consistent of independent com-
plaint mechanisms for affected individuals.
2.3. Asylum 
A similar securitization logic has contaminated the latest develop-
ments on EU asylum policy. A majority of the more recent Com-
mission legislative proposals to reform the EU Dublin Regulation 
aimed at reframing some already existing EU asylum legal instru-
ments in the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) as secu-
rity tools characterized by a punitive, containment-driven, crim-
inalizing and expulsions-driven logic (Carrera and Cortinovis, 
2019). An illustrative case in point has been the political priority 
given to prevent and fight the so-called ‘secondary movements’ of 
asylum seekers inside the EU. 
The proposals included procedural and material sanctions, 
including cutting of judicial and asylum procedures guaran-
tees, increased use of detention and unlawfully restricting access 
to reception conditions for individuals’ not staying in the state 
responsible for assessing their asylum claim in line with the EU 
Dublin Regulation and the ‘first irregular entry’ criterion. They 
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entail an equally problematic framing of intra-EU mobility or 
‘onward movements’ by people seeking international protection as 
irregular, quasi-criminal and illegitimate. Their compatibility with 
the right to seek asylum in Article 18 EUCFR is highly question-
able, if not illusory. 
The EU notion of ‘secondary movements’ has proved to be 
flawed. It disregards the fact that intra-EU mobility is not always 
a question of ‘free choice’ or ‘voluntary preference’ by individuals. 
‘Mutual Trust’ in the functioning of the CEAS cannot be taken 
for granted. The Luxembourg Court has confirmed that there is 
not such a thing like ‘blind trust’ among EU member states on the 
basis that any of them can be always considered ‘safe’ for asylum 
seekers. This presumption is rebuttable. 
Several cases have shown that, in practice, member states expe-
rience major operational and structural deficiencies, which some-
times are even systemic, in their asylum systems. Therefore, there 
may be very legitimate reasons for people to seek safety elsewhere. 
These may relate to degrading reception and living conditions, 
exclusion from social assistance, poverty, insecure residency status, 
institutional discrimination, the lack of durable life opportunities 
and family links (Carrera, Cortinovis, Stefan and Luk, 2019).
3. Intergovernmentalism and Informalization
Since 2015, we have witnessed several instances where the Euro-
pean Council and member state governments, making use of 
crisis-labelling politics, have started to act outside of or in direct 
contravention to EU Treaty and AFSJ law commitments. The Euro-
pean Council and some EU Member States’ Ministries of Interior 
have played a crucial role in re-injecting intergovernmentalism – 
JHA rationale – and informal or ‘flexible’ patterns of transnational 
cooperation in communitarized EU AFSJ policies. 
Contrary to preliminary expectations that the European Par-
liament was the key beneficiary of the ‘Lisbonisation’ of AFSJ 
policies, the European Council has been in practice the actual 
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winner. While the European Council has a clear role attributed in 
the Lisbon Treaty, it is very problematic that it has often acted in 
direct contravention of EU law and principles laying at the basis 
of EU constitutional Treaty framework through extra-Treaty and 
informal methods and tools of cooperation. 
EU external relations migration policies have constituted per-
fect illustrations of these dynamics. There has been a strategic 
choice by some EU and national leaders – under the auspices of 
the European Council – to ‘go informal’ and avoid EU Treaties, 
thereby side-limiting the roles of the European Parliament and 
the Luxembourg Court in clear violation of the principles of insti-
tutional balance and sincere and loyal cooperation. This ‘policy 
choice’ has also entailed going along with or not feeling respon-
sible for the profound risks that these instruments pose to individ-
uals’ fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Paradigmatic examples include the much debated 2016 
EU-Turkey Statement (Carrera, den Hertog and Stefan, 2019), the 
adoption of EU readmission arrangements with some African and 
Middle-East governments or the use of emergency funding such 
as the EU Trust Funds (EUTF) for the implementation of poli-
cies focused on ‘delegated containment’ and readmission (Carrera, 
Santos and Strik, 2019). Two common characteristics of these 
instruments have been their extra-Treaty and extra-EU budget 
nature, not corresponding with any EU legal acts or international 
agreements envisaged by the Treaties. The European Council has 
played a key role in their promotion and validation. They have been 
able to rely on the indirect complicity and support of the European 
Commission and EU agencies such as Frontex and EASO in their 
practical implementation. This is most surprising as this com-
plicity stands in direct contradiction with the Commission’s role 
as guarantor of the Treaties.
The actual impact of the EU’s indirect financial support through 
emergency funding (EUTF) and the role played by EUNAV-
FOR-MED Operation Sophia have been issues of grave concern 
in respect of the cooperation on ‘migration management’ and 
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training of Libyan coast guard authorities on intercepting boats 
in the Mediterranean sea. As a consequence, in practical terms, 
asylum seekers have been illegally prevented from leaving Libya 
and many others have lost their lives at sea. This has also meant 
the violation of the principle of non-refoulement, as asylum seekers 
have been returned to a country that remains in conflict and where 
there is ample evidence of wrongful international acts and crimes 
against humanity (Carrera and Cortinovis, 2019b). 
These developments may have given the wrong impression to 
Ministries of Interior and some EU governments that they can 
successfully act in direct violation of their legal commitments 
under EU AFSJ law and the Treaties. This has been the case for 
example of the Schengen Area. Since 2016, adducing the ‘refugee 
crisis’ as justification, Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway introduced internal border controls and have unlawfully 
prolonged them beyond the deadline foreseen in the Schengen 
Borders Code (Carrera, 2019). 
Nationalism has also prevailed in relation to reform of the EU 
asylum policy. The European Council has been here a decisive 
factor of blockage towards a much-needed legislative reform of the 
EU Dublin Regulation. It gave preference to a logic of consensus or 
de facto unanimity among EU member states during negotiations 
on some of the CEAS reform files, in clear violation to the Qual-
ified Majority Voting (QMV) rule applicable under the ordinary 
legislative procedure in asylum policies. 
The deadlock in the EU Dublin Regulation reform, along with 
the former Italian Minister of Interior’s closed-ports policy for 
boats saved in the Mediterranean, led to the emergence of ‘ad hoc 
disembarkation and relocation arrangements’ implemented since 
the summer of 2018, or, more recently, the 2019 Malta Declaration 
on a Controlled Emergency Procedure – Voluntary Commitments 
by Member States for a Predictable Temporary Solidarity Mecha-
nism (Carrera and Cortinovis, 2019c).
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These extra-Treaty arrangements involved a small group of 
Member States willing to accept a share of asylum seekers disem-
barked mainly by NGOs in Italy and Malta on a voluntary basis, 
with the Commission playing a weak coordination role and EU 
agencies supporting their implementation. They have also proved 
to be largely unsuccessful in gaining enough political support by 
other EU Member States. While proposals for ‘flexible solidarity’ 
or ‘solidarity à la carte’ may sound appealing, they run a real risk 
of turning the clock backwords three decades in European integra-
tion and re-injecting nationalism into fields that, after the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009, are under clear EU competence and scrutiny remits. 
Allowing ‘flexibility’ may yet again give the wrong impression 
to certain EU governments that the EU principle of solidarity 
in the CEAS can be understood as ‘anything goes’ and freedom 
to comply with their already existing EU legal commitments 
depending on what they can get out of it or on some paranoid 
cost-benefit analysis. The current infringement proceedings 
started by the Commission against the governments of Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic for not implementing the 2015 
Relocation Decisions substantiates this point. 
The EU solidarity principle implies equality among all EU 
Member States. Equal membership rights entail the expectation 
of equal responsibilities. This was confirmed by the Luxembourg 
Court in the 2017 ruling on the above-mentioned 2015 Temporary 
Relocation Decisions against Hungary and Slovakia. The Court 
made it clear that the EU principle of solidarity means equal soli-
darity, so that EU responses ‘must, as a rule, be divided between all 
the other Member States’.
4. Conclusion
The opening quote to Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion 
brings into critical light the main challenges characterizing the 
latest developments in AFJS cooperation. I fully agree with her 
that ‘we must all do better than that’. 20 years after the Tampere 
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Programme, and more than a decade since the Lisbon Treaty, the 
Europeanization patterns stemming from the politics of crisis and 
self-centredness have negatively affected and undermined the very 
essence of EU AFSJ founding principles. 
The next phases of EU AFSJ cooperation should give priority to 
designing and implementing a principled and consistent course of 
action, giving priority to fully and loyally implementing the Lisbon 
Treaty and its principles, and delivering the EUCFR to individuals 
(Carrera, 2018). 
As Brännkärr writes in the Preface of this Collective Volume, 
the future of AFSJ cooperation must be approached from the per-
spective of unnegotiable EU principles, which in her own words, 
constitute the “conjunctive glue that holds the Union together”. 
This calls for all EU institutions to unequivocally uphold and 
better safeguard these principles in practice by walking the talk. It 
is by putting EU democratic rule of law principles and individuals’ 
rights first that the EU AFSJ can expect legitimation from all the 
relevant actors involved and from individuals.
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6. THE EUROPEAN BORDER 
AND COAST GUARD IN THE 
NEW REGULATION: TOWARDS 




The development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AFSJ) has led to a multiplication of the activities carried out by 
EU agencies, which were created to support and reinforce opera-
tional cooperation between national authorities. It is not possible 
to understand the development of the AFSJ without the agencies. 
The activities carried out by AFSJ agencies are very diverse and 
have continued to expand in recent years. The large-scale and 
uncontrolled arrival of migrants and asylum seekers to the EU 
has led to the expansion of the operational powers of Frontex and 
EASO beyond original expectations. The activities performed by 
Frontex and EASO in the last years go beyond mere coordination 
and they have assumed relevant operational activities which may 
have negative implications on fundamental rights. 
Table of Contents
68 PART II - BORDERS AND ASYLUM
A good illustration is the hotspots set up to manage the massive 
arrival of refugees to Italy and Greece, developed within the frame-
work of the Agenda for Migration of 2015. Frontex, EASO and 
Europol work together on the ground with the authorities of Italy 
and Greece to help them to fulfill their obligations under EU law 
and swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants. 
These developments point to the gradual emergence of an increas-
ingly ‘integrated European administration’.1 EU agencies are also 
called to play a key role in developing the cooperation between 
the EU and third countries in this field, which increasingly leads 
to the externalisation of the management of migration and protec-
tion obligations.2
The establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard 
(EBCG) in 2016 was one of the main initiatives adopted by the 
EU to deal with the asylum and migration ‘crisis’.3  The national 
authorities of member states responsible for border management, 
including coast guards to the extent that they carry out border 
control tasks, the national authorities responsible for return and 
the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (‘the Agency’) con-
stitute the EBCG.4 
The creation of the EBCG and the transformation of Frontex 
1 *Professor of Public International Law and European Law, Jean Monnet Chair in EU 
External Action, Coordinator of the European Joint Master’s in Strategic Border Man-
agement at the University of Salamanca. This contribution has been written within the 
framework of the research project on ‘The externalisation and informalisation of the 
EU migration, asylum and border management policies: new legal challenges’ (EUM-
ABEXT), funded by the Spanish Government (RTI2018-099097-B-I00).
  De Bruycker, P. (2016), “The European Border and Coast Guard: A new Model Built 
in an old logic”, European Papers: A Journal on Law and Integration, Vol. 1(2): 559-569; 
Tsourdi, L. (2016), “Bottom-up Salvation? From Practical Cooperation Towards Joint 
Implementation Through the European Asylum Support Office”, European Papers: a 
Journal on Law and Integration, Vol. 1(2): 987-1031.
2  See Santos Vara, J. (2015), “The External Activities of AFSJ Agencies: The Weakness of 
Democratic and Judicial Controls”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 20: 118-136.
3  Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on 
the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 
and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, L 251/1, 16 September 2016. 
4  Article 3, Regulation 2016/1624; article 4, Regulation  2019/XXX.
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into the Agency of the EBCG did not amount to establishing a 
real European Border and Coast System that replaced national 
authorities in charge of border management in each member state. 
Even though the Regulation on the EBCG has significantly rein-
forced the tasks conferred upon Frontex, these innovations did not 
entail a real transformation of its legal nature. The member states 
continue to retain the primary responsibility for the management 
of the external borders.5 According to de Bruycker, the EBCG is 
essentially “a new model built on an old logic”.6 As it was pointed 
out by Carrera and den Hertog, the 2016 Frontex Regulation led 
to transform the former Agency into a “Frontex+”7. The changes 
introduced in the configuration of the Agency could not be quali-
fied as revolutionary but more as a natural evolution in the process 
initiated in 2004 with the creation of Frontex8. 
The reliance on voluntary Member States’ contributions of staff 
and equipment resulted in persistent gaps affecting the support 
that the Agency could offer to member states. Less than two years 
after the adoption of the Regulation establishing the EBCG, the 
President of the European Commission announced on the occa-
sion of his 2018 speech on the State of the Union that the Commis-
sion intended to reinforce the EBCG.9 On 12 September 2018, the 
Commission proposed an updated version of the Regulation on 
the EBCG.10 The Parliament and Council reached a political agree-
5  Recitals 6 and 5 of the Preamble, Regulation 2016/1624.
6  De Bruycker, op. cit., p. 559.
7  Carrera, S. and L. den Hertog (2016), A European Border and Coast Guard: What’s in a 
name?, Brussels: CEPS; Carrera, S. et al (2017), The European Border and Coast Guard. 
Addressing migration and asylum challenges in the Mediterranean?, Brussels: Report of 
a CEPS Task Force.
8  See Rijpma, J. (2016), The proposal for a European Border and Coast Guard: evolution 
or revolution in external border management?, Study for the LIBE Committee of the Eu-
ropean Parliament; Santos Vara, J. (2018), “La transformación de Frontex en la Agencia 
Europea de la Guardia de Frontera y Costas: ¿Hacia una centralización en la gestión de 
las fronteras?”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, Vol. 59, 143-186.
9  European Commission, State of the Union 2018 – the Hour of European Sovereignty, 
12 September 2018.
10  European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council, 
COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018.
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ment on the new proposal in March 2019. The new Regulation 
on the EBCG was adopted by the Council on 8 November 2019.11 
The successive amendments to the Agency’s legal framework are 
“symptomatic of a lack of strategic thinking on the future of border 
management at EU level”.12
This Chapter will be devoted to examining the main implica-
tions of the new Regulation on the EBCG, which involves a sub-
stantial reinforcement of Frontex as regards tasks, human and 
financial resources with the aim to strengthening the protection 
of the external borders and restoring the normal functioning of 
the Schengen area. It will be assessed to what extent this ambitious 
objective can be reached by reinforcing Frontex. On the other 
hand, it will be analysed if the new Regulation of the EBCG trans-
forms Frontex into a fully-fledged European Boarder and Coast 
Guard system leading to a centralization in the management of 
borders at European level.
2. The Conferral of Executive Powers on the Agency’s 
Staff
The establishment of a Rapid Reaction Pool of 1.500 border 
guards by Regulation 2016/1624 was considered a positive step 
to address emergency situations at the external borders. The cre-
ation of the Standing Corps of 10.000 operational staff by 2027 is 
the main innovation introduced by the new Frontex Regulation. 
The Standing Corps should enable the Agency to deploy border 
guards where needed and therefore enhance the Agency’s capacity 
to support member states in securing external border controls.13 
The enhancement of human and financial resources of individual 
member states through Frontex can be perceived as a tool of EU 
11  Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border 
and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, 
2019/XXX, 23 October 2019.
12  CM1817 Comments on the draft for a new Regulation on a European Border and 
Coast Guard, (COM (2018) 631 final) and the amended proposal for a Regulation on a 
European Union Asylum Agency (COM(2018) 633 final), November 2018.
13  Article 54, Regulation on the EBCG (2019).
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solidarity and fair sharing.14 
The Standing Corps shall be part of the Agency and will be 
composed of the following categories of border guards: opera-
tional staff of the agency (art. 55), staff seconded from member 
states to the Agency for a long term deployment (art. 56), staff from 
member states provided to the Agency for a short-term deploy-
ment (art. 57), staff from the member states ready to be deployed 
for the purposes of rapid border interventions (art. 59). The estab-
lishment of the Standing Corps should be fitted in the objective of 
developing a multiannual strategic policy for European integrated 
border management.15
The members of the Standing Corps, including the operational 
staff of the Agency, are conferred executive powers.16 The statu-
tory staff of the Agency may perform executive tasks such as the 
verification of the identity and nationality of persons, the author-
isation or refusal of entry upon border check, the stamping of 
travel documents, issuing or refusing of visas at the border, border 
surveillance, or registering fingerprints.17 Providing the Agency’s 
own staff with executive powers is questionable since the primary 
responsibility for the management of the external borders lies pri-
marily with the member states. It can be argued that article 77(2) 
(d) TFEU provides the legal basis for any measure necessary for 
the gradual establishment of an integrated management system for 
external borders. 
It is true that the members of the teams may only exercise exec-
utive tasks under the command and control of the host member 
state and as a rule in the presence of border guards or staff involved 
in return-related tasks of the host member state. However, such 
tasks may be performed by the Frontex operational staff in the case 
that they have been authorized by the host member state to act 
14  Tsourdi, L. (2019), “European Conference from Tampere 20 to Tampere 2.0”, Pre-Con-
ference Version.
15  See EBCG proposal, Explanatory memorandum, pp. 2-3.
16  Article 54 (3), Regulation on the EBCG (2019).
17  Article 55 (7), Regulation on the EBCG (2019).
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on its behalf.18 Article 77(2) (d) TFEU should be read in conjunc-
tion with articles 72 TFEU and 4(2) TEU. According to article 72 
TFEU, the EU has to respect the “the exercise of the responsibil-
ities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the mainte-
nance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security”. 
Article 4(2) TEU provides also that the maintenance of internal 
security remains the responsibility of each member state. There-
fore, the Treaties lack a clear legal basis for conferring executive 
powers on the Agency’s own staff. 
Frontex is entering unchartered waters with the conferral of 
executive powers. This new task raises serious concerns as regards 
judicial control in the case of fundamental rights violations are 
committed in the context of operations involving Frontex teams. 
Since Frontex was created to reinforce operational cooperation 
between national authorities and assist them, the Agency has 
avoided judicial accountability so far arguing that the member 
states are responsible vis-à-vis the individuals. The substantial 
autonomy enjoyed by AFSJ agencies and, in particular Frontex, in 
developing their activities does not mean that they are immune 
to judicial controls. The Treaty of Lisbon expressly introduced in 
Article 263 TFEU the possibility of taking legal action to annul 
legal acts of the agencies. However, there is sometimes uncertainty 
as regards the distribution of responsibility between Frontex and 
the member states involved in the agencies’ activities. 
A good illustration is the hotspots set up to manage the mas-
sive arrival of refugees to Italy and Greece where EASO, Frontex 
and Europol work together on the ground with the authorities of 
member states to help them to fulfill their obligations under EU 
law. The broadening of powers conferred on Frontex by the new 
Regulation may exacerbate the problems facing individuals who 
are victims of human rights violations and try to obtain judicial 
redress. There is a clear need to reflect on this issue before the exer-
cising of executive powers by Frontex operational staff. 
18  Article 82, Regulation on the EBCG (2019).
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3. The Emergence of a Supervisory Role
The Agency is called to supervise the effective functioning of the 
national external borders and detect deficiencies in the manage-
ment of the national borders. There is a hierarchical relationship 
placing Frontex above national authorities. Both the 2016 and 
2019 EBCG Regulations have equipped the Agency with a mech-
anism to assess vulnerabilities in the member states’ capacities to 
face challenges at the external borders.19 In case of non-compli-
ance with the recommendations made by the Executive Director 
and the decisions taken by the Management Board of the Agency 
to address the deficiencies identified at the external borders, the 
vulnerability assessment may lead to the so called ‘right to inter-
vene’. 
If the member state concerned does not cooperate with the 
Agency, the Council, acting on the basis of a proposal from the 
Commission, may adopt a decision by means of an implementing 
act identifying the measures needed to mitigate those risks and 
requiring the member state concerned to cooperate with the 
Agency.20 The implementing power to adopt such a decision is 
conferred on the Council because of the potentially politically sen-
sitive nature of the measures to be decided. However, if a member 
state is opposed to the application of certain measures, Frontex has 
not at its disposal any means to impose them. In practice, interven-
tion will not consist in sending teams from the EBCG to take over 
the responsibilities or tasks of a particular member state in man-
aging its borders, but in suspending the application of Schengen in 
relation to the member state concerned on the basis of Article 29 
of Regulation (EU) 2016/399.21 
There is an underlying tension between the new operational 
tasks bestowed upon Frontex and, in particular, the executive 
powers and the conferral of a supervisory and intervention role. 
19  Article 32, Regulation on the EBCG (2019).
20  Article 42, Regulation on the EBCG (2019).
21  Regulation on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across 
borders (Schengen Borders Code) (codification), OJ L 77, 23 March 2016.
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Frontex would be called to play a double role since it will be 
involved in implementing EU external border policy and moni-
toring policy implementation.22 There is a risk of politization of the 
Agency when conducting the vulnerability exam and identifying 
the weaknesses in a particular sector of the external border. AFSJ 
agencies and, in particular Frontex, are not independent from the 
member states and are not immune to political influences. Member 
states are represented at the Management Board of Frontex which 
plays a key role in operationalizing its mandate. It should be fur-
ther reflected how to ensure the independence of the Agency when 
supervising the implementation of EU external border policy by 
the member states.
4. Cooperation Between the Agency and Third Countries
The 2016 Regulation introduced the possibility of carrying out 
operations on the territory of neighboring third countries subject 
to a prior agreement concluded by the EU and the third country 
concerned. The geographical scope of the cooperation with third 
countries is substantially expanded in the new Regulation since 
the Agency can develop operational cooperation with any third 
country. Cooperation between the Agency and authorities of third 
countries may concern all aspects of European Integrated Border 
Management, including border control and return activities.23 
When the deployment of border management teams from the 
standing corps to a third country involves the use of executive 
powers, a status agreement has to be concluded by the Union with 
the third country concerned on the basis of Article 218 TFEU.24 
The first status agreement was concluded with Albania in October 
2018 and a similar agreement was signed with Montenegro in 
22  Tsourdi, L. (2018), “Monitoring and Steering through FRONTEX and EASO 2.0: The 
Rise of a New Model of AFSJ Agencies”, EU Migration and Asylum Law and Policy, p. 
2.
23  Article 73(1), Regulation on the EBCG (2019).
24  Ibid.
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October 2019.25 The EU is negotiating similar status agreements 
with North Macedonia, Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina.
The first joint operation outside the territory of the member 
states was launched in Albania in May 2019. The deployment 
of border management teams on the territory of third coun-
tries raises complex legal and political questions as regards the 
legal regimen applicable and the delimitation of responsibilities 
between the different actors involved in the operations.  As a result 
of the status agreements negotiated so far, Frontex teams can exer-
cise extra-territorial activities in the field of border control and 
return operations which may affect the fundamental rights of third 
country nationals. It is not excluded the possibility that operations 
will develop on the territory of third countries with a questionable 
human rights record. 
According to the status agreements negotiated with Albania 
and Montenegro, the members of the team enjoy immunity from 
the criminal jurisdiction of the host member state in respect of 
the acts performed in the exercise of their official functions in the 
course of the actions carried out in accordance with the opera-
tional plan.26 While the staff from the member states will remain 
criminally and civilly liable under the laws of their home member 
state, there is some uncertainty as regards Frontex.27 Since the 
cooperation with third countries may have serious fundamental 
rights implications, there is a clear need to carry out a fundamental 
rights assessment prior to engaging in operational cooperation 
with third countries.28
25  Status Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Albania on ac-
tions carried out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in the Republic of 
Albania, OJ 43, 18 February 2019. 
26 Article 6(3) Status Agreement with Albania and Article 7(3) Status Agreement with 
Montenegro.
27  See Meijers Committee, op. cit. 
28  Ibid. 
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5. Redress in Case of Fundamental Rights Breaches
The dynamic evolution of the tasks undertaken by the AFSJ agen-
cies, in particular, by Frontex, and EASO in the last years, has 
not led the institutions to admit that the agencies’ activities may 
have potential fundamental rights implications. It is considered 
that these agencies were mainly set up in order to facilitate and 
coordinate operational cooperation between the authorities of the 
Member States. Frontex and the Commission have always held 
that the responsibility for fundamental rights breaches lies exclu-
sively with the member states.
Since the powers of Frontex are mainly directed towards man-
aging the external borders, its activities have raised many complex 
issues. The respect for the right of asylum, the right to an effective 
remedy and the principle of non-refoulement may be at stake in 
the operations coordinated by Frontex. The Agency has under-
taken a number of initiatives with a view to integrating funda-
mental human rights in its activities, such as the development of 
the Frontex Fundamental Rights Strategy and the establishment of 
the Frontex Consultative Forum on human rights and the appoint-
ment of a Fundamental Rights Officer. The 2016 EBCG Regulation 
introduced a new complaint mechanism to monitor and ensure 
respect for fundamental rights.29 The new procedure brings a pos-
itive development to deal with human rights violations since the 
victims have at their disposal a complaint mechanism. However, 
it is an administrative procedure that cannot substitute the right 
to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights.
In the new Regulation, the mandate of the Fundamental rights 
Office is reinforced through the enhancement of its capacities and 
the creation of the function of the fundamental rights monitors 
with the task to assess the fundamental rights compliance of oper-
ational activities.30 However, the individual complaints mecha-
29  See Article 109, Regulation on the EBCG (2019).
30  Article 110, Regulation on the EBCG (2019).
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nism remains an internal oversight that is not impartial or inde-
pendent. The new Regulation does not give an adequate solution 
to the question of responsibility for fundamental rights violations 
occurred in the course of joint operations coordinated by Frontex. 
In such context, the exercise of executive powers entailing a 
wide margin of discretion by Frontex may exacerbate the problems 
facing individuals who are victims of human rights violations and 
try to obtain judicial redress. In addition, the fact that the oper-
ations can be developed on the territory of third countries raise 
additional concerns for fundamental rights. The responsibility of 
Frontex regarding violations of human rights has not yet found 
a satisfactory solution. It will be difficult to sustain in the future 
that the responsibility as regards infringements of fundamental 
rights lies exclusively with member states. The expansion of activ-
ities carried out by the AFSJ agencies and, in particular Frontex, 
would probably continue to raise tensions concerning the right to 
an effective remedy. It should be further explored how to develop 
adequate mechanisms for ensuring effective access to justice. 
6. Conclusion
The evolution of the Agency should be framed within the process 
of agencification that the AFSJ has experienced over the last years. 
EU agencies, in particular Frontex and EASO, are called to play an 
increasing role to respond to the challenges that the EU is facing in 
the areas of migration, asylum and border management. They are 
presented by the institutions as instruments to reinforce the imple-
mentation of EU law, to enhance solidarity between the member 
states and to implement cooperation between the EU and third 
countries. Although both Regulations 2016/1624 and 2019/XXX 
substantially strengthen the autonomy of Frontex, in particular 
by granting a supervisory role and executive powers, the member 
states continue to play a key role in operationalizing its mandate. 
The member states are very reluctant to transfer new powers to 
the Agency since EU external border policy touches upon their 
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sovereignty. Frontex was created to support the member states in 
the management of external borders and the Agency needs at the 
same time the support of member states to implement its mandate.
The successive amendments of the Agency’s mandate show a 
lack of a common vision on how the European administration of 
border management at EU level should develop. The 2019 Regula-
tion does not take the definitive step that will lead in the future to 
the establishment of a true European system of border and coast 
guards. Despite the fact that the Commission refers constantly to 
the Agency as a fully-fledged European border and coast guard 
system, the EU has not yet developed a real European adminis-
tration in this area. The new EBCG Regulation does not create a 
genuine integrated border and coast guard that replaces national 
border guards and provides for genuine solidarity in the manage-
ment of external borders. 
The EU should progress towards a more centralized model that 
includes more solidarity among member states in the manage-
ment of external borders. However, without developing a common 
asylum and migration policy, the constant amendments of the 
Agency’s mandate will not be the adequate solution in times of 
crisis and the failures of the Agency could lead to more frustration 
and a lack of credibility of the EU.
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7. REINSTATEMENT OF 
INTERNAL BORDER CONTROLS 
IN THE SCHENGEN AREA




This Chapter addresses Schengen, focusing in particular on the 
re-instalment of internal border controls by Member States. Since 
2015, internal border controls have been reinstalled more than 80 
times, with Member States justifying these measures on account 
of secondary movements of migrants, the threat of terrorism and 
the situation at the external borders of the EU. Currently, Norway, 
Denmark, Sweden, France, Germany and Austria have reinstalled 
internal border controls, either at all internal borders or at spe-
cific points such as particular ferry crossings.1 Many of the current 
1  Norway (period from 12 November 2019 - 12 May 2020, Terrorist threats, secondary 
movements; ports with ferry connections with Denmark, Germany and Sweden); Swe-
den (period from 12 November 2019 - 12 May 2020, Terrorist threats, shortcomings at 
the external borders; to be determined but may concern all internal borders); Denmark 
(period from 12 November 2019 - 12 May 2020, Terrorist threats, organized criminal-
ity from Sweden; land border with Germany and with Sweden, ferry connections to 
Germany and to Sweden); Germany (period from 12 November 2019 - 12 May 2020, 
Secondary movements, situation at the external borders; land border with Austria; 
Table of Contents
82 PART II - BORDERS AND ASYLUM
re-instalments have been in place for a long time, their legal basis 
alternating between the grounds mentioned in Articles 25, 28 and 
29 of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC).2
These provisions provide for the temporary re-instalment of 
border control either in case of a serious threat to public policy 
or internal security in a Member State (Articles 25 and 28), or in 
case of serious deficiencies in the external border management 
of a Member State which put the overall functioning of the area 
without internal border control at risk (Article 29). In both cases, 
such measures are subject to strict conditions, mainly related to 
their proportionality and necessity. Moreover, the permitted dura-
tion of these measures is limited: In cases of foreseeable events 
posing a serious threat to public policy or internal security, internal 
border controls may not exceed a maximum of six months (Article 
25), in cases requiring immediate action that period is two months 
(Article 28). In situations where the serious threat to public policy 
or internal security is related to deficiencies in the management 
of the external borders, internal border controls may not exceed a 
period of two years (Article 29). 
As some of the current re-instalments have switched legal bases 
each time their maximum duration had expired, questions arise 
regarding their lawfulness. Along similar lines, concerns have 
been raised regarding the proportionality and necessity of the 
re-instalments, which are allegedly not well argued by the Member 
States in their notifications to the Commission. The claim by the 
Commission that it reviews the notifications carefully therefore 
seems difficult to substantiate.3 These legal complexities need to 
be addressed carefully, especially seeing that the Commission has 
Austria (period from 12 November 2019 - 12 May 2020, Secondary movements, risk 
related to terrorists and organized crime, situation at the external borders; land borders 
with Hungary and with Slovenia; France (period from 31 October 2019 - 30 April 2020, 
Persistent terrorist threat, upcoming high profile political event in Paris, secondary 
movements; all internal borders) See https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaf-
fairs/files/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-bor-
der-control/docs/ms_notifications_-_reintroduction_of_border_control_en.pdf 
3  EU Observer 12 December 2019, “Revealed: Little Evidence to Justify Internal Border 
Checks”, at  https://euobserver.com/investigations/146897 
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recently put forward a proposal for amending the SBC.4 
Nevertheless, the primary aim of this contribution is not to 
answer questions regarding the legality of the current re-instal-
ments. Instead I will try to zoom out a little bit from the precise pro-
cedures and legal requirements for introducing border control as 
laid down in the SBC, and reflect on the significance of the absence 
of internal border control for the EU, highlighting its character as 
simultaneously highly symbolical and deeply functional. I argue 
that placing too much emphasis on its symbolic dimension, as is 
often done by the Parliament and the Commission, obscures from 
sight the changing connotations of territorial borders and border 
control in contemporary Europe, and has the unintended effect of 
over-privileging economic interests to the detriment of the pro-
tection of those individuals that are mostly affected by changing 
‘border practices’. 
A similar outcome can be seen in the case law on internal 
border control by the Court of Justice of the EU. The Court, by 
insisting upon a traditional conception of border control, also 
attaches great weight to the very tangibility of territorial fault 
lines, therewith refusing to acknowledge that border control and 
surveillance have undergone fundamental shifts during the last 
twenty years. Ironically however, it is precisely Schengen that has 
facilitated such shifts in border control. Schengen is profoundly 
two-faced: the portrayal of its symbolic dimension by the Com-
mission and Parliament is complemented by a pragmatic approach 
and instrumental use by the Member States.
To make this argument I will first discuss the symbolism of 
Schengen as foregrounded by the Parliament and Commission 
when they address the absence of internal border control. I will 
then turn to Schengen’s pragmatism as seen in Member States 
policies – a pragmatism which upon a closer look is firmly linked 
4  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regards the rules applicable to the temporary reintroduc-
tion of border control at internal borders. COM(2017) 571 final, 27 September 2017. 
Although the Parliament has confirmed its position on the proposal and voted to open 
inter-institutional negotiations, the Council has not yet taken a position.
84 PART II - BORDERS AND ASYLUM
to the symbolism of a resilient national border. Current tensions 
result from the irreconcilability of both approaches. In my con-
clusions I claim that such irreconcilability does not need to be 
problematic because conflict is inherent in politics and can be pro-
ductive. A precondition for such productivity however is that the 
manifestation of conflict goes beyond contesting views on a sym-
bolism that is modelled on experiences from the past, but it should 
include opposing views on how Europe can address contemporary 
global challenges such as economic and social inequality, the regu-
lation of migration, and threats to human security.
2. Schengen as Europe’s Greatest Achievement:  
A Very Tangible Symbolism
Schengen as the area without internal border control has consist-
ently been portrayed as one of Europe’s greatest achievements, 
most notably by the Commission and the Parliament. In official 
documents by these institutions, a forceful but concise reminder 
insisting on the great significance of a borderless Europe is gen-
erally followed by a substantial discussion on how to strengthen 
Schengen, and bring about more accountability and transparency. 
What kind of achievement Schengen precisely represents is almost 
never made explicit, apart from references to the individual rights 
of free movement and the popularity that borderless travel enjoys 
with European citizens. 
Unsurprisingly then, such superficial appeals to the signifi-
cance of Schengen will not result in a productive confrontation 
of the European institutions with those Member States that rein-
troduce internal border control: the rights to free movement of 
persons, goods and services in itself are not negated through the 
introduction of internal border control.5 Moreover, the very fact 
that these governments are democratically elected and generally 
enjoy at least some popular support for their border control pol-
5  That free movement and the absence of internal border control are not identical is 
also apparent from the phenomenon of differentiated integration in this area – some 
Member States are part of the internal market but do not participate in Schengen.
85REINSTATEMENT OF INTERNAL BORDER CONTROLS IN THE SCHENGEN AREA - G. Cornelisse
icies turns the popularity argument into a mere contestation of 
facts, not of values or visions.
However, while the concrete achievement of Schengen may be 
the ease of travelling a borderless Europe for the individual citizen, 
borderless Europe obviously stands for something far larger in a 
continent that has been defined by centuries of violent struggle 
over territorial borders. Against the historical rationale of Euro-
pean integration – the prevention of interstate war within Europe 
– it makes sense to present a borderless Europe as a monumental 
triumph. In such a narrative, re-instalment of internal border con-
trols, especially when done on a large and extended scale, signifies 
the beginning of the end of the European ideal. What is problem-
atic here is that, while no-one would contest the importance of 
historical awareness, unreflexive appeals to Schengen as Europe’s 
greatest achievement obscure the fact that the meaning of territo-
rial borders has changed over the years. 
Thus, in contemporary Europe, interstate war over territorial 
fault lines between Member States is unlikely, but intense disagree-
ment over how the border relates to national identity and national 
security can have profoundly destabilising effects. Insisting on 
Schengen’s symbolism without explicitly linking its significance 
to the contemporary meaning and functioning of borders then 
impedes the development of a meaningful discussion about con-
flicting visions of Europe.
A borderless Europe which is conceptually anchored to the 
tangibility of territorial borders, without updating that vision so 
that it may better align with the political reality of contemporary 
border practices, can also be seen in the case law of the Court of 
Justice. Thus, while controls at the internal borders are not allowed 
under article 67 TFEU and Article 20 SBC, the latter instrument 
does not prohibit checks within national territory, provided that 
their effects are not equivalent to border checks. Article 21 SBC 
specifies that such equivalent effect is absent if these checks do not 
have border control as an objective; if they are based on general 
police information regarding possible threats to public security 
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and aim to combat cross-border crime; if they are devised and 
executed in a manner clearly distinct from systematic checks on 
persons at the external borders; or if they are carried out on the 
basis of spot-checks. The Court has maintained a very ‘territorial’ 
interpretation of the concept of border control, when assessing 
whether 1) a measure could be designated as border control, or 
2) whether it had an equivalent effect. Thus, if checks are carried 
out, not ‘at borders’ or ‘when the border is crossed’, but inside the 
territory of a Member State, those checks do not amount to pro-
hibited border control under Article 20 SBC.6 This is even when 
the duty to carry out checks (imposed by national law on private 
companies) “is intended to ensure that foreign nationals satisfy the 
conditions [laid down national law] for crossing the border” and if 
“those checks are triggered by the crossing of the internal border.”7 
This very narrow interpretation to Article 20 of the SBC does 
not do justice to contemporary practices where border control is 
increasingly outsourced, either through privatisation or extra-ter-
ritorialisation (Rijpma 2018). With regard to measures having an 
equivalent effect, the Court has held that a power which is exer-
cised in a frontier area “in order to detect persons whose presence 
is unlawful and aim to deter illegal immigration”8 or “to check 
compliance with the obligation to hold, carry and present identity 
papers”9 pursues objectives that are different from border control. 
Here the Court discloses a similarly limited understanding of the 
function of contemporary border control (Cornelisse, 2014), one 
which does not take account of the fact that security checks and 
surveillance more generally have taken over the function of the 
traditional border. 
This view on the function of border control is even more 
striking when regarded in light of Council Implementing Deci-
sion (EU) 2017/246, in which the Council has explicitly encour-
6  Case C-412/17, Touring Tours and Travel, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1005.
7  See AG Bot in his opinion to Touring Tours and Travel, ECLI:EU:C:2018:671, para 85.
8  C278/12 PPU, Adil, EU:C:2012:508.
9  Case C188/10 and C189/10, Melki and Abdeli, EU:C:2010:363.
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aged the Member States “to assess whether police checks would 
not achieve the same results as temporary internal border con-
trols, before introducing or prolonging such controls.”10 The legal 
interpretation of border control by the Court of Justice fits with a 
political portrayal of Schengen as Europe’s greatest achievement, 
in that they both make it difficult to address, in the political and 
legal sphere, that “the promise of a borderless Europe applies only 
to a privileged group of bona fide travellers and not to those who 
are seen as the crimmigrant ‘other’” (Aas, 2011; Van der Woude 
and Van der Leun, 2017, at 41).
3. Schengen’s Pragmatism: Flanking Measures and 
Economic Interests
Schengen cooperation itself has also contributed greatly to changes 
in border practices, for example precisely through outsourcing 
border control, or through the use of modern technologies that 
conflate the distinction between crime control and border control. 
Many of these changed border practices have a disparate racial, 
religious or social impact.11 This perspective on Schengen cooper-
ation also brings another, much more pragmatic side of Schengen 
to the fore: its instrumental use by Member States in order to attain 
certain policy objectives. 
Schengen’s pragmatism is exemplified first and foremost 
by its economic rationale: the economic benefits of the absence 
of internal border control are significant and stretch far beyond 
a positive impact on the transport sector (European Parliament 
2019). The very origins of a borderless Europe can be traced 
back to economics: the Saarbrucken agreement came into being 
as a reaction to protests by lorry drivers who blocked the Fran-
co-German border because they were upset about the long waiting 
10  Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/246 of 7 February 2017 setting out a 
Recommendation for prolonging temporary internal border control in exceptional 
circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk (OJ L 36, 
11.2.2017, p. 59)
11  See Den Heijer (2018) on visa policies.
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times. The economic foundations for Schengen explain the vision 
of the Court on what constitutes border control discussed above – 
such controls are prohibited once they interfere with the smooth 
travel of economically active citizens and providers of services. 
‘Scattered security checks’ (Atger, 2008) based on risk technology 
generally do not have this effect.
While economic incentives thus pushed for the abolishment of 
internal borders in the early eighties, the larger political implica-
tions of such a project were apparent from the outset: abolishing 
internal border controls would presuppose amongst other things 
“the gradual application of a common policy on third country cit-
izens” (Adonnino Report, 1985). However, further cooperation 
with regard to what were originally meant as ‘compensatory meas-
ures’ was soon driven by a very different rationale: national con-
cerns over rising immigration by third-country nationals, espe-
cially after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The result was that before 
long the ‘flanking’ measures had acquired a logic of their own. And 
while supranationalisation could arguably have served as some 
sort of correction mechanism, insisting on a coherent policy on 
immigration and asylum for an area without internal borders, the 
intergovernmental character of Schengen cooperation made sure 
that states and their governments considered little more than their 
own national interest in protecting their national borders (Cor-
nelisse, 2014). 
The lack of attention for the way in which flanking meas-
ures should relate to the proper functioning of a Europe without 
internal borders has resulted in laws and policies that have no con-
cern for the “structural inequalities and asymmetric shocks”12 that 
characterise Schengen (Cornelisse, 2014). Structural inequalities 
are caused by the considerable variation amongst the Member 
States regarding their geographical location: not all of them have 
external land or sea borders, and amongst those who do, consid-
erable differences exist in the feasibility of guarding them ade-
12  Hinarejos uses these terms to discuss the challenges facing the European Monetary 
Union (Hinarejos, 2013). 
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quately against unwanted immigration. Asymmetric shocks are 
shocks that affect some Member States, but not all -the current 
situation in Greece providing a particularly apt illustration of this. 
Asymmetric shocks are obviously related to the concept of struc-
tural inequalities, in that disparities with regard to geographical 
particularities make the occurrence of these asymmetric shocks 
more likely. The Schengen system, where structural inequalities 
and asymmetric shocks are the order of the day, should have some 
sort of mechanism to deal with them. 
This idea is reflected in Article 80 TFEU, which requires that EU 
policies on border checks, immigration and asylum are governed 
by the principle of solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility. 
However, since 2015 most efforts at supranationalising Europe’s 
response to the so-called refugee crisis have failed, not in the 
least because of “mobilisation of national identities by right-wing 
populist parties” (Börzel and Risse, 2018). Besides, previous legal 
measures adopted in the area of asylum, most prominently the 
Dublin Regulation, even exacerbate inequalities between Member 
States. In the absence of an effective supranational mechanism to 
deal with structural inequalities and asymmetric shocks, national 
responses such as re-instalment of internal border control are an 
entirely predictable response.13 As long as the roots of the crisis 
are not addressed, devising ever more stringent procedures, con-
ditions and time limits for such measures – even the introduction 
of supranational oversight over internal border control – remains 
a mere fight against symptoms. 
This is even more so when measures of re-instalment remain 
marginally motivated and are never subject to scrutiny by a court, 
also because in this policy field the Commission rather acts a 
mediator between Member States, and not as guarantor of the 
13  A good illustration of such self-evidence can be found in a statements such as by a 
Danish minister of integration in 2016: “I think we should prolong border control. 
There is still an uncertain situation in southern Europe, where thousands of refugees 
and migrants care coming ashore in Sicily. That can create pressure on Danish bor-
ders.” See https://www.thelocal.no/20161013/norway-eu-must-accept-extended-bor-
der-controls.
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Treaties (Guild et al, 2016). It would be interesting to see how the 
Court of Justice (or national courts)14 would assess the proportion-
ality and necessity of re-instalment: in light of the specific char-
acteristics of EU law, these courts would inevitably need to rule 
on the seriousness of the security and public order threats. More-
over, courts would be required to elaborate upon the relationship 
between re-instalment of border control and alternative measures, 
therewith making explicit what Member States are purportedly 
protecting with internal border control. A mere insistence on the 
function of border control as firmly linked to the tangibility of ter-
ritorial borders, or on the symbolic implications of re-instalment 
cannot take the place of such a legal assessment.15 
4. Conclusion 
The portrayal of Schengen as Europe’s greatest achievement is 
deeply linked to Europe’s past as a continent defined by violent 
conflict over territorial borders. But the symbolism of a borderless 
Europe is in dire need of modernization to be able to engage in a 
productive conflict over opposing visions of Europe. The insist-
ence on Schengen’s symbolism and the occasional emphasis on 
its perceived economic benefits in the political arena are a weak 
counterforce to the link made by right-wing populism between 
national identity, security and the necessity of border control, and 
they obscure the actual workings of the contemporary border. 
Credible proposals regarding the regulation of re-instalment 
of internal border control can therefore not remain limited to the 
devising of more stringent procedures and increased suprana-
tional oversight if they do not simultaneously recognise the spe-
cific forms of violence that contemporary borders give rise to. Such 
proposals need to be based upon explicit alternatives regarding 
14  To my knowledge there are no national legal challenges to the reinstatement of border 
controls, although such challenges could easily be brought on the basis of EU law (di-
rect effect and primacy).
15  In any case, internal border control does not turn the internal border in all respects 
into an external border. See Case C-444/17, Arib, ECLI:EU:C:2019:220.
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the relationship between borders, identity and security. In other 
words, revising the Schengen Borders Code cannot remain a tech-
nical exercise the details of which are only understandable to a 
select group of experts and subsequently sold to the public as the 
strengthening of Europe’s biggest achievement – for such legisla-
tion to be sustainable it should be preceded by a confrontation of 
competing visions on Europe and its policies regarding global jus-
tice, human mobility, and human security.16
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8. NORMALISING 'THE 
HOTSPOT APPROACH?'
AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
COMMISSION’S MOST RECENT 
PROPOSALS
Giuseppe Campesi
In the 2015 European Agenda on Migration, the ‘hotspot approach’ 
was referred to as one of the main immediate actions to sup-
port Greece and Italy to ‘swiftly identify, register and fingerprint 
incoming migrants’ (European Commission 2015). According to 
the description provided by Commission’s documents, the hotspot 
approach is ultimately a measure of operational support activated 
in order to help frontline member countries facing dispropor-
tionate migratory pressure in providing to the registration, identi-
fication, fingerprinting and debriefing of asylum seekers, as well as 
return operations. To that end personnel of the European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO), EU Border Agency (Frontex) EU Police 
Cooperation Agency (Europol) and EU Judicial Cooperation 
Agency (Eurojust) are deployed on the ground and work with the 
authorities of member countries concerned to help to fulfil their 
obligations under EU law. 
The approach has been object of intense criticism, especially 
for the alleged violations of human rights of migrants and asylum 
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seekers perpetrated inside so-called hotspot facilities (Amnesty 
International 2016; European Council for Refugees and Exiles 
2017; EU Fundamental Rights Agency 2019). Reports have in par-
ticular highlighted horrific reception conditions at disembarka-
tion points, excessive use of force in collecting fingerprints, lack 
of effective access to asylum procedures and independent mon-
itoring. A report commissioned by the EU Parliament has high-
lighted, in particular, the risk that pressure to swiftly processing 
incoming migrants may lead to unlawful returns to unsafe places 
without proper consideration of individual claims (Neville et al. 
2016: 30). 
The hotspot approach has also been criticized for its weak legal 
basis. Many commentators (Casolari 2016; Thym 2016; Neville et 
al 2016) have emphasized the absence of a specific legal framework 
regulating the implementation of the approach and the extreme 
uncertainty regarding the role of different actors involved, espe-
cially as regards EU agencies in relation to national authorities. 
Criticisms have also emphasized the inconsistency between the 
mandate and competence of EU agencies and their de facto roles 
on the ground (Hoori 2018; Saranti, Papachristopoulou and Vak-
ouli 2018). 
The intense scholarly debate generated by the implementation 
of the hotspot approach has also revealed the existence of some 
confusion about its exact nature, and this should be considered 
as another consequence of its weak legal basis. So much so, that 
some have even described hotspots as chimeric entities (Benvenuti 
2018), and others have underlined the multiple dimensions that 
characterize the approach (Pascucci and Patchett 2018). Hotspots 
can indeed be regarded either as a procedure, a mechanism called 
to make migrants’ processing after disembarkation more effective 
and producing a swift division between those eligible for protec-
tion and those who must be returned back; or as specific geograph-
ical sites, spaces of confinement and detention created near main 
disembarkation points in order to prevent potential secondary 
movements of asylum seekers. 
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This duplicity is clearly reflected in Commission’s policy papers 
and in the very few legal provisions enacted on the hotspots 
approach into EU law, where the emphasis is apparently placed 
more on the procedures to be carried out in those places identified 
as hotspots and less on their spatial configuration. The fact that the 
first legal provisions on the hotspot approach have been included in 
the regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) is 
for instance indicative of a tendency to frame the approach mainly 
in procedural terms. The regulation establishes the ‘Migration 
Management Support Teams’ (MMST) and defines the activities 
that are to be carried out in ‘hotspot areas’ but gives very few hints 
on how the places where the approach is to be implemented are to 
be organized and managed, just defining hotspot areas as ‘an area 
in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union 
agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim 
of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory 
challenge characterized by a significant increase in the number of 
migrants arriving at the external borders’1.
In spite of being framed essentially in procedural terms, the 
hotspot approach also entails a specific re-configuration of space. 
The use of a term such as ‘hotspot’ is not neutral in geopolit-
ical terms, quite the contrary it is indicative of a specific spatial 
thinking (Neocleous and Kastrinou 2016). A hotspot it is always a 
zone, a space of disorder where a focused intervention is needed. 
Clearly Hotspot procedures must not be carried out anywhere, but 
at EU’s border sections facing ‘disproportionate migratory pres-
sure’, but they also entailed a specific physical re-articulation of 
the border infrastructure, in particular at main disembarkation 
points. Commission’s policy papers (European Commission 2015) 
suggested providing hotspot areas with ‘reception facilities’, and 
made explicit reference to the rules covering the ‘reception’ of 
asylum-seekers kept at the border under accelerated and border 
procedures according to Articles 31(8) and 43 of the Directive 
2013/32/EU, and to the rules laid down by Article 18 of the Direc-
1  Article 2(10), Regulation No. 2016/1624.
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tive 2008/115/EU for situations in which member countries find 
themselves having to manage the repatriation of a great number 
of irregular migrants. In both cases, reference was made to rules 
allowing for derogation to the ordinary standards on the detention 
of asylum-seekers and irregular migrants, permitting an easing of 
procedural guarantees and a significant lowering of the standards 
relating to reception and detention conditions.
While there was a clear indication that Commission’s preferred 
solution was to create closed and secured facilities in order to pre-
vent secondary movements, thus envisaging a situation protracted 
confinement at the borders of asylum seekers, the reference made 
to two directives left member countries concerned with some room 
for discretion in the implementation of the approach. And indeed, 
the approach has been implemented differently by Greece and 
Italy, which have essentially embedded it in the existing national 
system for first reception. 
Whereas in Greece, in particular after the controversial 
EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016, the implementation of the 
hotspot approach has entailed a de-facto detention of migrants 
and asylum seekers in the 5 facilities (Lesvos, Samos, Chios, Leros 
and Kos) identified as hotspot facilities (European Council for 
Refugees and Exiles 2017; Papotousi et al. 2018), in Italy migrants 
remained an average of 5 days in 2017 and 3,5 days in 2018 in the 
5 hotspot facilities (Lampedusa, Trapani, Ragusa Pozzallo, Taranto 
and Messina), under a regime that has been not clearly defined by 
law, but decided by the police at the local level depending on the 
circumstances (Garante Nazionale 2017). As a matter of fact, Italy 
has not conceived hotspots as places of mass detention but has 
instead used them as a more flexible tool for controlling asylum 
seekers’ mobility (Tazzioli 2017). 
The Commission had the opportunity to clarify the legal frame-
work regulating the implementation of the hotspot approach, in 
particular as regards reception conditions in so-called ‘hotspot 
areas’, when published its proposals on the recast of the reception 
directive (European Commission 2016a) and on the new regula-
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tion on asylum procedures (European Commission 2016b). How-
ever, while the hotspot approach is never explicitly mentioned, 
Commission’s proposals greatly expand the possibility of keeping 
asylum seekers in detention near main disembarkation points. In 
the case of the so-called ‘border procedures’, the proposed regula-
tion on asylum establishes that the asylum seeker is ‘kept in border 
or transit zones’ up to 4 weeks2, albeit without specifying under 
what kind of ‘reception’ regime. However, it is likely that in Com-
mission’s design the facilities installed near main disembarkation 
points should be detention centres, given that in the proposal on 
the recast reception directive border procedures are listed among 
the grounds legitimizing asylum detention3. Moreover, in intro-
ducing the proposal on the new regulation on asylum procedures 
the Commission stated explicitly that border procedures ‘normally 
imply the use of detention throughout the procedure’ (European 
Commission 2016b), thus confirming the impression that hotspot 
areas must be set up and managed essentially as sites of border 
confinement for asylum seekers. 
According to the proposed regulation, border procedures may 
also be applied at locations in proximity to border areas4, in par-
ticular when a disproportionate number of applicants lodge their 
applications at the border or in a transit zone. This in fact would 
permit a spatial introversion of borders which is functional to 
deal with the logistic complications that are likely to arise when 
thousands of asylum seekers must be kept in a situation of pro-
tracted confinement. The scenario of mass detention at the border 
is therefore explicitly envisaged by the Commission, and hardly 
the provision included in the Recital No. 42 of the proposed reg-
ulation will be a brake on member countries’ temptation to abuse 
of special procedures in order to forcibly keep at the border all 
migrants arriving by sea5.
2  Article 41(3) in European Commission 2016b.
3  Article 8(3)(d), in European Commission 2016a.
4  Recital No. 40 and Article 41(4) in European Commission 2016b.
5  The Recital No. 42 says that ‘As long as an applicant can show good cause, the lack of 
documents on entry or the use of forged documents should not per se entail an auto-
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The reference to the need of custodial measures is even more 
explicit in the policy papers and proposals published by the Com-
mission starting from 2018, where the overall objectives of the 
hotspot approach are also apparently redefined. Whereas in 2015 
the approach was presented as a tool for helping the authorities 
of member countries facing a disproportionate inflow of migrants 
in fulfilling their obligations under EU law, in 2018 Commis-
sion’s main preoccupation is to offer a solution for the diplomatic 
row over search and rescue and disembarkation. This is evident, 
for example, in the controversial 2018 non-paper on ‘controlled 
centers’ (European Commission 2018a), where the Commis-
sion, while not explicitly mentioning the hotspot approach, in 
many respects takes stock of past experience of operational sup-
port in so-called hotspot areas to propose a revised version of the 
approach. 
The aim of the measures envisaged by the Commission in 
response of the European Council conclusion of 28-29 June 2018 
was to improve the process of distinguishing between individuals 
in need of international protection, and irregular migrants with 
no right to remain in the EU, while speeding up returns. As with 
the hotspot approach, this would be realized by mobilizing staff 
from EU agencies in support of member countries with the aim 
of speeding up the processing of asylum claims, in particular by 
‘applying rapid procedures available under EU law followed by a 
quick return procedure in case of negative decisions’ (European 
Commission 2018a). Interestingly, the areas were operational 
support should be provided were now more explicitly redefined 
as sites of confinement, and the added value of controlled centres 
was clearly seen in their capacity of preventing asylum seekers’ 
secondary movements (European Commission 2018a). Needless 
to say, the legal footing for the establishment of controlled centres 
was seen in the rules on the detention of asylum seekers processed 
according to the so-called border procedures. 
matic recourse to an accelerated examination procedure or a border procedure’ (Recital 
No. 42 in European Commission 2016b)
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The non-paper on controlled centers, however, contained 
another important innovation that the Commission would have 
further developed in a more articulated manner. In this docu-
ment first emerged the idea of the ‘border return procedure’ that 
the Commission officially advanced with the publication of the 
proposal on the recast return directive (European Commission 
2018b). The proposed rapid return procedure provides specific, 
simplified rules applicable to asylum seekers whose application 
was rejected following a border procedure. As a rule, they will not 
be granted a period for voluntary return and will have a shorter 
time-limit to lodge an appeal. In addition, the Commission pro-
poses to ensure the continued detention of failed asylum seekers 
who were already kept in detention as a part of asylum border pro-
cedures6. 
The assumption is that failed asylum seekers will remain in 
detention for a further 4 months in the same facilities located 
near main disembarkation points. Although there is not much 
clarity on the issue, these should be the very same facilities that 
were defined as ‘controlled centers’ by the non-paper of July 2018, 
which must function, at the same time, as hotspot areas for the 
implementation of the hotspot procedures envisaged by the EBCG 
regulation, as detention facilities were asylum seekers subject to 
border procedures are kept in custody and, lastly, as pre-removal 
facilities for failed asylum seekers being deported under the new 
border return procedure. 
The multifunctional nature of ‘controlled centers’ was finally 
made explicit with the proposal on the new regulation on the 
EBCG (European Commission 2018c), in which these facilities 
were defined as centres ‘established at the request of the Member 
State, where relevant Union agencies in support of the host 
Member State and with participating Member States, distinguish 
between third-country nationals in need of international protec-
tion and those who are not in need of such protection, as well as 
carry out security checks and where they apply rapid procedures 
6  Article 22(7), in European Commission 2018b.
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for international protection and/or return’7. 
Interestingly, Commission’s proposal apparently maintained a 
distinction between ‘controlled centers’ and ‘hotspot areas’8, pro-
viding that MMSTs shall perform their functions in both places9, 
with the only exception that functions performed in ‘hotspot areas’ 
should be exclusively related with the ‘provid(ing) (of) assistance 
in screening, debriefing, identification and fingerprinting’ in cases 
of ‘existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge’.
Beyond the confusion created by the multiplication of the sites of 
migration enforcement, I believe that Commission’s policy design 
is to ‘normalize’ the hotspot approach. This is why the deploy-
ment of MMSTs has been envisaged as no longer circumscribed to 
cases of disproportionate migratory pressure and limited to assist 
member countries in screening, debriefing and fingerprinting, but 
also extended to offer support in the implementation of the rapid 
asylum and return procedures even outside ‘crisis’ situations. This 
in the framework of an approach which relies heavily and explic-
itly on the protracted detention of migrants and asylum seekers in 
border areas. 
While every reference to controlled centers has been finally 
removed from the new regulation on the EBCG approved in 
November 201910, the overall policy design is that of encouraging 
frontline member countries to manage disembarkation procedures 
by confining migrants at the border, while attributing to EU agen-
cies an ever-greater role in the management of the accelerated pro-
cedures relating to identification, asylum processing and return. 
It is no coincidence that over the last two years, during which 
the talk on the need to set up ‘controlled centers’ at the border 
has been persistent, both Greece and Italy have finally developed 
plans to strengthen their regulatory framework on asylum deten-
tion (Ferri and Massimi 2018; Mouzourakis and Refugee Support 
Agean 2019).
7  Article 2(24) in European Commission 2018c.
8  See Article 2(23), in European Commission 2018c.
9  Articles 2(19), 10(1)(12),37(2)(d), and 41 in European Commission 2018c.
10  Regulation No. 2019/1896.
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In conclusion, many of the concerns that scholars and activists 
have been rising over the implementation of the hotspot approach 
are still extremely relevant. The Hotspot approach is indeed 
increasingly institutionalized as an asylum and return sub-system 
where migrants rights’ will be protected by sub-standard legal and 
procedural guarantees, which will be operated, with the increasing 
involvement of EU agencies, in remote areas where civil society 
and independent oversight is extremely difficult. Moreover, beside 
accessing a sub-standard procedure, asylum seekers will be sys-
tematically detained. 
While clearly in breach of human rights standards, requiring 
individualized assessment on the necessity and proportionality 
of every deprivation of liberty, systematic mass detention at the 
border may be considered as entailing a de-facto criminaliza-
tion of asylum seekers and, as a consequence, to be contrary to 
the Refugee Convention prohibiting States to penalize refugees 
for their irregular entry or status, and to the 1999 Tampere Pro-
gramme’s reaffirmation of the absolute respect of the right to seek 
asylum, now enshrined in Article 18 of the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights. Finally, one has to wonder what the price of coer-
cion is. Detaining migrants and asylum seekers for months after 
their arrival, besides being legally questionable, risk to stimulate 
practices of resistance and disorders within detention facilities, 
especially given the well-documented poor detention conditions. 
Encouraging frontline member countries to resort to mass deten-
tion at the border will put border police and other security forces 
under a strong pressure that will greatly increases the risk of an 
excessive and uncontrolled use of force inside detention facilities. 
In light of this, the attempt made by the Commission at nor-
malizing an approach which was originally conceived as an excep-
tional response to a ‘disproportionate migratory pressure’, and has 
been already explicitly denounced as creating ‘fundamental rights 
challenges that appear almost unsurmountable’ (EU Agency for 
Fundamental Rights 2019: 7), it is in many ways extremely ques-
tionable.
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9. EU ASYLUM POLICIES 
THROUGH THE LENSES OF THE 
UN GLOBAL COMPACT ON 
REFUGEES 
Sergio Carrera and Roberto Cortinovis1
1. Introduction
EU policy debates on asylum over the course of 2019 have revolved 
around the need to abandon crisis-led policy-making that had 
dominated EU policies in the aftermath of the so-called ‘refugee 
crisis’ from 2015 onward.  The EU response to the crisis produced 
a number of controversial policy developments. Emergency meas-
ures adopted during that period, including informal and extra-EU 
Treaty instruments of cooperation with third countries, ended up 
bypassing the system of checks and balances foreseen by the EU 
legal system, raising concerns regarding their compatibility with 
EU rule of law and fundamental rights principles and standards 
(Carrera, Santos and Strik, 2019). 
These developments stands in direct contradiction with the 
Tampere Programme’s aim, laid down in its paragraph 4, to estab-
lish “an open and secure European Union, fully committed to the 
1  This Chapter draws from research conducted under the ReSOMA project. ReSOMA 
receives funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under the grant agreement 770730.
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obligation of the Geneva Refugee Convention and other relevant 
human rights instruments, and able to respond to humanitarian 
needs on the basis of solidarity”. They are incompatible with the 
commitment to the “absolute respect of the right to seek asylum”, 
ensuring that “nobody is sent back to persecution, i.e. maintaining 
the principle of non-refoulement (paragraph 13 of the Tampere 
Conclusions). This Chapter also argues that the ‘informalisation’ 
and intergovernmentalism characterizing latest EU policies and 
initiatives stand at odds with the Lisbon Treaty call for the Union 
to establish a common policy on asylum in Article 78.1 TFEU.
In 2016, the European Commission launched an overall reform 
of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which aimed, 
among other things, to provide for structural responses to respon-
sibility-sharing issues raised by the refugee crisis by reforming the 
EU Dublin system (European Commission, 2016a, 2016b). How-
ever, none of the proposals for the reform of the CEAS presented 
by the Commission in 2016 could be finalised before the expiry of 
the 2014-2019 legislative term due to the choice of member states 
to stick to a logic of consensus and to discuss the asylum reform as 
a ‘package’ (Carrera and Cortinovis, 2019a).
The need for a ‘fresh start’ out of the polarized debates of the 
post-crisis period may be the reason behind the choice of the new 
President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen to develop a 
New ‘Pact on Migration and Asylum’.2 In parallel, the adoption 
of the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) in 
December 2018 and the agenda it lays down to advance respon-
sibility sharing for refugees at the global level fostered a debate 
regarding the role and contribution of the EU and its Member 
states in the achievement of the Compact’s objectives over the 
years to come (Carrera and Cortinovis, 2019b). 
In spite of the momentum injected by the agenda of the new 
Commission and the steering role played by the implementation 
of the UN GCR, policy developments over 2019 have underlined 
2  Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission. Mission letter to Ylva 
Johansson, Commissioner for Home Affairs, Brussels, 1 December 2019.
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how difficult the transition from a ‘crisis-labelling’ policy making 
in the area of asylum is proving to be. EU policy responses still 
heavily rely on extra-Treaty, informal and emergency-framing 
cooperation frameworks and instruments with third countries 
such as Libya and Turkey. These can hardly be considered as sus-
tainable and international refugee and human rights law-com-
pliant solutions, posing a number of crucial issues concerning 
their (lack of) consistency with EU democratic rule of law and 
fundamental rights principles in external action. On the ‘internal 
side’, ad hoc arrangements among few EU Member States for the 
disembarkation and relocation of asylum seekers rescued in the 
Mediterranean sea implemented during 2018 and 2019 are a clear 
manifestation of  intergovernmentalism and ‘flexible solidarity’ 
dominating EU policy responses in the area of asylum in the 
absence of a structural reform of the CEAS.
2. The External Dimension and Its Containment Bias: 
Solidarity Towards Third Countries?
The EU and its member states have taken an active role in the 
consultation process that led to the adoption of the GCR by the 
UN General Assembly in December 2018. The EU Delegation 
in Geneva expressed its support to the GCR process, while EU 
member states have generally aligned with the common state-
ments delivered by the EU Delegation during subsequent negoti-
ating rounds (Gatti, 2018). 
The GCR represents the international reference framework for 
planning and monitoring policy responses to address refugee situ-
ations in the future.3 Its main goal is to provide a basis for predict-
able and equitable responsibility-sharing among all UN Member 
States and other relevant stakeholders. The GCR core foundation 
is international refugee protection and international human rights 
driven. It confirms as its point of departure the existing interna-
tional protection framework, centred on the cardinal principle of 
3  See ‘The Global Compact on Refugees. Final Draft’ (as of 26 June 2018). https://www.
unhcr.org/5b3295167.pdf 
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non-refoulement, which lies at the core of the 1951 Geneva Con-
vention and its 1967 Protocol.
The potential added value of the GCR in fostering solidarity 
and responsibility sharing for refugee protection at the global 
level, however, face a political environment characterized by the 
proliferation of multiple instruments and arrangements aimed at 
preventing access, reducing admission and increasing the expul-
sion of asylum seekers to countries of transit or origin (Hathaway 
and Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2015). 
During recent decades, European states have developed a com-
plex and diversified matrix of policy, legal and financial instru-
ments to involve third countries in the management of migration, 
borders and asylum. At the EU level, policies guided by non-arrival 
and non-admission logics have taken the shape of a common EU 
visa and border (Schengen) policy, EU readmission agreements 
and arrangements, carrier sanctions and the inclusion of provi-
sions on ‘safe country concepts’ in EU asylum legislation (Byrne, 
Noll and Vedsted-Hansen, 2002; Costello, 2005; Scholten, 2015; 
Costello, 2016; Costello, 2017; Carrera, 2018). 
In the name of the 2015 European Refugee Humanitarian 
Crisis’, EU cooperation with third states on asylum and migra-
tion has been re-prioritised, leading to the adoption of a number 
of non-legally binding political ‘arrangements’. There has been a 
shift in EU policy: from an approach emphasising formal coop-
eration through legal acts and international agreements, towards 
another calling for informal channels and political tools or non-le-
gally binding/technical arrangements of cooperation, often linked 
to emergency-driven EU financial tools, such as EU Trust Funds 
(Carrera, Santos and Strik, 2019). As a consequence of this policy 
framework centred on containment, refugees and asylum seekers 
face overwhelming legal and practical barriers in effectively 
accessing protection in the EU. Savino has rightly pointed out 
that the resulting paradox is one where EU policies “feed the very 
same phenomenon of unauthorised arrivals – that the broader EU 
migration policy intends to curb” (Savino, 2018).
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A case in point of the tension between containment and fair 
responsibility sharing goals in EU asylum policy is the 2016 
EU-Turkey Statement (Carrera, den Hertog and Stefan, 2019),4 
which has been controversially portrayed by some EU policy 
makers as a ‘model’ to be replicated in cooperation with other 
major refugee hosting countries. The Statement set up an oper-
ative framework under which asylum seekers having irregularly 
entered Greece via Turkey would be returned to the latter. At the 
same time, it included the so-called ‘one-for-one’ resettlement 
arrangement, according to which, for every Syrian returned from 
the Greek islands to Turkey, another Syrian would be resettled 
from Turkey to the EU. The Statement was based on the political 
framing of Turkey as a ‘safe third country’, despite the fact that 
Turkey maintains a geographical limitation to the applicability of 
the Geneva Convention (thus it does not recognise full refugee 
status to non-European asylum seekers), and the wealth of evi-
dence about the human rights violations and rule of law challenges 
in the country (Amnesty International, 2017; Council of Europe, 
2017).
The EU-Turkey statement is an exemplary case illustrating how 
the containment bias underpinning EU policies often comes with 
specific forms of mobility and admission for refugees. The State-
ment in fact provides both containment and mobility elements in 
its priorities and design, and may be seen as a living instance of a 
contained mobility approach. Such an approach combines aspects 
of containment – e.g. safe third country rules, border surveillance 
and interception at sea – with others on mobility, yet a kind of 
mobility that presents highly selective, restrictive and discrimina-
tory features, e.g. a resettlement component only covering Syrian 
nationals. 
The EU-Turkey Statement took the shape of a political declara-
tion presented in the guise of a press release. The academic litera-
ture has expressed concerns about the strategic political ‘non-use’ 
4  Council of European Union (2016), EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016, Press 
Release 144/16, 18 March, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releas-
es/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/pdf   
110 PART II - BORDERS AND ASYLUM
of EU Treaty instruments through informal arrangements that 
escape democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament and judi-
cial control by the Court of Justice of the EU in Luxembourg, 
questioning the compatibility of this approach with the EU Treaty 
principles of inter-institutional balance and sincere and loyal 
cooperation (Carrera, den Hertog and Stefan, 2017). 
The human rights violations inherent in the practical imple-
mentation of the Statement in Turkey and Greece have been well 
documented (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2019). The selective 
mobility logic included in the one-for-one resettlement scheme 
– which only covers Syrians refugees – is contrary to established 
principles of international refugee law, which lie at the basis of 
the UN GCR. In particular, the scheme violates the prohibition 
of non- discrimination based on country of origin as laid down in 
Art. 3 of the 1951 Geneva Convention (Carrera and Guild, 2016).
The implementation of the ‘deal’ has raised fundamental 
questions regarding the independence of civil society actors and 
non-governmental organisations in the hotspots located on the 
Greek islands. Many civil society actors decided to stop providing 
services and assistance to asylum seekers and leave the country 
due to the human rights challenges that the operationalisation of 
the Statement posed to their ethos, independence and humani-
tarian assistance principles (Carrera et al., 2019). 
On the occasion of the third anniversary of the Statement in 
March 2019, a group of twenty-five civil society organisations sent 
an open letter to European leaders, reiterating their concerns about 
the ‘unfair and unnecessary containment policy’ implemented via 
the deal, which is still forcing thousands of refugees and asylum 
seekers to live in degrading conditions in hotspots on the Greek 
Islands.5
5  See NGOs calling on European leaders to urgently take action to end the human-
itarian and human rights crisis at Europe’s borders. https://oxfam.app.box.com/v/
3yearsEUTurkeyDeal At the time of writing, in February 2020, around 36,000 asylum 
seekers were still facing alarming overcrowding and precarious conditions in reception 
centres on the Greek islands. See ‘UNHCR calls for decisive action to end alarming 
conditions on Aegean islands’, 7 February 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/news/brief-
ing/2020/2/5e3d2f3f4/unhcr-calls-decisive-action-end-alarming-conditions-aege-
an-islands.html 
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Finally, the effectiveness of the ‘deal’ has been largely questioned. 
The limited number of Syrian refugees that have been returned to 
Turkey in the framework of the Statement (359 from April 2016 
to November 2019), as well as the total number of returns (only 
reaching about 2,000 over the same period) is a clear demonstra-
tion of the legal obstacles associated with unlawfully applying ‘safe 
third country’ notions in that specific context (UNHCR, 2019).
In addition, the EU-Turkey Statement has not prevented 
mobility from happening. According to statistics provided by 
Frontex, in 2019 there were about 82,000 irregular border cross-
ings from Turkey to Greece, in comparison to 56,000 in 2018 and 
42,000 entries in 2017 (Frontex, 2020; 2019). In light of the previ-
ously identified challenges, the EU-Turkey Statement hardly pro-
vide a sustainable and protection-driven model of cooperation and 
sharing of responsibility with third countries, as it stands at odds 
with the human rights principles and protection-driven rationale 
at the basis of EU Treaties and the GCR.
3. Solidarity Among EU Member States: Flexible 
Solidarity Is No Solidarity
Search and Rescue (SAR) and disembarkation of people rescued 
in the Mediterranean became once again a thorny political issue 
during the summer of 2018, after the decision by the Italian and 
Maltese governments to deny or delay disembarkation in their 
ports to NGOs and other vessels carrying migrants and asylum 
seekers found in distress at sea. In the following period, cases of 
delayed disembarkation were addressed through ad hoc disembar-
kation and relocation arrangements. These arrangements involved 
a small group of Member States willing to relocate, on a volun-
tary basis, a limited share of rescued asylum seekers disembarked 
in Italy, Malta and Spain (ECRE, 2019; Carrera and Cortinovis, 
2019a).
Following lengthy negotiations within the Council of the EU 
during 2019 on ‘temporary arrangements for disembarkation’, an 
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initiative led by four Member States (Germany, France, Italy, Malta) 
resulted in a Ministerial Meeting in Valletta on 23 September 2019. 
The declaration adopted by the four countries in that context – 
the so-called ‘Malta Declaration’ – aims to overcome the previous 
‘ship by ship’ approach to relocation by setting in place a “more 
predictable and efficient temporary solidarity mechanism”.6 The 
solidary mechanism foresees inter alia relocation to participating 
member states of asylum seekers disembarked in Italian and Mal-
tese ports on the basis of pre-declared pledges and through a fast 
track system taking no more than four weeks. The Declaration was 
further discussed at the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council 
meeting of 7 and 8 October 2019, in an attempt to broaden partic-
ipation in the mechanism to other EU member states. 
The intergovernmental nature of the ‘mechanism’ foreseen by 
the Malta declaration opens up fundamental questions concerning 
its relationship and compatibility with the EU rule of law frame-
work enshrined in the Treaties. A ‘pick and choose’ approach by 
member states to the application of the principle of solidarity 
stands at odds with the well-advanced stage of Europeanisation 
characterising EU asylum policies. 
‘Flexible integration’ and ‘solidarity à la carte’ run the risk of 
turning the clock back three decades in European integration and 
re-injecting intergovernmentalism into fields that – after the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 – are under clear EU com-
petence and scrutiny remits. The principle of solidarity in the field 
of asylum enshrined in Article 80 TFEU should not be understood 
as an ‘anything goes’ option for national governments  but as an 
EU constitutional principle driving the establishment and imple-
mentation of the CEAS (Moreno-Lax, 2017; Karageorgiou, 2019). 
In the 2017 ruling that dismissed the actions brought by Slo-
vakia and Hungary against the emergency relocation decisions 
adopted by the Council in 2015, the Luxembourg Court made 
6  See joint declaration of intent on a Controlled Emergency Procedure – Voluntary 
Commitments by Member States for a Predictable Temporary Solidarity Mechanism, 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-temporary-voluntary-relocation-mech-
anism-declaration.pdf
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it clear that when one or more Member States are faced with an 
emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of nationals 
of third countries, EU responses “must, as a rule, be divided 
between all the other Member States, in accordance with the prin-
ciple of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between the 
Member States”.7
When assessing EU responses in the context of the 2015 
humanitarian crisis, it is critical to recall that the Tampere Pro-
gramme in Paragraph 16 urged “the Council to step up its efforts 
to reach agreement on the issue of temporary protection for dis-
placed persons on the basis of solidarity between Member States”. 
Following up on that request, the EU adopted the Temporary Pro-
tection Directive (TPD) in 2001 (Peers et al. 2015).8
The purpose of the TPD is to set out minimum standards to 
give temporary protection in the event of a ‘mass influx’ of ‘dis-
placed persons’ from third countries who cannot return to their 
country of origin, and ‘to promote a balance of effort between 
Member States’ as regards the consequences of receiving such per-
sons (Art.1). 
One of the limitations of the TPD is its complex activation 
mechanism: its envisaged regime can only be activated if the 
Council decides to adopt a Decision establishing the ‘existence 
of a mass influx of displaced persons’. The Council must act by 
a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, which 
must consider any request to make such a proposal made by any 
Member State (Art. 5(1)).9
A number of explanations have been provided on why the TPR 
8  Council directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving tem-
porary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures 
promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and 
bearing the consequences thereof, OJ L 212/12.
9  The Directive also includes a number of solidarity and responsibility sharing related 
provisions. Art 25 (1) states that the Member States “shall receive persons who are eli-
gible for temporary protection in a spirit of Community solidarity”. Art. 26(1) specifies 
that Member States “shall cooperate with each other with regard to the transferral of 
the residence of persons enjoying temporary protection from one Member State to 
another, subject to the consent of the persons concerned to such transferral”.
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Directive has never been used in practice so far, including in con-
text prevailing in the EU since 2015. Previous contributions have 
underlined how the negotiation of this instrument revealed since 
the outset deep controversies between member states on issues 
related to burden-sharing, the relationship between temporary 
protection and asylum procedures and long-term solutions for the 
beneficiaries of temporary protection. The cumbersome activa-
tion procedure has constituted another reason preventing its use 
(Deniz Genç and Şirin Öner, 2019). 
Finally, the instrument of temporary protection, which 
emerged in Europe in the 1990s as a response to large influxes into 
European countries from the former Yugoslavia, was later on rec-
ognized by EU actors as incompatible with current EU policies 
of containing and controlling immigration (Koo, 2016). Guild, 
Peers and Moreno have in any case argued that the non-use of this 
Directive has been in fact good news as it posed a serious risk to 
undermine Geneva Convention standards by offering EU Member 
States the possibility “to grant considerable numbers of people the 
lower standards of protection in this Directive instead of refugee 
status” (Peers et al. 2015).
The background of controversies over solidarity briefly 
described above is one characterized by major protection dilemmas 
affecting the current shape of the CEAS. As Vedsted-Hansen (2017) 
has showed, the CEAS is not only still incomplete in nature in 
light of the Tampere Programme. It is also characterized by struc-
tural protective failures and an unfair and asymmetric distribu-
tion model of responsibilities among member countries under the 
Dublin Regulation. Moreover, current EU asylum law standards 
enshrined in EU Directives have allowed for the use and misuse 
of ‘optional clauses’ by Member States to reduce protection stand-
ards to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. If anything, the 2015 
humanitarian refugee crisis brought those very challenges into the 
spotlight (Vedsted-Hansen, 2017).
In 2016, the European Commission proposed a reform of the 
CEAS, which included a revision of the Dublin regime. The Com-
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mission proposal included the introduction of a ‘corrective allo-
cation mechanism’ – taking over the 2015 temporary relocation 
decisions - that would be activated automatically in cases where 
a member state has to deal with a disproportionate number of 
asylum seekers (European Commission, 2016b).
In November 2017, the LIBE Committee of the European Par-
liament (EP) adopted its report on the Dublin reform as a basis 
for inter-institutional negotiations (European Parliament 2017). 
The EP Report envisaged an overhaul of the criteria for allocating 
responsibility for asylum claims within the EU: deleting the irreg-
ular entry criterion, expanding the criteria based on family links, 
and introducing academic and professional qualifications as rele-
vant criteria. A key component of the EP proposal was the intro-
duction of a distribution mechanism between member states as 
the default rule when none of the (revised) criteria laid down in 
the Dublin’s hierarchy apply. Furthermore, the EP report pro-
vided applicants with a (limited) choice in the identification of the 
member state responsible for examining their claim, which repre-
sents an absolute novelty in the Dublin procedure.
The reform of the CEAS, however, was put ‘on hold’ during 
the previous legislative term by persisting disagreements among 
member states in the Council over issues related to the distribu-
tion of responsibility and specifically the introduction of a system 
of mandatory relocation of asylum seekers. Representatives of 
the member states gave preference to a logic of consensus and de 
facto unanimity during negotiations on the CEAS reform files. As 
underlined by the European Parliament, this choice disregards the 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) rule under the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure for asylum-related legislative initiatives foreseen in 
the Lisbon Treaty (Carrera and Cortinovis, 2019a: 30). 
The lack of progress on the CEAS reform has clear repercus-
sions on the ‘external sides’ of EU asylum policy, which are still 
driven by a predominant home affairs and policing approach 
focused on containment. Establishing an efficient, sustainable, 
equitable system for sharing responsibility between member states 
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is a precondition for honouring the EU’s commitment laid down 
in the Tampere Programme and the EU Treaties to ensuring access 
to protection and adequate reception standards to the relatively 
small share of world’s refugees that seek protection in Europe. 
Addressing structural and protection gaps in EU asylum govern-
ance is also crucial for ensuring the credibility and legitimacy of 
EU efforts to promote refugee protection and integration in the 
main refugee hosting countries in other world regions.  
4. Conclusion
The principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility 
enshrined in Article 80 TFEU implies equality among all EU 
member states and a common response to asylum challenges. The 
way forward for the EU should be that of developing its asylum 
policy based on a paradigm of ‘equal solidarity’, whereby all EU 
member states share fairly and equally the responsibility for 
asylum seekers across the Union. This would translate into the 
enactment of a set of asylum policies grounded in EU and national 
constitutive principles and fundamental rights, as a precondition 
for restoring the legitimacy and credibility of the EU in this area.
Furthermore, the requirement laid down in Art. 78(1) TFEU 
that the common EU asylum policy must be in accordance with 
the Geneva Refugee Convention and ‘other relevant human rights 
treaties’, implies that the principle of solidarity should not be cir-
cumscribed to internal asylum policies but guide the external 
facets of the CEAS as well. This should go hand in hand with EU 
efforts to reform its own projection regime in line with interna-
tional refugee law and the GCR commitments. 
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10. SEARCH AND RESCUE AT 
SEA, NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANISATIONS AND THE 




In recent years, humanitarian actors supporting migrants have 
been increasingly harassed, discredited and criminalised by public 
authorities in different EU countries and regions, both on land and 
at sea, at external as well as internal Schengen borders (Bellezza 
and Calandrino, 2017; Carrera, Allsopp and Vosyliūtė, 2018; 
Fekete, Webber and Edmond-Pettitt, 2017; 2019). This Chapter 
focuses on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaged in 
search and rescue (SAR) in the Central Mediterranean. Between 
the end of 2016 and early 2017, the EU Border agency Frontex first 
suggested that NGOs may be used by smugglers (Robinson, 2016), 
then claimed they encourage smugglers while not cooperating 
with the police (Bewarder and Walter, 2017). Following this, sim-
ilar allegations were made by Italian prosecutors (Reuters, 2017) as 
well as policymakers from both government (Grignetti, 2017) and 
opposition (Agi, 2017). 
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Since then, NGO staff have been prosecuted in Italy (and then 
Malta) not only for facilitating irregular immigration but also for a 
range of administrative issues, while NGO vessels and reconnais-
sance airplanes have been seized or otherwise prevented from car-
rying out SAR missions (Fra, 2018; 2019). Other NGO ships have 
been hampered after they rescued people at sea, as permission to 
disembark was denied or delayed. Finally, NGO assets have been 
gradually excluded from SAR operations coordinated by the mar-
itime rescue coordination centres (MRCCs) of the coastal states 
concerned. This is all aimed at facilitating forced returns from 
international waters by the Libyan authorities and preventing 
people from reaching EU soil. These developments pose serious 
challenges to the principles that should guide the EU’s external 
action.
2. Excluding NGO Vessels From SAR Operations
After a period (from 2014, when the first NGO rescue mission 
took place, to 2016) of effective cooperation with SAR NGOs (Cut-
titta, 2018c; Stierl, 2018), the Italian MRCC (I-MRCC), which is 
managed by the Coast Guard, gradually changed its policy towards 
NGO vessels (Cuttitta, 2018a; 2018b). While international law 
requires state authorities, whenever there is a distress case, to avail 
themselves of any available asset to the maximum extent possible 
(Papanicolopulu, 2017), I-MRCC started excluding NGO vessels 
from SAR operations.
As a first step, when NGO ships were the closest to a distress 
case, I-MRCC started asking them to intervene but refrain from 
taking people onboard, and only monitor the situation until 
Libyan patrol boats would arrive and forcibly return the passen-
gers to Libya (Cuttitta, 2017). Thus, NGOs were obliged to de 
facto passively support deportations. By doing this, I-MRCC also 
distanced itself from its previous, extensive interpretation of the 
notion of ‘distress’, whereby a situation of ‘distress’ is what triggers 
the legal obligation to immediately rescue people (Cuttitta, 2018a).
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The second step was not to involve NGO ships in SAR opera-
tions anymore. Maltese and Libyan authorities also followed this 
policy. Since the contested establishment of a Libyan SAR region 
(Santer, 2019) in 2018, European and North African coast guards 
mostly: a) do no longer entrust NGO vessels with rescue duties; b) 
do not even send out NAVTEX messages, that are received auto-
matically by all vessels transiting in the relevant area (Mensurati, 
2018; Nicolosi, 2019; Tonacci, 2018). NGO vessels are involved 
only as a last resort. This is aimed at making sure that the Libyan 
authorities are given priority in their purported SAR region, and 
can carry out interdictions disguised as rescues (Moreno-Lax, 
2017). Indeed, international law requires that a rescue operation 
ends with the disembarkation in a place of safety, that is “a place 
where the survivors’ safety of life is no longer threatened, and 
where their basic human needs (such as food, shelter and medical 
needs) can be met” (Imo, 2004). Libya is not such a place, since 
migrants are systematically subjected to violence and abuses there, 
even from public authorities (United Nations, 2019). 
3. Facilitating Pull-Backs to Libya
While not involving NGO vessels opens up the question of the 
responsibility for any failed rescue that should result from this 
policy, the practice of supporting pull-backs (Markard, 2016; 
Pijnenburg, 2018) from international waters to Libya opens up the 
question of the indirect or even direct legal responsibility of Italy 
or the EU for these actions. The fact that Italy (Palm, 2017) and 
the EU (European Commission, s.d.) provide the authorities of the 
Libyan government of national accord (GNA) with assets as well 
as training programmes for their officials (Political and Security 
Committee, 2016), knowing that this will result in forced collective 
returns, suggests that an indirect responsibility may arise for both 
Italy and the EU for assisting Libya in committing an internation-
ally wrongful act (Giuffré, 2013; Markard, 2016). 
index
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Direct responsibility may arise for pull-backs carried out by 
Libyan patrol boats if these take place under the actual coordina-
tion of the Italian authorities. Several circumstances suggest that 
this may be the case. One is the fact that no Libyan MRCC exists 
yet: the EU-funded project supporting its establishment is still at 
an early stage (European Parliament, 2019). In the absence of an 
effective Libyan MRCC, a Libyan SAR region arguably only exists 
potentially, and coordination of pull-backs seem to be actively 
supported, if not directly coordinated, by the Italian navy ships 
that have been anchored at the port of Tripoli since August 2017 
(Ministero della difesa, 2019; Senato della Repubblica, 2017), 
as found by an Italian court (Tribunale di Catania, 2018). These 
issues are currently under the scrutiny of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR, 2019; Pijnenburg, 2018) as well as the 
International Criminal Court (Bowcott, 2019; Shatz and Branco, 
2019). As regards Maltese authorities, these seem to have coordi-
nated pull-backs to Libya even directly: through their MRCC and 
from the Maltese SAR region (Lüdke, 2019).
4. Struggles About Disembarkation
When NGO ships manage to rescue people and take them onboard, 
public authorities pose increasing obstacles to disembarkation. 
Disembarkation is often denied or delayed (e.g. by arguing that 
other states are responsible), and followed by legal proceedings, 
also including the seizure of the vessel.
Italy decided, first, to disengage from responsibility to coor-
dinate SAR, and identify a place of safety, for events occurring 
outside its SAR region, thus involving the other Mediterranean 
coastal states: the first such case was that of the Golfo Azzurro, 
which had rescued people in the Maltese SAR region in August 
2017 (The Maritime Executive, 2017). Since then, when it was 
brought into play, Malta often denied permission to dock and dis-
embark, arguing that other principles, such as that of the closest 
port of safety (mostly Lampedusa or Tunisia), should apply. 
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More generally, both Italy and Malta have often accepted dis-
embarkation only after other countries had formally committed to 
relocate part of the rescued people to their territories (Carabott, 
2019; La Repubblica, 2019a; Ziniti, 2019b). This took often weeks, 
during which people were forced to wait at sea, and NGO vessels 
were unable or only partly able to carry out other rescues. 
The compliance of such practice with international law is ques-
tionable. According to the International convention for the safety 
of life at sea, whenever a rescue is carried out by a private ship, 
shipmasters should be released from their obligations with min-
imum further deviation from the ships’ intended voyage.1
Italy and Malta have also used the flag argument to skip 
responsibility. Thus, they managed to involve the authorities of 
flag states in their offensive against SAR NGOs. This issue was 
first posed only in theory, in June 2017: the Gentiloni government 
suggested that failure from the EU to provide more support may 
result in foreign flagged vessels to be denied permission to dock 
at Italian ports (Ansa, 2017). Similar threats were posed again 
in March 2018, towards the Spanish-flagged NGO ship Open 
Arms (Guardia Costiera, 2018), and two months later, towards 
the UK-flagged Astral (Brera, 2018). The following government 
(the first Conti government) put the idea into practice. In August 
2018, it said the UK was responsible for the disembarkation of 141 
people rescued by the Aquarius, the ship bearing a Gibraltar flag 
and managed by SOS Méditerranée and Médecins Sans Frontières 
(MSF). The permission to bear the Gibraltar flag was immediately 
revoked (Yeung, 2018). Short after the vessel was re-registered 
with Panama, it was de-flagged by the Panama authorities as well 
(Weaver, 2018). According to the NGOs, Panama was pressured by 
1  Significantly, permission to dock was also denied to commercial ships which were 
only accidentally involved in rescue operations. Italy gave the example with the Danish 
Alexander Maersk and the Italian Vos Thalassa, which were both forced to wait for days 
before they could dock or transfer the rescued to other vessels in 2018 (Rainews, 2018; 
Lopapa, 2018). The supply vessel Sarost V was even refused authorisation to dock by 
Malta after rescuing 40 people in the Maltese SAR region, under Maltese coordina-
tion, and its flag state Tunisia kept it waiting for weeks before allowing disembarkation 
(Santer, 2018). The Tunisian authorities did the same with the Egyptian Maridive 601 
in 2019 (Tondo and Stierl, 2019).
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the Italian government (Kelly, 2018). SOS Méditerranée and MSF 
resumed SAR operations with a new ship flying a Norwegian flag 
in 2019.
Similarly, the NGO Sea Eye had to charter a new ship under a 
new flag after Italy asked the Netherlands to verify the registration 
of its Seefuchs, as well as of another NGO ship, the Lifeline. The 
Dutch authorities replied that the boats were insufficiently regis-
tered for them to bear the Dutch flag. Both ships were blocked 
in Malta. A trial for ‘insufficient registration’ against the Lifeline 
and its captain is still going on (Mission Lifeline, 2019). The Neth-
erlands also changed its legislation by introducing new require-
ments for rescue ships, only to block the Dutch-flagged Sea-Watch 
3 (Sea-Watch, 2019) after the Italian government claimed that 
the people rescued by the ship of the German NGO Sea-Watch 
should disembark either in the Netherlands or in Germany, in Jan-
uary 2019. However, a Dutch court found that the blockage was 
unlawful, and the Sea-Watch 3 could resume SAR operations after 
a month. The flag issue was raised again by the Italian government 
against the Sea Eye’s Alan Kurdi in April (La Repubblica, 2019c) 
and the Sea-Watch 3 in June (La Repubblica, 2019b). In August 
2019, the Italian government called for the Spanish government 
to de-flag the Open Arms, the rescue vessel of the Spanish NGO 
Proactiva Open Arms (Ziniti, 2019a). 
In sum, NGO assets have been systematically blocked not only 
after rescue operations but even preventively. More specifically, 
EU countries such as Malta and Spain have not only denied disem-
barkation: they have also denied NGOs the authorisation to leave 
their ports to carry out SAR missions (Abellán, 2019). Malta (Sea-
Watch, 2018; Ziniti, 2018) and Italy (Mensurati and Tonacci, 2019) 
also blocked the airplanes used by NGOs to spot vessels in distress.
5. Legal Prosecutions
As of 1 June 2019, the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights counted 5 ongoing and 8 past legal proceedings (in Italy 
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and Malta alone) against NGO assets engaged in SAR, while sim-
ilar proceedings have taken place in Greece as well (Fra, 2019).
The first to be targeted was the NGO Jugend Rettet, whose ship 
Iuventa was seized in August 2017. While accusations seem to 
rest on weak foundations (Forensic Oceanography and Forensic 
Architecture, 2018), ten crew members are currently being prose-
cuted by the Italian judiciary for aiding illegal immigration.
In March 2018, the Open Arms refused to hand over to Libyan 
authorities the people rescued in the would-be Libyan SAR 
region, as requested by I-MRCC. For this reason, it was seized by 
the Italian authorities after it was eventually allowed to dock in 
Pozzallo (Ruta, 2018). More prosecutions followed in 2018 and 
2019. Arguably, their proliferation was partly facilitated by the 
2002 EU Facilitators’ package (Bellezza and Calandrino, 2017; 
Carrera, Vosyliūtė, Smialowski, Allsopp and Sanchez, 2018; Fra, 
2018; Vosyliūtė and Conte, 2018). Unlike the Migrant Smuggling 
Protocol supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, the EU package does not include 
a clause exempting those who do not aid for profit but for other 
(e.g. humanitarian) reasons, thus leaving it to the member states to 
decide whether to adopt such a humanitarian clause or not. 
In Italy, however, since no evidence of collusion with smugglers 
has ever emerged, the fact that the accused acted in the accom-
plishment of the higher legal obligation to rescue has always made 
sure that legal proceedings were discontinued, even in the absence 
of a humanitarian clause (Masera, 2018). On the other hand, the 
very fact that NGOs are investigated and prosecuted contributes 
to criminalising and discrediting them, which results in a decrease 
in donations (Cusumano and Pattison, 2018), while boat seizures 
result in a strong reduction of the overall SAR capacity in the Med-
iterranean.
A role in the process of criminalisation was also played by 
the ‘code of conduct’, a private agreement imposed by the Italian 
government on NGO ships in 2017. The code has little juridical 
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relevance, if at all, since it cannot prevail over national and inter-
national law (Cusumano, 2019; Mussi, 2017). However, together 
with the increasing aggressions from Libyan patrol boats (Cut-
titta, 2018a; 2018c), it contributed to discouraging several NGOs, 
which decided to leave the Mediterranean, while the seizure of the 
Iuventa appeared to be a retaliation act of the Italian judiciary, as it 
occurred the day after Jugend Rettet announced it would not sign 
the code (Dearden, 2017). Some of the provisions contained in the 
code seem to have inspired the decree of the  Libyan GNA of 14 
September 2019 regulating SAR activities in the would-be Libyan 
SAR region (Arci, 2019). Few weeks after the decree was issued, 
a Libyan militia fired warning shots and interfered with a rescue 
operation carried out by the Alan Kurdi (Deutsche Welle, 2019).
6. Separation of Powers
In March 2019, the former Italian interior minister Matteo Sal-
vini publicly called on the judicial authorities to arrest the Mare 
Jonio’s crew when the vessel of the NGO Mediterranea entered 
the Lampedusa harbour (Ansa, 2019). This was just one of sev-
eral interferences from the executive and legislative over the judi-
ciary. Prosecutors were not only pressured to investigate NGOs, 
but they were also openly intimidated when they started inves-
tigating Salvini for kidnapping, as migrants were forced to wait 
onboard a navy ship in Italian waters before they were allowed to 
dock and disembark in August 2018. A member of the Parliament 
publicly threatened to “come and pick [them] up if [they] touch 
the Captain”2 (La Repubblica, 2018). In May 2019, Salvini himself 
commented on the decision of Agrigento’s public prosecutor to 
allow disembarkation of the migrants rescued by an NGO vessel 
by declaring that “if this public prosecutor wants to serve as a min-
ister of interior, he should run for elections” (Il Messaggero, 2019).
Incidentally, attempts from Italian politicians to pressure the 
judiciary were not new in the field of migration (see Bellezza and 
2  Salvini is called “il Capitano” by his followers.
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Calandrino, 2017, p. 250, on the pressure to arrest boat drivers as 
smugglers even if they were just migrants like the other passen-
gers), which further attests to an overheated climate surrounding 
migration which seriously risks eroding the fundamental princi-
ples of the separation of powers and the independence of the judi-
ciary, which are cornerstones of the rule of law. 
7. Solidarity
Struggles about which country should take responsibility for the 
rescued and their disembarkation clearly show a lack of solidarity 
among the states concerned. This also led the EU to conceive 
the plan of regional disembarkation platforms, with people res-
cued in international waters to be disembarked in third countries 
(Ecre, 2018). The idea, which was rejected by African countries 
(Boffey, 2019), was a further attempt to circumvent legal obliga-
tions towards migrants. Like outsourced forced returns to Libya, 
it would have been arguably in breach of international law, since 
countries such as Tunisia and Egypt are, like Libya, not safe.
Since 2018, people rescued by NGOs are mostly allowed dis-
embarkation in Italy or Malta only after their partial redistribu-
tion has been accepted by other EU countries. Thus, an informal 
relocation mechanism has been created, but only on a voluntary 
basis, and with only little success, since most governments do 
not keep their promises (Lopapa, 2019; Rt, 2019). Even the joint 
declaration agreed upon by the governments of France, Germany, 
Italy and Malta on 23 September 2019 (Valletta Declaration, 2019) 
only leaves it to the states to agree on relocation arrangements 
(Carrera and Cortinovis 2019a; 2019b). Importantly, the Valletta 
Declaration further states that the EU should enhance its “aerial 
surveillance in the southern Mediterranean in order to ensure 
that migrant boats are detected early with a view to fight migrant 
smuggling networks, human trafficking and related criminal 
activity and minimising the risk of loss of life at sea”, whereby early 
detection means higher chances to inform Libyan authorities in 
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time for them to carry out pull-backs. It seems that the only way 
not to put solidarity among member states under strain is to deny 
any form of solidarity towards individuals who try to exercise their 
rights to mobility and asylum.
8. Conclusion
The externalisation of migration and border controls to inter-
national waters is part of the EU’s external action. According to 
article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, “[t]he Union’s action 
on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and 
which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule 
of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of 
equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter and international law”. 
The developments outlined in this Chapter show that these 
principles are being openly defied by public authorities. The rule 
of law is challenged by the increasing interferences from the exec-
utive and legislative towards the judicial branch. Forced returns 
from international waters pose serious challenges to the princi-
ples of international law. ‘Indivisible’ human rights and funda-
mental freedoms are in fact divided into two categories: the more 
deserving, such as the right not to be exposed to the risk of death 
or abuses and violence by smugglers, and the less deserving, such 
as the right to leave any country, including one’s own (Markard, 
2016), the right to asylum and the right not to be subjected to 
abuses and violence by state authorities. 
Solidarity among member states, far from serving as a guiding 
principle, is downgraded to an option, while solidarity among 
individuals is systematically discouraged. Finally, the human dig-
nity of those kept hostages for weeks onboard rescue ships is dis-
regarded, and even more so that of the people pushed back against 
their will to North Africa on behalf of Europe, and subjected there 
to inhuman treatments and violence.
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11. 20 YEARS AFTER 
TAMPERE’S AGENDA ON 
“ILLEGAL MIGRATION”: POLICY 




In the rather polarized context of EU politics, immigration and 
asylum have become a matter of “high politics” used by certain 
government leaders to exacerbate tensions between member 
states. The issue has received wide media attention since 2015 and 
there have been several Council meetings dedicated to immigra-
tion and asylum. So commemorating the Tampere summit is not 
just a step back in time, it takes place in a more discreet and con-
sensual context. 
In 1999, a few highly specialized hauts fonctionnaires of the 
Council Secretariat well versed in the EU culture of compromise 
could prepare a summit and its conclusions with little interfer-
ences from their own institution or from the 15 member state gov-
ernments (Mangenot, 2003). It was a different moment than the 
politicized character of the 2002 Seville summit when the “BAB 
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trio” (Blair, Aznar and Berlusconi) put the fight of illegal migration 
at the top of the agenda, calling for instance for a European corps 
of border police or cutting aid to immigration source countries.
Calling for a “constant review progress” with a Commission 
“scoreboard” and “the necessary transparency” vis à vis the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Conclusions of the 1999 Tampere summit is 
an agenda-setting document. It is thus appropriate to ask about the 
implementation of the various orientations laid out in this blue-
print. Although it is forward-looking, the Tampere Programme 
also reflects the proximate context of the times, which I will briefly 
outline and analyse before turning to the legacy of Tampere. 
This Chapter argues that the policy paradigm set out in the Tam-
pere conclusions was never called into question nor were afferent 
policy instruments. While it became clear that there were negative 
consequences to “remote control” with migrants taking dangerous 
and even deadly routes and entering irregularly, while there was 
little evidence of the success of cooperation with third countries, 
especially in the geopolitical chaos South of Europe, there was no 
reorientation of policy and this inertia led to policy drift. 
2. The Tampere Moment
The Tampere conclusions built on a decade or so of cooperation in 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), first through the Schengen Sec-
retariat and working groups and, as of 1994, with a Directorate at 
the Council Secretariat, which was more active than the very small 
Commission taskforce. This means that policy inputs on immi-
gration and asylum came from law and order officials and firmly 
located the issue on a security continuum. Notwithstanding, the 
text is quite balanced with its first section devoted to numerous 
references to liberty, “a shared commitment to freedom based on 
human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law” and the 
respect of the right to asylum. Yet, what is striking is the impor-
tance of “external action” in the area of immigration, the so-called 
“global approach to migration.” This was relatively new but it 
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exemplified the intense intergovernmental activity in this area in 
that period.
One illustration regards the numerous references to organised 
crime, and the smuggling and trafficking of persons. In 1999, the 
civil servants involved in EU JHA circles were involved in negoti-
ating the UN convention on transnational crime and its protocols. 
Among them, there was the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children 
and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea 
and Air. Moreover, several international organizations had been 
focusing on trafficking of human beings after 1989 and the fall 
of the Iron Curtain. This was the case of the Geneva-based IOM, 
which commissioned many reports on the issue and by the mid-
1990s offered to repatriate trafficking persons. Similarly, the Vien-
na-based ICMPD founded in 1993 that served a secretariat of the 
intergovernmental Budapest process also acquired expertise in the 
field of smuggling and trafficking. Thus, the emerging EU agenda 
at Tampere was embedded in a large web of parallel intergovern-
mental initiatives at the regional and global levels. 
Tampere thus established diplomacy as a pillar of JHA. Again, 
there were proximate events. Negotiations between the EU and 71 
ACP countries that will lead to the signing of the 2000 Cotonou 
agreement were under way and included a clause on readmis-
sion. With the coming into force of the 1997 Amsterdam treaty, a 
Council working party entitled the High Level Working Group on 
migration and asylum was set up. The HLWG commissioned six 
“action plans” on cooperation with several source and/or “transit” 
countries (Morocco, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and 
Albania). The goals were three-fold: negotiating readmission 
agreements, transferring the European model of immigration con-
trol with the adoption of laws criminalizing illegal migration, and 
providing operational support from airport liaison officers to the 
training of border guards and export of equipment. 
The Tampere summit consecrated the particular vision of JHA 
personnel in charge of immigration policy: shifting policy elabo-
ration upwards to the supranational level and outwards to non-EU 
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states. This has meant intense transgovernmental activities of law 
and order officials that have monopolized this policy domain and, 
in parallel, deploying the EU diplomatic capital to enlist third 
countries and have them implement the European restrictive 
agenda (Guiraudon, 2003). 
3. Fighting “Illegal Migration,” Really? The Elusive Goal 
of EU Policy
EU policy before and after Tampere has focused on illegal migra-
tion and the measures meant to stem the phenomenon. In the 
Tampere Programme, the term “illegal migration” (“immigration 
clandestine”, “immigrazione clandestina”) is used, albeit spar-
ingly, but not defined.1 There is also no explanation of its causes, 
no discussion of its consequences, and no justification of why it is 
a EU policy priority. The phrase “illegal migration” is juxtaposed 
to others such as “organized crime” as something to combat, as 
a common place. In fact, the phrase itself apposes two different 
terms: migration, which is a social phenomenon, and the adjective 
“illegal”, that combined reflect a legal-political reality – the sover-
eign right of states to decide on the status of non-nationals who 
enter and stay on their territory. 
There is thus something peculiar about wanting to fight illegal 
migration at the EU level while member states are still solely 
responsible for granting a legal status in all cases except the short-
term visas for Schengen states. Moreover, states decide on ‘who is 
deported’, in spite of current EU norms such as the 2008 Returns 
Directive. Supranational constraints when acknowledged come 
from jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on 
articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
respectively on torture and on family life. Similarly, states manage 
asylum systems with very different rates of recognition and thus 
numbers of rejected asylum seekers who join the population of 
1  The Commission will do so in much detail in a 2001 Communication and subse-
quent documents. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX-
:52001DC0672
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potential “illegals” and deportees, and equally different rates of 
expulsion of those who did not obtain protection. Finally, states 
decide on the regularization of foreigners, whether they are indi-
vidual or parts of larger more publicized campaigns. So the main 
focus of EU policy, “illegal migration” actually depends on national 
laws and practices.
There is also something odd in the focus on preventing “illegal 
migration” before persons actually reach the territory of a member 
state. How can you be “illegal” before you set foot in the EU? The 
justification was the need to be “proactive,” deter potential or 
future illegal entry and stay. In the Schengen codebook, consulates 
should detect “migratory risks”, persons that claim to want to visit 
a EU member state but in fact intend to overstay their visa. Very 
early on, at the signing of the Schengen Agreement, a number of 
international organizations and NGOs denounced the measures 
meant to fight illegal migration as targeting all asylum-seekers that 
could not obtain a passport and visa and thus would be stopped at 
airports by the personnel of transport companies that wanted to 
avoid carrier sanctions. 
Under the misleading label of the “fight against illegal migra-
tion,” the EU policy core focuses on preventing certain types of 
migrants from reaching EU soil. Since the 1980s, law and order 
agencies in charge of immigration management in North-western 
Europe, knew that, once on EU soil, the rule of law and access to a 
modicum of rights would inter alia make it hard to expel migrants. 
This has not changed.
4. The Tampere Legacy
Since Tampere, the “external dimension” of EU border policy is 
a key feature of immigration control. It is the dark side of poli-
cy-making in contrast with visible bordering and spectacular wall-
building, especially since it is often difficult to obtain information 
on the deals struck or trace the allocation of EU funds. It is also 
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dark in normative terms by human rights activists as the case of 
cooperation with Libya under Muammar Ghaddafi and in the cur-
rent chaos shows.
A key development of the so-called 2015 crisis is a joint state-
ment negotiated by the German and Dutch heads of government 
with the Turkish Prime Minister and then accepted by other 
EU leaders signed on 22 March 2016. This is as high-level “high 
politics” gets in this policy domain, far from the protracted dec-
ades-long negotiations between EU Commission civil servants and 
Moroccan officials on the readmission of third country nationals. 
This diplomatic solution consisted in convincing a transit country 
to stem flows and readmit foreigners, in his case Syrian nationals 
in Turkey, with some financial compensation (6 billion euros). It 
was also mostly a matter of political expediency. 
EU governments were divided in a moment of heightened 
public attention, unable to agree on reforming key policy instru-
ments (Dublin and Schengen). Turkey appeared as a deus ex 
machina, and the deal was a quick fix to relieve interstate tension. 
So we should underline that important decisions can bypass the 
EU institutions supposedly involved in policy-making of immi-
gration, asylum and borders policy. The European Parliament was 
not even consulted and the Luxembourg Court ruled that it was 
not competent to examine what it deemed as a “non-EU” agree-
ment made at the margin of a European Council meeting.2 
2015 with the peak of Syrian arrivals in Europe could have been 
a turning point and the occasion for reform. Instead, we saw pro-
found rifts within the EU, a “crisis of solidarity” that prevented 
reform, in particular of the EU asylum system. Otherwise, it was 
“business as usual” with an increased budget and mandate for 
Frontex, and more means cooperation to interdict emigration: the 
2015 Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to fight the “root causes 
of irregular migration and displaced persons,” the aforementioned 
EU-Turkey joint statement of 2016 or the operational help to var-
ious Libyan forces or leaders in the Sahel-Sahara region. 
2  Joined Cases C208/17 P to C210/17 P.
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Can we explain this continuity in policy? Based on classical 
theories of public policy and EU studies, I briefly outline forward 
two different kinds of logics, which we could summarily label 
“bureaucratic and “political.”
Once a policy is set, it is difficult to shift paths (Guiraudon, 
2017). Political scientists have long underlined this phenomenon 
regardless of the concepts that they use (“policy feedbacks,” “path 
dependence,” “punctuated equilibrium”). Vested interests cling 
on. In this case, the first to invest in the field of immigration and 
asylum are Home Affairs ministries and border and security forces. 
First come first serve. This monopoly means that decision-makers 
process information according to their particular lens or “policy 
frame” even if it is based on false foundations. The European Com-
mission attempted just after Tampere in a 2000 Communication 
to develop a utilitarian argument alongside the securitarian frame 
of immigration by referring to a contested UN report suggesting 
that immigration was needed to compensate for labor shortages in 
an aging Europe with low fertility rates. The idea was immediately 
shot down and the Commission criticized in such a way that it 
never tried afterwards to do more than accompany the wishes of 
governments and their powerful Home Affairs ministers.
Second, a related issue regards “sunk costs.” The more you invest 
in a particular policy option, the harder it is to admit failure. This 
has been documented in the case of immigration policy and more 
generally border control, notably in the US case (see Andreas, 
2009). The fall of the numbers of unwanted arrivals shows success. 
However, if numbers rise, stakeholders do not see it as a failure 
but as proof that more means should be invested to reach the 
original goal. This is a vicious circle exemplified in the EU case 
by the increase in budget and personnel for Frontex but also the 
sums allocated to cooperation with third countries after the 2015 
summit in La Vallette.
Third, pooling resources for distributive measures that could 
possibly be useful to all is easier to “sell” to EU governments than 
redistributive measures where it is easier to identify winners and 
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losers. Getting EU-wide support to step up border controls and 
to cooperate with transit and origin countries has been easy in the 
two main legislative bodies, the Council and Parliament. Pooling 
resources to interdict migrants at the source or on the way poten-
tially benefits all member states and, in fact, little has been done to 
precisely assess the actual effects of measures. This is not the case 
of redistributive initiatives like the reallocation of asylum-seekers 
throughout the EU. We have seen how some governments such as 
Poland and Hungary have battled including in front of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice not to apply quotas of asylum-seekers. Inter-
state solidarity within the EU is thus more difficult than allocating 
EU funds to Turkey, African states or Frontex. Thus, agreement 
on the external dimension of EU policy masks the crisis of agree-
ments of regulations affecting intra-EU movement, namely the 
Dublin and Schengen systems.
Fourth, we should interrogate the pre-eminence of the “high 
politics” of diplomacy to externalize control especially after 2015 
in relation to the enduring “low politics” of labor migration. In 
spite of intense activity at EU level, member states jealously guard 
their national prerogatives when it comes to regulating the entry 
and stay of third country nationals. Cooperation on labour migra-
tion can be summed up in a watered down “Blue Card Directive” 
rarely used by member states that still compete for “global talent” 
with national schemes. Other EU Directives that have sought to 
approximate the national legislation regarding family reunifica-
tion, or the status of long-term residents fall short of harmoniza-
tion. 
In brief, operational cooperation at the border and joint dip-
lomatic efforts to stem migrants at the source have been the main 
focus of member states by default i.e. avoiding EU meddling in 
internal regulations affecting foreigners. Transgovernmental 
cooperation mechanisms that involve the buffering and bordering 
of the EU are more palatable to member state governments. These 
are presented as a plus rather than as a substitute for national pre-
rogatives. 
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The goals set at the Tampere Programme were not based on 
any solid evidence and have enormous costs in diplomatic capital 
apparently is not important to policy-makers. The external dimen-
sion of EU border policy often refers to the link between migration 
and development and the fallacious idea that EU development aid 
will contribute to stemming migration flows. Migration scholars 
hailing from economics or sociology have long demonstrated 
empirically that migration is more likely from developing rather 
than from poor countries. Engaging with regimes in source and 
transit countries in exchange for emigration control has been very 
costly, and I do not refer it to money but leverage and credibility. 
What is the cost of migration control when the EU legitimizes 
regimes in Libya and Sudan? Mainstreaming immigration in inter-
national negotiations essentially gives transit countries unwar-
ranted earnings based on their geographical position, (a “rente 
de situation”). They can engage in long, protracted negotiations, 
as did Morocco with respect to an EU readmission agreement (El 
Qadim, 2015). In December 2019, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
threatened to let Syrian refugees reach the EU if it condemned the 
Turkish military incursion into Syria.
5. Conclusion
20 years ago, the Tampere Programme laid out the model for 
“controlling EU borders.” Prepared by the JHA Department of the 
Council Secretariat, it also called for diplomatic action to enlist 
third states as sheriff deputies to prevent to the EU or readmit 
third country nationals. The model is thus one of “remote control” 
and the erection of a number of locks to prevent unwanted flows 
inspired in part from North American precedents (Fitzgerald, 
2019).
There has been no reorientation of policy, no questioning of 
the policy paradigm and continuity in policy instruments. The 
bureaucratic stakes and later private vested interests in the domain 
of immigration and asylum explain this situation even more 
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than the evolution of the political make-up of the EU with more 
member states and more populist governments.
Since 2016, the numbers of irregular crossings in South of 
Europe published by Frontex are down but deaths at the borders 
are proportionally on the rise and camps in Greece are still over-
populated. The priority may be to de-escalate the highly politicized 
and polarized debates within the EU. Yet, it is equally important to 
acknowledge the perverse effects of the Tampere policy model and 
do a proper evaluation of its instruments. 
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OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
TO AN EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL 
REMEDY IN THE PROPOSED 
RETURN DIRECTIVE AND 
BEYOND: A DANGEROUS PATH? 
Elise Muir and Caterina Molinari
1. Introduction
Title V of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union 
(‘TFEU’) opens with the following statement: “the Union shall 
constitute an area of freedom security and justice with respect for 
fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions 
of the Member States.” This affirmation, contained in art. 67 TFEU 
sets the Union’s shared competence in the Area of freedom secu-
rity and justice (‘AFSJ’) on a path of caution, immediately high-
lighting two features of the field: (i) its far reaching fundamental 
rights implications; and (ii) its potential for conflicts with national 
legal system.
This Chapter turns the spotlight on a regulatory technique that 
amplifies both features, namely detailed (or ‘micro’-)harmonisa-
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tion of standards of judicial protection at the EU level. Micro-har-
monisation of this kind can be limited to minimum standards, or 
go as far as to impose maximum standards of protection. It is a 
characteristic of several EU measures the asylum and migration 
fields of the AFSJ field and it culminates in the surprising level of 
procedural detail of the proposed recast of the Return Directive 
(Commission 2018 – ‘Proposed Return Directive’).
The following analysis will explore and problematise the con-
sequences of the use of this regulatory technique to shape the legal 
regime for the return of irregular migrants. The 1999 Tampere 
Programme stipulated the goal for the EU to develop “common 
policies on asylum and immigration” with particular focus on the 
management of migration flows and “illegal immigration”. The 
Chapter will identify examples of micro-harmonisation of rules 
of judicial procedure in the Proposed Return Directive and other 
instruments in the area of migration and asylum, and then explore 
its implications for fundamental rights and the legal systems of the 
member states. 
2. Micro-Harmonisation of Rules on Judicial Protection in 
The Proposed Return Directive: Examples
As mentioned, the micro-harmonisation of standards of judicial 
protection reaches its apex in the Proposed Return Directive, 
which contains several examples not only of minimum, but also 
maximum standards of judicial protection. The most striking pro-
visions are found in Chapter III, entitled “Judicial Safeguards’’ and, 
more particularly, in its Art. 16.
First, Art. 16(1) starts by establishing a minimum standard 
of protection, namely the requirement that an effective remedy 
against return decisions be offered before a judicial, rather than 
administrative, authority. However, it immediately goes further, by 
limiting the number of levels of judicial review to no more than 
one for rejected applicants for international protection. 
159MICRO-HARMONISATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REMEDY - 
E. Muir and C. Molinari
Second, Art. 16(3) regulates in detail the suspensory effect of 
appeals. It requires automatic suspension of the return decision 
in case of appeal when a risk of refoulement exists, but forbids 
automatic suspension in all other cases, requiring instead a case-
by-case decision. The provision goes as far as to prohibit the con-
cession of the interim relief to rejected applicants for international 
protection, when (i) the reason for suspension has already formed 
the object of an examination in the context of an asylum proce-
dure, or (ii) the return decision is the consequence of a decision 
terminating legal stay already made subject to effective judicial 
review. 
Third, Art. 16(4) establishes a maximum time-limit to chal-
lenge return decisions issued against rejected applicants for inter-
national protection. The deadline for appeals is set to no more than 
5 days, reduced to 48 hours in the context of the accelerated border 
procedure provided for in Art. 22 of the Proposed Return Direc-
tive. 
Besides the detailed rules contained in Art. 16, other provisions 
contribute to the micro-harmonisation efforts of the Proposed 
Return Directive. In particular, Art. 6(2), (m) to (p), regulates the 
burden of proof, by creating a rebuttable presumption that the 
returnee is at risk of absconding in four situations. 
The combined effect of all these norms defining detailed rules 
of judicial procedure is remarkable: very little leeway is left to 
member states to design the related rules of judicial procedure and 
the right to an effective remedy is contained within the narrow 
perimeter set by the provisions examined above. 
3. Micro-Harmonisation of Rules on Judicial Protection in 
the Proposed Return Directive: Peculiarities
The level of micro-harmonisation displayed by the Proposed 
Return Directive is surprising for several reasons. 
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First, the Commission’s proposal significantly departs from 
the regulatory technique that characterises legislative instruments 
currently in force in the area of asylum and migration, by estab-
lishing not only minimum, but also maximum standards of pro-
tections.1 This distinguishes the Proposed Return Directive from 
other instruments which can also be characterised as micro-har-
monising rules of judicial procedure, such as the current Return 
Directive (European Parliament and Council 2008) and the 
Asylum Procedures Directive (European Parliament and Council 
2013). In fact, the current Return Directive (in particular its Art. 
13) and the Asylum Procedures Directive (in particular, its Art. 
46) set minimum standards of protection concerning suspensive 
effects of appeals, reasonable length of time-limits to challenge 
negative decisions before a court, and access to at least a court or 
tribunal of first instance. Conversely, the Proposed Return Direc-
tive attempts to go further, proposing fully harmonised rules of 
judicial procedure with respect to several essential aspects of the 
right to an effective remedy, ranging from the number of levels of 
jurisdiction, to interim relief and to time-limits for appeal.2
Second, the Proposed Return Directive, much as the current 
Return Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive, does not 
contain a fully-fledged non-regression clause. Its Art. 4(3), simi-
larly to Art. 5 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, reads: “[t]his 
Directive shall be without prejudice to the right of the Member 
States to adopt or maintain provisions that are more favourable to 
persons to whom it applies provided that such provisions are com-
patible with this Directive” (emphasis added). This formulation 
fails to protect national higher standards from backsliding on pro-
cedural rights in the name of the effectiveness of EU law. Instead, 
such a protection is offered in recent micro-harmonising measures 
1  The avoidance of full harmonisation, through the establishment of minimum stan-
dards only, has been traditionally meant to prevent a harmonisation of procedural 
standards based on the lowest common denominator (De Bruycker 2005, 56).
2  Several of the Proposal’s provisions are nuanced in the partial negotiating position ad-
opted by the Council (Council 2019). For example, the position reverts to a minimum 
standards on number of levels of jurisdiction and extends the maximum time-limits for 
appeals in the context of the border procedure to one week, rather than 48 hours.
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in another field of the AFSJ, namely judicial cooperation in crim-
inal matters. Non-regression clauses in the field all provide that 
“[n]othing in [the relevant] Directive shall be construed as lim-
iting or derogating from any of the rights or procedural safeguards 
that are ensured under […] the law of any Member State which 
provides a higher level of protection”,3 without further qualifica-
tions (see Mitsilegas, forthcoming).
Third, a striking discrepancy exists between the nature of the 
Proposed Return Directive as an instrument conceived to set 
objectives only, and its extremely detailed content, which would 
have been more attuned to a regulation. This point is well illus-
trated by a comparison between the Proposed Return Directive 
and the Proposed Procedures Regulation (Commission 2016). The 
two instruments share a micro-harmonising approach, which sees 
the Union setting maximum time-limits for appeals, imposing 
recourse to accelerated procedures in certain cases and limiting 
the availability of interim relief. However, the Proposed Proce-
dures Regulation contains less far reaching provisions (e.g. it does 
not limit the number of levels of jurisdiction), even though it is 
presented in a form which would have allowed a higher level of 
detail, i.e. a regulation.
Fourth, the Proposed Return Directive harmonises areas, such 
as time-limits for appeals, in which the Union’s legislator has so 
far been reluctant to intervene (Eliantonio and Muir 2015, 191), 
possibly by reason of the different nature, conditions of admissi-
bility, and formalities to which appeals are subject in the different 
member states. Such differences arguably make a one-size-fits-all 
standard difficult to evaluate as to its compliance with the funda-
mental right to effective judicial protection across the EU (Muir 
and Molinari 2018, 84). 
Finally, the choice to limit the suspensory effects of appeals 
departs from the usual nature of legislative interventions on 
3  Inter alia, Art. 10 Directive on the right to information in criminal proceedings (Eu-
ropean Parliament and Council 2010); Art. 13 Directive on presumption of innocence 
(European Parliament and Council 2016).
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interim reliefs. In fact, the EU has traditionally required member 
states to make interim relief available, so that rights guaranteed 
by EU law could be protected, pending a final decision.4 In this 
respect, micro-harmonisation in the AFSJ field presents a pecu-
liarity, linked to the perception of high standard of judicial pro-
tection as limits to the effectiveness of EU asylum and migration 
policies (Commission 2018, 4 and recital (20)), rather than as tools 
to enhance the effectiveness of the related EU policy, as is the case 
in other fields of EU law.
4. Problematising Micro-Harmonisation of Rules on 
Judicial Protection
The above characteristics of the Proposed Return Directive - and 
the choice to micro-harmonise rules on judicial protection more 
generally - have significant implications on the fundamental rights 
of third country nationals throughout the EU. They also affect the 
equilibrium of the multilevel European constitutional space (Per-
nice 2009), which encompasses potentially competing sources of 
fundamental rights protection (i.e. national constitutions, the EU 
legal system, as well as international law guarantees, including 
those enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights 
– ‘ECHR’).
A first consequence of micro-harmonisation of rules on judicial 
protection in the AFSJ is the potential for the national legislator 
to roll back higher standards of protection, in order to align on 
the minimum standards provided for by EU law. Several national 
decrees or laws adopted in member states such as Italy (Decrees 
2017 no. 13 and 2018 no. 113), and France (Law no. 2018-778 of 10 
September 2018) to regulate asylum procedures have cut back on 
guarantees previously accorded to international protection appli-
cants, but not required by the EU acquis on asylum. Often, these 
reforms were explicitly justified in the political discourse by the 
4  See Eliantonio Muir 2015, 196, referring to the Remedies Directive in the field of Pub-
lic Procurement (Council 1989) and the Injunctions Directive in the field of consumer 
protection (European Parliament and Council 2009).
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willingness of national governments to align with EU (minimum) 
procedural standards (Favilli forthcoming; Ministère de l’Intérieur 
2018, 4). 
A second consequence of micro-harmonisation of rules on 
judicial protection is the increased likelihood that national safe-
guards protected by national constitutions be set aside in the name 
of the effectiveness and unity of EU law. In fact, as affirmed by the 
European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) in its Melloni ruling, “where an 
EU legal act calls for national implementing measures, national 
authorities and courts remain free to apply national standards of 
protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of pro-
tection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, 
and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby 
compromised” (emphasis added – ECJ, Melloni 2013, para. 60). 
In other words, unity and effectiveness of EU law might displace 
fundamental rights standards enshrined in constitutional texts. T
The Melloni ruling was issued in the field of judicial coopera-
tion in criminal matters, which, since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009, is protected from possible undermining of 
constitutional standards of protection of fundamental rights by 
Art. 82(2) TFEU. The latter reads “[…] the European Parliament 
and the Council may […] establish minimum [procedural] rules 
[…]. Adoption of the minimum rules referred to in this paragraph 
shall not prevent Member States from maintaining or introducing 
a higher level of protection for individuals” (emphasis added). No 
corresponding mechanism to avoid constitutional clashes is envis-
aged for the asylum and migration aspects of the AFSJ. As harmo-
nising measures adopted at EU level are capable of trumping fun-
damental rights guarantees enshrined in national constitutions by 
virtue of the principle of primacy (ECJ, Taricco II 2017, para. 47, 
and Kolev 2018, para. 75), increased proceduralisation of asylum 
and migration law at the EU level is likely to create tensions. For 
example, Art. 16(1) of the Proposed Return Directive, that limits 
the number of level of judicial remedies to one, would most likely 
lead to a clash between primacy of EU law and those national con-
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stitutions, such as the Italian one,5 which impose higher standards 
(Muir and Molinari 2019, 56, 90-92.). 
A third consequence of micro-harmonisation of rules on judi-
cial protection is a risk for EU secondary measures either to be 
found in breach of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
(‘Charter’) or to undermine the Charter right to effective judicial 
protection through interpretation. The first scenario is undesirable 
in terms of legal certainty, as it would lead to the total or partial 
invalidation of the measure in question, with spill over effects 
on national implementing measures.6 An example of a potential 
Charter breach is the establishment of very short maximum time 
limits for appeals in Arts 16(4) and 22(3) Proposed Return Direc-
tive, which would likely be considered by the ECJ as not “sufficient 
in practical terms to enable the applicant to prepare and bring an 
effective action” (ECJ, Samba Diouf 2011, para. 66, see Muir Moli-
nari 2018, 83-84).
The second scenario, namely a restrictive interpretation of 
Charter rights in light of secondary legislation, may have even 
more disruptive consequences, leading to a reduction of funda-
mental rights protection across all areas of EU law and trumping 
higher constitutional safeguards contained in member states legal 
orders. Moreover, a deferential stance of the ECJ towards legis-
lative choices on procedural standards may lead to incoherence 
between EU and ECHR standards. In this respect, the recent ECJ’s 
ruling in Sacko (ECJ, Moussa Sacko v Commissione Territoriale 
per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale di Milano 
2017) is particularly telling. In Sacko, the ECJ qualified the right 
to be heard in the field of asylum. More particularly, it held that 
member states can allow courts of first instance to refuse a hearing 
when reviewing an administrative finding that an international 
6  The invalidation of EU measures that strike a balance between fundamental rights 
and policy objectives runs the risk of leading to a legislative void, that national legis-
lators might find difficult to address. This dynamic is exemplified by the insufficiency 
of the national measures adopted, to ensure compliance of data retention policies with 
fundamental rights, after the ECJ annulled the Data Retention Directive (European 
Parliament and Council 2006) in Digital Rights Ireland (ECJ, Digital Rights Ireland 
2014- see FRA 2017, 164-165).
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protection application is manifestly unfounded, if a hearing has 
been conducted in the context of the administrative procedure 
and “the factual circumstances leave no doubt as to whether that 
decision was well founded” (para. 49). In its reasoning, the ECJ 
relies on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’), but revisits it in a particularly restrictive manner in 
light of the wording of the Asylum Procedures Directive, which 
only requires a “full and ex nunc examination of both facts and 
law” by the judicial authority (Art. 46), without mentioning a right 
to be heard in that context. By omitting to refer to certain parts 
of the ECtHR’s judgments it itself invoked (i.e. ECtHR, Jussila v 
Finland 2006 and Döry v Sweden 2003), the ECJ may be seen, as 
noted by Favilli (forthcoming) to call into question the presump-
tion that “unless there are exceptional circumstances that justify 
dispensing with a hearing, the right to a public hearing implies 
a right to an oral hearing at least before one instance” (ECtHR, 
Döry v Sweden 2003, para. 39). According to the ECJ, the right 
of defence simply requires that courts be given the possibility to 
conduct a hearing when the latter is “necessary for the purpose of 
ensuring that there is a full and ex nunc examination of both facts 
and points of law, as required under Article 46(3) of the [Asylum 
Procedures] Directive” (para. 49).
The tendency to read fundamental rights restrictively in the 
context of the interpretation of secondary EU legislation is not 
unprecedented. The ECJ has already adopted a restrictive interpre-
tation of non-refoulement in order to preserve, to the extent pos-
sible, the effectiveness of EU measures aimed at ensuring mutual 
recognition in the field of asylum. By affirming that only “systemic 
flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for asylum 
applicants in [a] Member State” might justify a refusal to transfer 
the asylum seeker back to that state (ECJ, N.S. v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department 2011, para. 86), the ECJ has initially7 
7  The distance between the case-law of the two courts was at least partially bridged 
thanks to the recent acknowledgment by the ECJ that a refusal of transfer would also be 
justified by “deficiencies […] which may affect certain groups of people [provided that 
they] attain a particularly high level of severity, which depends on all the circumstances 
of the case” (ECJ, Jawo v Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2019, paras 87-90, and Ibrahim 
at al. v Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2019, paras 88-89).
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adopted a stance that has been perceived as less protective than 
that upheld by the ECtHR in analogous situations and requiring 
a case-by-case assessment of the risk of inhuman and degrading 
treatment (ECtHR, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece 2011, para. 365, 
and Tarakhel v Switzerland 2014, para. 102). 
To conclude, micro-harmonisation of rules on judicial protec-
tion has the potential to lead to a lowering of fundamental rights 
standards in member states, as well as to clashes with national con-
stitutional guarantees and the ECHR. 
These observations strengthen the concerns raised, in specific 
fields, by the spillover effects of “incidental proceduralisation”8 of 
EU law (Eliantonio Muir 2015). As in the area of migration and 
asylum, micro-harmonisation touches procedural guarantees 
which constitute the substance of the fundamental right to effective 
judicial protection, the above concerns are particularly pressing: 
the fundamental right to effective judicial protection constitutes 
the essential gateway for the protection of all other rights, and thus 
it is a core tenet of the EU as a rule of law based legal system.
5. Ways Forward
Several good practices and initiatives could mitigate or avoid the 
risks that micro-harmonisation of procedural rules entails.
On a very general level, the EU legislator should be more 
mindful of the limitation that subsidiarity, proportionality and 
respect for the difference in the legal systems and traditions of the 
member states place on the legitimacy of detailed harmonisation 
techniques in the area of judicial proceedings, especially in the 
AFSJ field (Muir Molinari 2018).
8  Incidental proceduralisation can be defined as “the insertion of procedural rules in 
secondary EU law measures adopted on the basis of provisions enabling the EU to 
develop a substantive policy” (Eliantonio Muir 2015, 178). It can be contrasted with the 
adoption of procedural norms in the context of measures which “give specific expres-
sion” to a fundamental right (Muir 2014, 223, citing ECJ, Kücükdeveci v Swedex 2010).
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Second, EU measures in the field should take fundamental 
rights concerns seriously, attempting to identify in advance 
potential negative impacts of the proposals on Charter rights and 
redressing them in the drafting stage. This might allow the insti-
tutions to better appreciate the risks of downward spiralling of 
fundamental rights standards and prevent it through, for example, 
the insertion of non-regression clauses in the text of proposed leg-
islation. It is particularly regrettable, in this sense, that the entire 
asylum and migration package of measures proposed by the Com-
mission between 2016 and 2018 has been presented to the EU 
legislators without any impact assessment, contrary to the Com-
missions’ own guidelines on legislation in fields that touch upon 
(often absolute) fundamental rights (Commission 2017, 15). 
Finally, constitutional and ECHR standards should be taken 
into serious considerations in the course of the EU legislative pro-
cess, to avoid proposing measures that might undermine them in 
the name of effectiveness (Favilli, forthcoming). 
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13. 20 YEARS OF ‘PARTNERSHIP 




In October 1999, I was one year into my PhD on the movement 
of refugees across the Mediterranean. At the time, the passage 
that caught my eye in the conclusions of the Tampere European 
Council was the opening lines of the opening section outlining “A 
Common EU Asylum and Migration Policy”. Immediately under 
this main title, sub-section I is headed “Partnership with Coun-
tries of Origin”. This contains just two short paragraphs (11 and 
12) which expand the sub-heading to “partnership with countries 
of origin and transit”. Yet these two paragraphs formalised the 
longstanding and highly influential aim of engaging with non-EU 
countries for migration related reasons. They contain some of the 
most ambitious objectives of the entire document. These objectives 
continue to structure what has become known as the “external 
dimension” of EU asylum and migration policy. Twenty years ago, 
this focus shaped my PhD and it has framed most of the research I 
have undertaken ever since. 
The importance of this theme lies in the tremendous potential 
for positive change such partnerships can bring, both in Europe 
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itself and well beyond. While these policies have not been without 
their successes, the direction of travel, particularly over the last 
five years, has been involved more regressive, repressive measures 
whose primary goal is the reduction of migration. This is a mis-
take. Broader engagement around migration is likely to become 
ever more important and a more open EU will have a much more 
positive impact on neighbouring countries and the world in gen-
eral. This Chapter falls into three sections. First, I briefly review 
the aims set out in the Tampere conclusions and how these have 
shaped the external dimension of EU asylum and migration policy. 
Second, I examine the nature of the challenges that this involves 
and finally I consider evidence for its success, as a tool of migra-
tion control and the impacts of migrants and potential migrants 
themselves.
2. The Origins of the “External Dimension”
The prominence of “partnership with countries of origin and 
transit”, as the first element of the EU’s Common Asylum and 
Migration Policy listed in the Tampere conclusions could of course 
be simply an accident of drafting, but it does have a logical role as 
a foundation for policy development in this field. The High Level 
Working Group on Migration and Asylum (HLWG) was estab-
lished in January 1999 and submitted its first report to the Tam-
pere European Council. At paragraph 12, the conclusions welcome 
this report and agree to extend the HLWG’s mandate. The HLWG 
continues to exist and for twenty years it has provided a powerful 
Council influence on the development of EU policy, particularly in 
the external dimension.
The two main themes of the external dimension are set out in 
paragraph 11. The first goal is to improve conditions in migrants’ 
countries of origin. The link between addressing the conditions 
that encourage people to leave in the first place and preventing 
migration occurring is implicit, though not actually articulated 
in paragraph 11. The objective of “combating poverty, improving 
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living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflict and 
consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human 
rights” in migrants’ countries of origin, suggests an expectation 
that such changes will lead to less migration. This approach, often 
referred to as the “root cause” approach but later termed “more 
development for less migration” continues to influence much 
EU engagement in this field. The second theme of the external 
dimension is briefly outlined as “Partnership with third coun-
tries concerned will also be a key element for the success of such a 
policy, with a view to promoting co-development”. “Success” is not 
defined in these conclusions, but again it is fair to assume given 
the context that success involves reducing arrivals of migrants and 
asylum seekers. 
Both of these themes build on approaches to tackle migra-
tion that have a long history outside the institutions of the EU. 
The “root cause” approach is usually traced to the early 1980s and 
the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa 
(ICARA) 1981 Geneva, 2 1984. Both of these pledging conferences 
failed to meet anything like their objectives but introduced the 
idea that wealthier states bore a responsibility to provide financial 
assistance to poorer countries hosting the majority of the world’s 
refugees (Türk and Garlick 2016). The second approach, “co-de-
velopment” was coined by Sami Naïr in a report submitted to the 
Jospin government in 1997 (Naïr 1997) but is widely used to refer 
back to the aide au retour policies pioneered in France in the early 
1970s, policies that the Naïr report recognises were largely failures. 
Given the ambition of the objectives set out in paragraph 11 
of the Tampere conclusions, it is perhaps unsurprising that little 
progress was made for some time. The Commission’s first attempt 
to analyse the connections between migration and development 
was widely critiqued as overly focused on security issues. This 
came in a 2002 Communication on “Integrating Migration Issues 
in the European Union’s relations with Third Countries” that also 
examined EU wide repatriation programmes. The objective of 
developing partnership with countries of origin was repeated at 
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the 2004 Hague European Council, became part of the 2005-2010 
Hague Programme and was addressed in a much more progressive 
2005 Communication on migration and development. Yet, it was 
not until the end of that year, December 2005, that clear policy 
direction was given to this approach through Global Approach 
to Migration (GAM) (COM(2007)247), since 2011 the Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) (COM(2011)743).
The GAMM still structures the External Dimension of migra-
tion and asylum policy. It remains organised into four pillars. The 
most recent guiding document for the EU”s migration strategy is 
the 2015 European Agenda on Migration (COM(2015)240 final). 
These four pillars are set out in this document: 1. Reducing the 
incentives for irregular migration; 2. Border management; 3. A 
strong common asylum policy; 4. Legal migration. The first of 
these pillars receives a disproportionate focus in this document 
and partnership with countries of origin and transit once again is 
first on the list with the recognition that “many of the root causes 
of migration lie deep in global issues which the EU has been trying 
to address for many years.” (p7). In practical terms, partnerships 
with countries of origin and transit have led to the development 
of nine mobility partnerships and a wider series of readmission 
agreements. The EU is engaged in a large number of Regional Con-
sultative Processes (RCP), at least five RCPs link countries across 
the Mediterranean. There has clearly been some evolution since 
Tampere, although the objectives set out in the Tampere conclu-
sions are still clearly recognisable in the EU”s migration strategy, 
particularly the external dimension. 
3. Partnership as a Geopolitical Challenge
The rise in arrivals across the Mediterranean in 2015 further high-
lighted the significance of the external dimension of EU asylum 
policy. The EU recognised that by the time people got into boats, 
it was too late. Rather than stopping people arriving, migration 
policy is now focused at ways of stopping them leaving in the first 
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place or at least detaining them in countries of transit along the 
route. This process had been developing for several decades at 
member state level even before Tampere but the Tampere conclu-
sions highlighted the direction that EU institutions would move 
in when they gained the necessary legal competency to become 
involved. 
The collective action that the EU has taken since 2015, 
including the EU-Turkey statement of March 2016 and the con-
tinued expansion of Frontex are a clear indication of the shifting 
priorities across the EU. Partnerships with countries of origin and 
transit have become more and more significant as control pri-
orities have moved from migrants arriving in the EU to poten-
tial migrants who have yet to arrive. Of course the large scale 
construction of new infrastructure along border lines that has 
occurred across Europe since 2015 appear to undermine this idea. 
Nevertheless, new border walls and fences have proved ineffective 
at actually preventing the movement of people and reinforce the 
idea that once people reach the border it’s really too late to stop 
them. Indeed, in some cases this has been the point. The efforts of 
Hungary’s Victor Orban or Britain’s Theresa May to construct new 
border controls has not reflected a widely recognised problem with 
undocumented migration in their countries but rather an effort to 
boost opposition to migration for broader political gain and focus 
attention at actions they were taking to reduce migration.  
Such actions help to legitimate the movement of border control 
away from the physical location of the border, a movement that 
has been established for some time. This may involve non-state 
actors, principally private companies and international organisa-
tions over which EU institutions have some direct influence. But it 
also involves various forms of engagement with national govern-
ments beyond the EU. Partnership of this nature poses an unu-
sual geopolitical challenge for migration control. On EU territory, 
member states and their representatives (such as Frontex) have a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence – to borrow Weber’s 
effective formulation. In a migration context this makes detention 
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and deportation legally legitimate acts when carried out on Euro-
pean territory. The growing range of readmission agreements that 
are facilitated by the EU can be used to accelerate pre-deportation 
administrative processes but have no authority once individuals 
have left EU territory. 
In the absence of legitimate violence, the tools that the EU 
Member States can use for migration control are substantially 
reduced when migrants or potential migrants are on the territory 
of other states. Where states do exercise similar levels of violence 
to detention and deportation on other states” territory it is called 
something different, such as “extraordinary rendition” to highlight 
the illegitimacy of the violence involved. Other techniques must 
therefore be used. Capacity building or provision of equipment or 
advice for enhancing the effectiveness of border control in neigh-
bouring countries is relatively widespread, although it can gen-
erate a backlash if migrants” human rights are flagrantly ignored. 
Information campaigns are therefore popular and involve edu-
cating migrants around the dangers of undocumented migration 
or the promotion of “safe” (ie. legal) migration, although they are 
equally problematic, leading to a victim blaming approach and are 
widely recognised as ineffective anyway. Development aid is prob-
ably the most widespread tool of the external dimension of the 
EU”s migration policy. This builds on long established principles 
by which the ability of wealthy states to intervene directly on the 
territory of poorer states has been widely recognised. The effec-
tiveness of development to address the root causes of migration 
has therefore once again become a matter of keen public debate. 
4. Partnerships for Development 
Partnerships with countries of origin and transit have become 
more significant within the external dimension of EU migration 
policy, as the previous section argued. This section turns to the 
growing role of development within those partnerships. This was 
foreseen in the Tampere conclusions” reference to codevelopment 
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and concretised five years later in the first iteration of the GAMM, 
where “migration and development” formed one of the initial three 
pillars. This use of development to address migration dates from 
colonial era assumptions that migration is caused by underdevel-
opment. If underdevelopment is the cause of migration, it follows 
that development will reduce that migration. This idea has been 
powerfully debunked in successive analysis from the early 1990s 
onwards. Ana Lopez-Sala refers to it as the “preventive” control 
of migration. Successful development may well reduce migration 
over a generational timeframe, but in shorter 4-5 year policy cycles 
development is more likely to increase migration by providing 
both the means and crucially the motivation to leave. 
The Commission has recognised this, at least rhetorically. The 
year after the more progressive 2005 communication on migration 
and development, this was referred to by Benita Ferrero-Waldner 
then Commissioner for External Relations as a “move more in 
keeping with today’s world. It takes us away from “more develop-
ment for less migration” to “better managing migration for more 
development” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006). This marks an impor-
tant recognition that “more development” will not lead to “less 
migration”. Nevertheless, many of her Brussels audience will have 
understood “better managing migration” to mean “less migration” 
anyway, so the difference between the two statements is perhaps 
not as significant as it might first seem. Despite this, the connec-
tion between more development and less migration has persisted. 
Towards the end of 2016, Priti Patel, then the UK”s International 
Development Secretary (now Home Secretary) wrote of her desire 
to use Britain”s aid budget to “reduce the pressure for mass migra-
tion to Europe” (Patel 2016)
This persistence in the connection between more development 
has less migration has been encouraged by changing definitions 
of development, particularly in the 2015 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). The 169 targets, spread across the 17 goals include 
frequent reference to migration, but only one target is exclusively 
about migration: target 10.7. This target sets out to “Facilitate 
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orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of 
people, including through the implementation of planned and 
well-managed migration policies”. For the first time it makes the 
management (long used as code for “control” or “reduction”) of 
migration an explicit development target. Goal 10.7 is quoted in 
the 2018 Marrakesh Action Plan, the most recent iteration of the 
Rabat process that began in 2006, and structures significant goals 
of EU spending on migration and development. This goes well 
beyond the “preventative” use of development to provide alterna-
tives to migration. In recent years, much more repressive forms of 
control have been labelled development. 
The first signs of this appear in the 2015 Valletta summit, which 
built on EU-AU dialogues around migration and offered some 
indication of priorities for the 2015 European Agenda on Migra-
tion. The opening paragraphs of the summit’s Action Plan called 
for “The EU, it’s Member States and associated countries” to “step 
up efforts to mainstream migration into their development coop-
eration”. The subsequent plan was organised into five “priority 
domains”: 1. “Development benefits of migration and addressing 
root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement”; 
2. “Legal migration and mobility”; 3. “Protection and asylum”; 
4. “Prevention of the fight against irregular migration, migrant 
smuggling and trafficking in human beings”; 5. “return, readmis-
sion and reintegration”. 
In a 2017 follow up meeting in Valletta, some details of the sub-
sequent spending are discussed. Although the five priority domains 
cover the full range of EU migration objectives, the large majority 
(70%) of spending at that stage was devoted to just one, the first 
objective on migration and development. These activities include 
plenty of positive development activities, such as youth employ-
ment programmes and retraining initiatives. Such activities are 
clearly welcome whether or not they reduce the “root causes” of 
migration – and available evidence suggests they will not. Yet the 
2017 discussion also highlighted some more surprising activities 
financed under this domain which do not appear to bear much 
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relationship to the “development benefits of migration” or indeed 
to development at all. These included a cooperation agreement 
signed between Germany and Egypt in July 2016 which “solidifies 
cooperation in preventing all types of crimes, including terrorism 
and corruption, as well reinforcing airport security and stemming 
illegal immigration.” The goal of “reinforcing airport security” may 
well be a priority for the Egyptian government, but it is only since 
the 2015 SDGs that it could be legitimately classified as develop-
ment cooperation with the aim of preventing Egyptians leaving 
the country. 
5. Conclusion: Circles of Friends
The Tampere conclusions initiated EU cooperation around “part-
nership with countries of origin and transit”. In the 20 years since, 
the extent to which the EU depends on its immediate neighbours, 
referred to by Romano Prodi as the EU”s “circle of friends” has 
become more apparent. This covers a broad array of international 
cooperation, but certainly since 2015, migration has become one 
of the more significant issues to be addressed. These conclusions 
picked up on a debate that was already old when Sami Naïr cau-
tiously coined the term “codevelopment” in 1997. Given the geo-
political restrictions on engaging non-citizens beyond EU terri-
tory, this idea of codevelopment has come to the fore, accounting 
for 70% of resources allocated in the initial two-year review of the 
2015 Valletta summit’s action plan. The definition of development 
has also been strategically shifted to incorporate migration control 
objectives that it is difficult to describe as development. 
Projects funded under the development shift in the external 
dimension of EU migration policy clearly include plenty of pos-
itive development work that is already improving the lives for 
the poorest people around the world. The fact that in the short 
term such programmes are likely to increase rather than decrease 
migration should concern us only to the extent that public con-
fidence in development aid will ultimately be undermined. Yet 
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the post-2015 return to the “more development for less migration 
approach” does not only include activities that will result in some 
benefits, even if they fail in their explicit objectives of preventing 
migration. It also encompasses a significant broadening of what 
development is. Target 10.7 of the 2015 SDGs is front and centre of 
the 2018 Marrakesh Declaration. This explicitly legitimates much 
more repressive migration control functions to be framed, and 
financed as development. 
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14. WHO IS A SMUGGLER?
Gabriella Sanchez
1. Introduction
In the European narrative of migration, the spectre of the migrant 
smuggler looms large. As the facilitator of a person’s clandestine or 
irregular journey into a country or territory other than his or her 
own, the smuggler is systematically portrayed as operating in vast 
networks of transnational reach, and as driven by the mere desire 
of financial gain. He (for the smuggler has also been gendered as 
male) is also portrayed as member of a vast criminal pantheon, 
working alongside drug traffickers and feared terrorists, whose 
goals are to cross the EU’s borders undetected. 
But the descriptions do not stop here. The smuggler, we are 
told, is inherently heinous, as evidenced by the acts of violence he 
perpetrates against gullible and vulnerable migrants. Harrowing 
stories of smugglers who scam migrants of their lives’ savings, beat 
them to death, sell them to brutal desert tribes or into prostitu-
tion, push them off of boats on the Mediterranean or force them 
into freezing lorries, have for years shaped our collective under-
standing of one of the quintessential predators of late modernity. 
The frequent reports involving migrant deaths by drowning or suf-
focation further cement the hate and dislike towards smugglers, 
who are almost singlehandedly blamed for people’s tragic ends. 
The pain and victimization endured by men, women and chil-
dren on the migration pathway must not be denied. There is in 
Table of Contents
184 PART III - Irregular and Regular Immigration
fact no shortage of evidence attesting to the innumerable risks 
and challenges they endure in their attempts to reach a destina-
tion different from the one they left behind. But the claims that 
blame smugglers alone for migrants’ pain and tragedy deserve to 
be examined, for they do not emerge in a vacuum.
The 1999 Tampere Programme replicated the above-mentioned 
narratives. The Programme called for the EU to “to combat those 
who organise - illegal immigration - and commit related interna-
tional crimes.” It added that priority “to detecting and dismantling 
the criminal networks involved”.
This Chapter, based on empirical research on the facilitation of 
irregular migration and its actors, raises concerns over the domi-
nant narratives concerning smuggling and the smuggler, and the 
consequences that arise from reproducing them uncritically. It 
argues that originated by and articulated by states through a crim-
inological lens (Baird & van Liempt 2016), said narratives privi-
lege a punitive stance. While many migrant journeys can indeed 
be characterized by abuse and violence, the practices articulated 
as smuggling by law enforcement and other state actors are quite 
often void of criminal intention, and aim instead at preserving and 
improving the lives and dignity of those whose only options to 
travel are irregular, unsafe and undignifying.  
2. What Drives the Demand for Smuggling Services?
The forms of abuse, violence and exploitation migrants experi-
ence in their journeys have been documented at length by law 
enforcement, international organizations, scholars and policy 
analysts. This body of literature shows that said experiences, while 
often devastating and traumatizing, do not only involve the feared 
smugglers at the centre of law enforcement and media narratives. 
In fact, migrants’ interactions with people who could be consid-
ered less frightening and, in many ways, much more ordinary, 
also put them at grave risk and mark their entire migratory expe-
rience. Law enforcement officials (Bochenek 2017), members of 
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military forces (Musaro 2017), staff from international organiza-
tions (Tazzioli & Garelli, 2018) or state agencies (Weichselbaumer 
2017), and even ordinary citizens (Bassel & Emejulu 2018) are 
often named among those inflicting damage or hurt upon people 
in transit and among those who have already managed to reach a 
destination. 
It has been however easier to singlehandedly blame smugglers 
for migrants’ victimization, given the often devastating nature of 
their acts as facilitators of mobility (the incident involving the 
unnecessary deaths of 39 Vietnamese migrants on the back of 
a lorry in Essex in the Fall of 2019 being just one of them). But 
blaming the smugglers obscures the fact that the demand for the 
services they provide is derived from the growing shortage of safe, 
legal and dignified paths for migration (IOM, 2017). This is often 
the result of war or conflict, but also of systematic discrimination, 
structural marginalization and other forms of widespread ine-
quality (UNODC 2018).
There is growing consensus among scholars that border con-
trols, strict visa requirements and regulations are key factors 
restricting mobility, leading those unable to fulfil or manage them 
to pursue the services of actors who for a fee or in-kind payment 
can facilitate parts of their journeys. Said journeys, however, by 
virtue of taking place outside of official channels, often rely on 
precarious means of travel and dangerous or remote trajectories 
(Andersson 2016), which expose those traveling to increased 
levels of risk and even death (Mainwaring & Brigden 2016).  In 
other words, it is the lack of safe and legal paths available to pursue 
migration what drives the demand for smuggling services. The 
knowledge those behind migrants’ journeys possess –many times 
the result of their accumulated experiences in the context of their 
own migratory journeys (Achilli 2018, Lucht 2015)—constitutes 
a valuable service for those who find themselves excluded from 
accessing the protections provided by visas or passports. In short, 
those seeking to move but excluded from legal paths to do so 
require the services offered by facilitators of migrants journeys for 
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they provide an alternative, if recognizably precarious, mechanism 
for protection. 
And so a question may emerge: if the services facilitators pro-
vide are indeed a form of protection, why would migrants opt 
to obtain it from transnational organized crime, dangerous traf-
ficking networks, mafias, cartels and militias?
A simple and simplistic answer would be that people’s desper-
ation is such, that they see no other option rather than exposing 
themselves to the abuse and exploitation of criminal actors. But the 
decisions migrants make to embark on a clandestine journey are 
not simple ones: they are most often taken considering the needs 
and aspirations of entire families, not the migrant alone (Heid-
brink & Statz, 2017; Maher 2018). They also involve considerable 
investments of time, money and effort (Ayalew et al 2018). Further-
more, there is clear evidence that despite the widespread claims of 
migrants’ journeys as being under the control of sophisticated and 
complex criminal networks, migrants most often travel with facil-
itators, brokers and guides recommended to them by friends and 
family members who have already completed the journey success-
fully. Traveling within these networks of trust increases the possi-
bilities that the migrant will have access to minimal standards of 
care and safety during his or her admittedly precarious journey 
(Zijlstra & van Liempt 2017).  In short, explanations that attribute 
the facilitation of migrant journeys to criminal networks alone are 
incomplete at best, for they privilege the criminalising narrative of 
the state over the one that recognizes on the one hand the efforts 
of migrants and their communities at creating mechanisms for 
protection, and the decrease of available legal paths for people to 
move safely.  
3. But… What Exactly Does Smuggling Entail?  
According to the United Nations Protocol Against the Smuggling 
of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, the smuggling of migrants con-
stitutes: “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indi-
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rectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a 
person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a 
permanent resident” (UNODC, 2000)  
According to Gallagher (2017) the first concerted effort to 
counter and label as migrant smuggling what the United States and 
some European countries perceived as an increase in the number 
of irregular entries into their territories began in the early 1990s. 
The alleged growth could not be explained as individual efforts 
on the part of people to enter a country without inspection alone, 
for these practices purportedly showed signs of complexity and 
sophistication that could only be traced to organized crime, under 
this claim the only entity capable of exploiting legislative, policy 
and law enforcement gaps.  
After several years of negotiation and debate, the Smuggling 
Protocol was signed in the year 2000. It outlined what aimed to be 
a global definition of migrant smuggling, while also proposing a 
protection clause aimed to prevent the criminalization of people 
who had to rely on the services of migrant smugglers in order 
to reach safety. An additional clause establishing that smuggling 
required the payment of a “financial or other material benefit” 
to count as a criminal act was introduced later on in an attempt 
to prevent the activities of those who facilitated migration for 
humanitarian or family reunification reasons to be labelled as 
criminal (UNODC, 2017).  
While the Protocol has been widely ratified (a total of 146 States 
Parties had done so by 2017),  a study by the UNODC revealed that 
few countries had in fact incorporated the definition of smuggling 
exactly as outlined in the Protocol into their national laws (2017). 
Furthermore, the same study showed there was abundant and 
compelling evidence “States Parties [had] distanced+ themselves 
from the Protocol’s goal of protecting smuggled migrants and 
ensuring their basic human rights,” (Gallagher 2017) often crim-
inalizing the provision of humanitarian assistance, and charging 
people with smuggling even when there was no indication they 
had profited financially from a migrant’s journey. In other words, 
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while many countries have ratified the Smuggling protocol, few 
have made attempts to ensure their laws are in line with it. Fur-
thermore, rather than serving as a tool to punish those who abuse 
migrants in the context of their journeys, the Smuggling Protocol 
has often served to criminalize migrants themselves (Sanchez 
2014), as well as those who provide them with assistance or sup-
port seeking no financial benefit (Carrera et al, 2018). 
While again, the existence of exploitation, abuse and violence 
in the facilitation of migrant journeys cannot be denied, there is a 
growing body of evidence that shows that rather than constituting 
the efforts of mafias or organized criminal networks, attempts to 
facilitate migrant journeys are often the result of collective efforts 
towards mobility and safety that lack any criminal intention (Boza 
Martinez 2019), and which aim is to reduce the precarity not only 
of those who travel clandestinely, but of the people they love.  
4. So Who Are the So-Called Smugglers?
The term smuggler is not neutral in nature. The people behind 
migrants’ journeys are almost automatically assumed to be crim-
inal. As mentioned earlier, they are also assumed to be male. And 
the hypervisibility of Libya and Morocco in the European con-
versations on migration has also led us to label them as foreign, 
not without racialising them as African or Arab (Sanchez, 2017) 
even in the absence of images that may confirm such perceptions 
(forthcoming, Massari & Achilli). The tendency to describe smug-
gling as an organized crime domain, and as in the case of Libya, as 
under the control of tribes or militias have further allowed for the 
perpetuation of the notion of smuggling as male.  
A survey of empirical data and caselaw shows men are more 
likely than women to be as involved in the facilitation of migrants’ 
journeys. Data also show that tasks pertaining to the practice tend 
to be quite gendered. Men for example are often involved in the exe-
cution of activities of more physical but also public nature (piloting 
boats, recruiting migrants, purchasing and inspecting equipment 
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to be used in the journeys, etc) (Mabrouk 2010; REACH & Mercy 
Corps 2018; Ghorbeli 2018).  
But women also figure prominently in the empirical and legal 
record. They work providing room and board for migrants and care 
for those who are too young, sick or injured to travel (FRAh022); 
others handle recruitment and economic transactions (AUTx054), 
or operate office equipment aimed to organize migrants’ journeys 
(PORh003). While this task tends to be performed more often by 
men, women also transport migrants across locations (AUTx049).
The apparent invisibility of women in the facilitation of 
migrants’ journeys may reside in the fact that while they perform 
important tasks essential for the sustenance of life (i.e., what fem-
inist scholars have referred to as intimate forms of labour), said 
tasks often tend to be socially constructed as peripheral or unim-
portant, or as inherent to women’s nature, for they often involve 
the provision of companionship, support and care (Zhang et al 
2007; Vogt 2018) . Recent research on the experiences of migra-
tion brokers in the trajectories between Senegal and Libya for 
example, indicate women often spend long periods of time with 
brokers or facilitators, supporting or assisting them in their tasks 
while simultaneously performing intimate and emotional labour, 
which may involve transactional sex, in order to be able to migrate 
(Migrating out of Poverty, 2019).  By virtue of being seen or per-
ceived as ordinary and not meriting compensation or recognition, 
the tasks women perform may be dismissed as nothing other than 
unremarkable.
Children and teenagers also perform active roles in the market. 
They articulate two specific reasons to become involved: offset-
ting the costs of their own migratory journeys, and generating 
an income that allows them to provide for themselves and their 
families, especially when living in disenfranchised or marginal-
ized settings. Researchers have documented how teenagers (in 
their majority boys) often act as recruiters of other migrants, 
repair boats, run errands and acts as lookouts (Achilli et al 2017; 
IOM 2016). Recent work conducted on the Libya-Tunisia border 
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also indicates that in marginalized and remote communities in 
the desert, supporting the facilitation of migrants journeys along 
with other forms of smuggling constitutes one of the few avail-
able forms of labour available to young people (Sanchez & Achilli, 
forthcoming). 
5. If They Are Not Organized Criminals, Then What Leads 
People to Perform Smuggling Related Tasks?
Simply put, the answer is: inequality. Lacking opportunities for 
education of employment, men, women and children whose 
homes are located along the contemporary migration pathway, 
or even migrants who have become stranded in their attempts to 
facilitate their own journeys, constitutes those who often enter the 
smuggling market.   
The examples described here – from the role of migrants who 
capitalize on their own knowledge concerning clandestine jour-
neys, the participation of children and teenagers for a shot at 
migrating, to the tasks women perform even if trivialized—point 
to a clear conclusion: participating in the facilitation of migrants’ 
journeys is often a tool to counter economic, social and gender 
precarity. The legal and the empirical record provide in fact evi-
dence of how those behind migrant journeys tend to be 1. migrants 
themselves (either stranded or in transit), 2. People experiencing 
long-standing dynamics of marginalization (tribes and other 
indigenous groups) and 3. Those disproportionally impacted by 
inequality (elderly men and women, women and children). 
While there are abundant claims of smuggling generating untold 
profits for its faciliators, these earnings appear to be minimal, spo-
radic, and to be immediately recirculated into the local economy 
(Sanchez & Achilli, forthcoming; GBRx016). Al-Arabi (2018) in 
his work on Libya uncovered that in remote villages in the south 
of the country, a handful of those who had benefited –even if tem-
porarily –from the provision of migrants journeys had reinvested 
their earnings into their communities, and creating new businesses 
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provided employment opportunities that fostered local wellbeing. 
Smuggling caselaw from Europe also points at how women used 
their earnings to cover basic and urgent expenses, like past-due 
rent or medical care (GBRx016; AUTx045).  Together, data indi-
cate the facilitation of journeys has become deeply embedded in 
local economies along the migration pathway, ordinary people –
rather than transnational criminal networks – coming to rely on 
the income they generate to mitigate the impact of low wages, 
unemployment and poverty. And that the criminalisation of their 
actions, rather than protecting migrants or reducing the incidence 
of crime, further the conditions of precarity that led them to per-
form smuggling tasks in the first place. 
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Caselaw
The smuggling cases cited in this essay came from SHERLOC: an 
internet-based repository of cases compiled by the UNODC, rel-
evant to the requirements of the Organized Crime Convention, 
the Protocols thereto and the international legal framework. They 
all involve prosecutions and appeals related to migrant smug-
gling offenses. While the cases are available online by entering the 
codes below, they tend to be anonymised and therefore, no specific 
names of any of the involved parties are included. Countries are 
identified. Cases can be accessed at: https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld
AUTx045 13Os44/02 (OGH, 26 June 2002) Austria 
AUTx054: 12Os157/08t (OGH, 15 January 2009) Austria 
AUTx059: 11Os122/07m (OGH, 1 April 2008) Austria 
FRAh022 Jugement Nr 713/2009  France 
PORh003 Acórdão – Processo 8/00.6ZRCBR.C1 Portugal 
GBRx016 R v Monika Slepcokova [2010] EWCA 2715 (28 October 
2010) United Kingdom
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15. EU LEGAL MIGRATION 
POLICIES SINCE TAMPERE, AND 
THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 




This chapter discusses the European Union (EU) legal and policy 
measures on legal migration adopted since the European Council 
Conclusions, agreed in Tampere, Finland, in October 1999 (the 
‘Tampere Milestones’),2 which set out the vision and framework 
for the EU law and policy on asylum and migration. The spe-
cific objective of the chapter is to consider how the governance of 
labour migration and protection of migrant workers from outside 
the EU since Tampere accords with international standards and 
the United Nations (UN) Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
1  The views in this paper are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of the 
ILO or any of its constituents.
2  Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Towards a Union of Freedom, 
Security and Justice: The Tampere Milestones, 15-16 October 1999.
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Regular Migration (GCM),3 the non-binding cooperative frame-
work on international migration adopted by the Intergovern-
mental Conference in Marrakech, Morocco on 10 December 2018 
and endorsed by the UN General Assembly later that same month.
The chapter first reviews the parts of the Tampere Milestones 
that apply to legal migration and provides a concise overview of the 
EU legal migration acquis, drawing also on the recent fitness check 
conducted by the European Commission as well as its reports on 
the implementation of relevant directives. It then considers this 
acquis in the context of the legally binding international human 
rights and labour instruments ratified by EU Member States. The 
final section examines the acquis in light of the decent work and 
labour migration provisions of the GCM. While EU member states 
were fully engaged in the negotiations on the GCM, almost one-
third voted against or abstained.
2. The Tampere Milestones and Legal Migration
The Tampere European Council Conclusions laid out the vision 
for implementation of the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, 
which afforded the EU competence over asylum and migration 
from third countries.4 The Conclusions covered the following 
themes: partnerships with countries of origin, a Common Euro-
pean Asylum System, fair treatment of third country nationals, 
and management of migration flows. The third and fourth the-
matic areas are particularly relevant to labour migration. With 
regard to the fair treatment of third country nationals, the Euro-
pean Council observed:
18. The European Union must ensure fair treatment of third 
country nationals who reside legally on the territory of its 
Member States. A more vigorous integration policy should 
3  UN General Assembly (UNGA), 73rd Session, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration, A/RES/73/195 (11 January 2019).
4  Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establish-
ing the European Communities and certain related acts, Official Journal (OJ) of the 
European Union, 1997, C340/1.
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aim at granting them rights and obligations comparable to 
those of EU citizens. It should also enhance non-discrim-
ination in economic, social and cultural life and develop 
measures against racism and xenophobia. …
20. The European Council acknowledges the need for 
approximation of national legislations on the conditions for 
admission and residence of third country nationals, based 
on a shared assessment of the economic and demographic 
developments within the Union, as well as the situation in 
the countries of origin. …
21. The legal status of third country nationals should be 
approximated to that of Member States’ nationals. A person, 
who has resided legally in a Member State for a period of 
time to be determined and who holds a long-term residence 
permit, should be granted in that Member State a set of uni-
form rights which are as near as possible to those enjoyed 
by EU citizens; e.g. the right to reside, receive education, 
and work as an employee or self-employed person, as well 
as the principle of non-discrimination vis-à-vis the citizens 
of the State of residence. The European Council endorses 
the objective that long-term legally resident third country 
nationals be offered the opportunity to obtain the nation-
ality of the Member State in which they are resident.5
Inherent in these paragraphs, therefore, is the emphasis on fair 
treatment of lawfully resident third country nationals or, in the 
context of strong integration measures, affording them comparable 
treatment to that of EU citizens; ensuring non-discrimination and 
countering racism and xenophobia; and providing a higher level 
of rights (“as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens”) for 
long-term lawfully resident third country nationals. Absent from 
these commitments, however, is any explicit reference to equality 
of treatment and opportunity for third country nationals with EU 
citizens and recognition of the rights of migrant workers in an 
5  Tampere Presidency Conclusions, op. cit., paras. 18, 20, 21.
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irregular situation. As noted below, this raises questions in terms 
of consistency with respect to the international human rights and 
labour instruments EU member states have ratified.
As far as management of migration flows is concerned, in addi-
tion to immigration control measures,6 the European Council 
called for “the development, in close co-operation with countries 
of origin and transit, of information campaigns on the actual possi-
bilities for legal immigration, and for the prevention of all forms of 
trafficking in human beings”.7
3. EU Legal Migration Acquis
The EU legal migration acquis flows from Article 79 of the EU 
Treaty8 and is applied in a series of sectoral directives applicable 
to highly skilled third-country nationals (‘Blue Card’ Directive), 
seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees, and other migrant 
workers not covered by these three categories.9 While these four 
groups comprise the majority of third-country nationals working 
in the EU, they do not apply to third-country national family 
members of EU citizens who benefit from the provisions relating 
to free movement of workers. Moreover, students, who can also 
6  Namely, addressing irregular migration, adoption of a common policy on visas, closer 
cooperation and technical assistance between Member States’ border control services, 
promotion of voluntary return, and conclusion of readmission agreements with third 
countries.
7  Tampere Presidency Conclusions, op. cit., para. 22 (emphasis added).
8  Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 
2012 C 326/47.
9  See respectively Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of 
entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified em-
ployment, OJ 2009 L 155/17; Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country 
nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers, OJ 2014 L 94/375; Di-
rective 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of 
an intra-corporate transfer, OJ 2014 L157/1; Directive 2011/98/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single application procedure 
for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a 
Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing 
in a Member State, OJ 2011 L 343/1;
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work, as well as researchers and third-country national long-term 
residents, are covered by separate directives,10 and the directive on 
the right to family reunification applies to third-country nationals 
in the EU, who hold a residence permit valid for one year or more 
and have a reasonable prospect of obtaining permanent resi-
dence.11 It should also be recalled that the directives applying to 
asylum-seekers, refugees and those granted subsidiary protection 
status contain provisions relating to their access to employment in 
EU member states.12 In June 2019, the EU adopted a Regulation to 
establish a European Labour Authority, inter alia to support com-
pliance and cooperation between EU member states in the con-
sistent, efficient and effective application and enforcement of EU 
law related to labour mobility across the EU, and social security 
coordination. The Authority’s activities cover individuals subject 
to EU law within the scope of the Regulation, including lawfully 
resident third country nationals.13
While these measures focus broadly on harmonising the con-
ditions for admission, residence and employment in EU member 
states, the latter retain the sovereign prerogative to decide how 
many migrants (if any) from third countries should be admitted 
to their territory for the purpose of employment.14 The European 
10  Directive 2016/801/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes 
of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational 
projects and au pairing (recast), OJ 2016 L 132/21; Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 
25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term 
residents, OJ 2003 L 16/44.
11  Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunifica-
tion, OJ 2003 L 251/12, Article 3(1).
12  Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, 
2013 L 180/96, Article 15; Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country 
nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform 
status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content 
of the protection granted (recast), OJ 2011 L 337/9, Article 26.
13  Regulation (EU) 2019/1149 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 
2019 establishing a European Labour Authority, OJ 2019 L186/21, Preamble, recitals 8 
and 13.
14  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, op. cit., Art. 79(5): “This Arti-
cle shall not affect the right of Member States to determine volumes of admission of 
202 PART III - Irregular and Regular Immigration
Commission has recognised in a number of policy documents, 
however, the need for the EU to become more attractive to highly 
skilled migrants (often also referred to as ‘talent’) in response to 
the expected future demand for skilled labour,15 and has given par-
ticular emphasis to this,16 including through a proposed revision 
of the ‘Blue Card’ Directive,17 although calls to open up more reg-
ular labour migration channels for low-skilled workers, have been 
less pronounced.18 
This need is also evident in the EU Global Approach to Migra-
tion and Mobility (GAMM),19 the EU’s external policy on migra-
tion from third countries, in which legal migration features as 
one of the four key components, along with addressing irregular 
migration, migration and development, and international protec-
tion, as implemented through Mobility Partnerships and Common 
Agendas for Migration and Mobility (CAMMs) concluded with 
third countries.20 In addition, member states are also developing 
legal migration pilot projects, jointly with key partner countries of 
origin and transit in Africa, and with the support of the European 
third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek 
work, whether employed or self-employed”.
15  European Commission, A European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240 final (13 
May 2005), p. 14: “Europe is competing with other economies to attract workers with 
the skills it needs. Changes in the skills required by the EU between 2012 and 2025 
are expected to show a sharp increase in the share of jobs employing higher-educated 
labour (by 23%). Shortages have already been seen in key sectors such as science, tech-
nology, engineering and healthcare. Europe needs to build up its own skills base and 
equip people for inclusion in today’s labour market” (footnote omitted).
16  European Commission, Progress report on the Implementation of the European Agenda 
on Migration COM(2019) 481 final (16 October 2019), p. 19.
17  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the 
Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the pur-
poses of highly skilled employment, COM(2016) 378 final (7 June 2016).
18  See European Commission, Enhancing legal pathways to Europe: an indispensable part 
of a balanced and comprehensive migration policy, COM(2018) 635 final (12 September 
2018), p. 3, which acknowledges skills shortages in occupations requiring less formal 
skills, such as sales representatives and drivers.
19  European Commission, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, COM(2011) 
743 final (18 November 2019).
20  According to the GAMM web page, Mobility Partnerships with nine third countries 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cape Verde, Georgia, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, Tu-
nisia) have been signed to date and two CAMMs (Ethiopia and Nigeria).
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Commission, which aim to match new skills for third country 
nationals with labour market needs in the EU.21 It has been argued 
however, that supporting legal migration to the EU from third 
countries, which are also the focus of cooperation on irregular 
migration, will not necessarily result in an influx of the skills the 
EU needs.22
4. Human Rights and Labour Standards
While no EU member state has ratified the International Con-
vention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families, 1990 (ICRMW),23 they have rat-
ified most of the other core international human rights instru-
ments, which apply to non-nationals, including migrant workers.24 
The treaty bodies monitoring the implementation by states parties 
of these instruments have drawn special attention to the need to 
protect migrant workers, including in general comments or rec-
ommendations.25
EU member states have also ratified the eight ILO fundamental 
conventions addressing the abolition of forced labour, elimination 
of child labour, freedom of association and collective bargaining 
(trade union rights), and non-discrimination in employment.26 
21  Progress report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration, op cit. p. 
19. Five pilot projects on legal migration are currently underway with EU funding, to 
implement circular and long-term mobility schemes for young graduates and workers 
from selected partner countries (Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and Tunisia).
22  A. Weinar, “Legal Migration in the EU’s External Policy: An Objective or a Bargaining 
Chip?” in S. Carrera et al. (eds), Pathways towards Legal Migration into the EU: Reap-
praising concepts, trajectories and policies, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
2017, 87-93, p. 92.
23  UNGA Resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990.
24  Up-to-date information on ratifications can be obtained from the Dashboard of the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
25  See e.g. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Gener-
al recommendation No. 26 on women migrant workers, CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R (5 
December 2008), and Committee on Migrant Workers General comment No. 1 on 
migrant domestic workers, CMW/C/GC/1 (23 February 2011) and General comment 
No. 2 on the rights of migrant workers in an irregular situation and members of their 
families, CMW/C/GC/2 (28 August 2013).
26  The texts of the fundamental ILO conventions as well as other ILO conventions and 
recommendations are available from ILO NORMLEX – Information System on Inter-
national Labour Standards.
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The 2014 Protocol to the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 
(No. 29), which focuses on prevention of forced labour, including 
in the context of abusive and fraudulent recruitment practices 
affecting migrant workers, protection of victims of forced labour, 
and their access, irrespective of their legal status or presence in the 
national territory, to appropriate and effective remedies, such as 
compensation, has now been ratified by 17 EU member states,27 
out of a total of 42 ratifications to date.
The two migrant worker instruments – Migration for Employ-
ment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97) and the Migrant 
Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143) 
– have also been ratified by ten and five EU Member States respec-
tively.28 Other relevant technical conventions, such as the Private 
Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), which regu-
lates the activities of private labour recruiters and draws special 
attention to the situation of migrant workers,29 and the Domestic 
Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), which recognises domestic 
work as work and which sets minimum standards for the pro-
tection of all domestic workers, including the many migrant 
domestic workers in Europe,30 have been ratified by 13 and seven 
EU member states respectively.31 The ILO instruments on social 
security, which set minimum standards in this field and also pro-
vide the framework for portability of social security benefits, are 
27  Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and United King-
dom. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland have also ratified the Protocol.
28  Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and 
United Kingdom have ratified Convention No. 97 and Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia 
and Sweden have ratified Convention No. 143. Norway has also ratified both Conven-
tions.
29  Convention No. 181, op. cit., Article 8.
30  In 2015, the ILO estimated that out of a total of 4.4 million domestic workers in Eu-
rope, 2.29 million were migrants. ILO global estimates on migrant workers: Results and 
methodology, ILO, 2015, p. 16 (Table 2.8).
31  Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Neth-
erlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain have ratified Convention No. 181, and 
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Sweden have ratified Conven-
tion No. 189. Switzerland has also ratified the latter instrument.
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also applicable to a number of EU member states.32
The main difference between these instruments, and particu-
larly the two ILO migrant worker conventions, and the EU legal 
migration acquis is the fragmentation of the latter into various 
migrant worker categories, namely highly skilled migrants, sea-
sonal migrant workers, intra-corporate transferees, and other 
migrant workers not falling into these three categories, as well as 
students and researchers, which is the “sectoral approach” that the 
European Commission opted for after the withdrawal of its 2001 
proposal for a horizontal framework Directive on economic migra-
tion – intended to regulate the entry and residence conditions for 
all third country nationals exercising paid and self-employed activ-
ities – which was not supported by EU member states.33 The Euro-
pean Commission’s recent fitness check on EU legislation on legal 
migration recognises the sectoral approach as one of the “internal 
coherence issues”.34 In effect, the ILO conventions provide for the 
horizontal approach and also apply to EU citizens given that the 
definition of a ‘migrant for employment’ or ‘migrant worker’ does 
not distinguish between EU and non-EU nationals.35 As argued 
elsewhere, this fragmentation risks infringing the equality prin-
ciple, both across the measures themselves and in the context of 
their individual implementation. 
32  Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102), ratified by 21 EU 
member states (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom); Equality of Treatment 
(Social Security) Convention, 1962 (No. 118), ratified by seven EU member states 
(Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Sweden); Maintenance of Social 
Security Rights Convention, 1982 (No. 157), ratified by two EU member states (Spain, 
Sweden). Iceland, Norway and Switzerland have ratified Convention No. 102, and Nor-
way has ratified Convention No. 118.
33  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive on the Conditions of Entry and Resi-
dence of Third-country Nationals for the Purpose of Paid Employment and Self-Employed 
Economic Activities, COM(2001) 386 final (11 July 2011). See also European Commis-
sion, Policy Plan on Legal Migration, COM(2005) 669 final (21 December 2005), p. 5.
34  European Commission, Staff Working Document, Executive Summary of the Fitness 
Check on EU Legislation on legal migration, SWD(2019) 1056 final (29 March 2019), 
p. 2.
35  ILO Convention Nos. 97 and 143, op. cit., Article 11.
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For example, there are clear distinctions between the more 
favourable rights afforded highly skilled migrant workers in the 
‘Blue Card’ Directive as compared with those granted lower-skilled 
migrants in the Single Permit and Seasonal Workers Directives, 
in particular when it comes to family reunification, access to the 
labour market for family members, and intra-EU mobility.36 Fur-
thermore, the proposal for the recast ‘Blue Card’ Directive risks 
exacerbating these differences as a number of provisions are 
aimed to improve the ability of the EU to attract and retain highly 
skilled third-country nationals by affording them and their family 
members more rights and enhanced labour mobility between EU 
member states.37 
While the recent assessment by the European Commission of 
the implementation of the Single Permit Directive observes that 
the equal treatment provisions are generally applied correctly, 
shortcomings in transposition have been identified in a number 
of areas, particularly in respect of the export of pension bene-
fits,38 which was already a concern raised in an earlier ILO note 
published by the EU Council during the negotiations on the draft 
Directive, which originally aimed to restrict the export of pen-
sions by third country nationals only if their EU member state of 
residence had concluded a social security agreement with their 
country of origin.39 
36  See also R. Cholewinski, “Labour Migration, Temporariness and Rights” in S. Carre-
ra, E. Guild and K. Eisele (eds) Rethinking the Attractiveness of EU Labour Immigra-
tion Policies: Comparative perspectives on the EU, the US, Canada and beyond, CEPS: 
Brussels, 2014, 22-28, p. 26, and R. Cholewinski, “International Perspective on Highly 
Skilled Migration in Light of the Blue Card Directive and its Transposition in EU Mem-
ber States” in C. Grütters and T. Strik (eds) The Blue Card Directive: Central Themes, 
Problem Issues, and Implementation in Selected Member States, Nijmegen and Oisterwi-
jk: Centre for Migration Law and Wolf Legal Publishers, 2013, 27-39, pp. 38-39.
37  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the pur-
poses of highly skilled employment, COM(2016) 378 final (7 June 2016), pp. 3 and 10-11.
38  European Commission, Report to the European Parliament and the Council on Directi-
ve 2011/98/EU on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country 
nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of 
rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State, COM(2019) 160 final 
(29 March 2019), pp. 9-11.
39  EU Council, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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On the other hand, in assessing the EU legal migration leg-
islation as a whole, the European Commission’s fitness check 
concludes, as one of the main positive effects of the evaluation, 
“improved recognition of the rights of third-country nationals 
(namely the right to be treated on an equal basis with nationals in 
a number of important areas, such as working conditions, access 
to education and social security benefits, and procedural rights)”.40 
However, there is little evidence in the fitness check and its sup-
porting documents41 to evaluate the EU legislation on legal migra-
tion against international human rights and labour standards, 
which is in stark contrast to the study on legal migration prepared 
for the European Parliament.42
5. Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration
As noted in the introduction, the GCM was endorsed by the UN 
General Assembly on 19 December 2019. 152 UN member states 
voted in favour of the GCM, five voted against, and 12 abstained. 
Three of the five UN member states voting against the GCM were 
EU member states (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), and 
six EU member states (Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia, Romania, 
Slovakia) were among the 12 UN member states abstaining. This 
meant that one-third of EU member states did not “sign up” to the 
GCM, in effect making Europe the region most opposed to the 
GCM.43
The GCM has been heralded as the first comprehensive global 
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of 
seasonal employment – ILO Note, Doc. 9564/11 (2 May 2011).
40  Executive Summary of the Fitness Check on EU Legislation on legal migration, op. cit., 
p. 4.
41  European Commission, Legal Migration Fitness Check: Final Evaluation Report - Sup-
porting Study (June 2018), Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 
2019.
42  European Parliament, The cost of Non-Europe in the area of legal migration, Study 
prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service, including CEPS research, 
Brussels: EU, March 2019.
43  Liechtenstein and Switzerland also abstained.
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framework addressing all aspects of international migration.44 It 
purports to align itself with international law, and rests on the pur-
poses and principles of the UN Charter and other international 
law instruments, including relevant ILO Conventions.45 The GCM 
is also based on a set of cross-cutting and interdependent guiding 
principles, inter alia that it is people-centred, recognises respect for 
the rule of law and due process, is based on international human 
rights law, is gender-responsive and child-sensitive, and promotes 
“whole of government” and “whole of society” approaches,46 which 
all resonate with the spirit of legally binding international human 
rights and labour standards and their application.
While the GCM is also rooted in the 2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development,47 there is no organised framework of goals, tar-
gets and indicators, as with the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), which sets timelines for the achievement of the actions 
specified.48
The scope of the GCM applies to nearly all aspects of migra-
tion, with the possible exception of mixed migration, and is thus 
considerably broader in scope to that of the legally binding UN 
and ILO migration instruments, which focus on regulating the 
labour migration process and protection of migrant workers and 
their families. Indeed, the GCM addresses one particular area that 
is not the principal concern of these instruments – with the excep-
tion where they contain provisions relating to the migration pro-
cess – namely, the need to make available more flexible pathways 
44  K. Newland, “Global Governance of International Migration 2.0: What Lies Ahead”, 
Migration Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., February 2019, p. 2.
45  GCM, op. cit., Preamble, paras. 1 and 2.
46  GCM, ibid., para. 15. The remaining guiding principles are concerned with interna-
tional cooperation, national sovereignty and sustainable development.
47  GCM, ibid., para. 6; UNGA, 70th Session, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development, adopted on 25 September 2015, UN doc. A/RES/70/71 
(21 October 2015).
48  Professor François Crépeau, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights 
of migrants, proposed such a framework as a model for the GCM. See UNGA, Human 
Rights Council, 35th Session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights 
of migrants on a 2035 agenda for facilitating human mobility, A/HRC/35/25 (28 April 
2017).
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for the admission of regular migrants for the purposes of employ-
ment, family reunion and study, which is articulated by its objec-
tive 5.49 Contrary to views in some quarters, however, the ICRMW, 
and ILO Conventions Nos. 97 and 143, do not interfere with the 
state sovereign prerogative to regulate the admission of foreigners 
into the territory. Even where the question of regularisation of 
migrants in an irregular situation is raised in these instruments, 
states parties are only encouraged to give consideration to such a 
possibility.50 
Arguably, in addition to its overall non-legally binding nature, 
the GCM does not undertake anything similar in objective 5, 
although this position continued to be expressed by some gov-
ernments, including those of EU member states, namely that the 
GCM poses a threat to the sovereign right of states to enforce their 
immigration laws and to secure their borders, and even that it 
would create a human right to immigration.51
Decent work and labour migration is spread across a number 
of GCM objectives, in particular objectives 5 (considered above), 
6 (facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions 
that ensure decent work), 15 (provide access to basic services 
to migrants), 16 (empower migrants and societies to realise full 
inclusion and social cohesion), 18 (invest in skills development 
and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and com-
petences), and 22 (establish mechanisms for the portability of 
social security entitlements and earned benefits).
49  GCM, op. cit., para. 21, objective 5: Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for 
regular migration.
50  For example, see ICRMW, Art. 69(1), “States Parties shall, when there are migrant 
workers and members of their families within their territory in an irregular situation, 
take appropriate measures to ensure that such a situation does not persist”, and Con-
vention No. 143, Art. 9(4), “Nothing in this Convention shall prevent Members from 
giving persons who are illegally residing or working within the country the right to stay 
and to take up legal employment.”
51  S. Carrera, et al., “Some EU governments leaving the UN Global Compact on Mi-
gration: A contradiction in terms?, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Policy 
Insights, No. 2018/15, November 2018, pp. 1, 6-7.
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Given its broad acceptance by UN member states outside of the 
EU, including by third countries in the EU neighbourhood, the 
GCM is an important multilateral instrument, which can foster 
stronger and more comprehensive cooperation on migration, 
including on labour migration, between these countries and the 
EU. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the European Commission 
will continue to see the value of the GCM as well as the interna-
tional legal standards upon which it rests as setting the framework 
for wider cooperation on legal migration with third countries 
despite the reticence of a number of EU member states towards 
this important non-binding framework.
6. Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to thread together the EU law and 
policy on legal migration, as originally articulated in the Tampere 
Milestones and elaborated in the 20 years since their adoption in 
detailed legal and policy measures, with the applicable human 
rights and ILO international labour standards, to which most EU 
member states adhere, and the provisions on decent work and 
labour migration in the GCM.
There continues to be a normative gap between the fragmented 
EU approach to addressing legal migration from third countries 
with international standards and frameworks. On a broader level, 
this tension runs to the core of state sovereign concerns and the 
protection of individual human and labour rights, which are also 
applicable to non-nationals. It is necessary to narrow this gap if 
indeed the EU is to fulfil the promise in the Tampere Milestones on 
realizing an area of freedom, security and justice for all, including 
those third country nationals from outside the EU who seek to 
enter lawfully to take up employment, study and join family mem-
bers, and thus contribute to its further economic development and 
prosperity.
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16. 20 YEARS FROM TAMPERE. 
THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION 




The Tampere Conclusions introduced an ambitious programme 
for the development of European integration in criminal matters, 
centered primarily around the principle of mutual recognition. 
20 years on, we have witnessed the transformation of European 
criminal law from a marginal, intergovernmental field to one of 
the most dynamic and constitutionally significant areas of EU law. 
Indeed, a number of key EU criminal law questions are essentially 
constitutional law questions. 
This Chapter will assess the great steps taken towards the 
coming of age of EU criminal law as a fully fledged area of EU law. 
It focuses on the constitutionalisation of Europe's criminal justice 
area. Four key constitutionalisation developments accelerated by 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty will be analysed and two 
main challenges for the future of EU criminal law will be high-
lighted.
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2. The Four Elements of the Constitutionalisation of 
European Criminal Justice
There are four key dimensions of constitutionalisation in Euro-
pean Criminal Justice related to institutions, competences, princi-
ples and rights. In terms of institutions, the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty signified the supranationalisation of European crim-
inal law, with EU institutions assuming their full EU powers in the 
field. The contribution of two of these institutions, the European 
Parliament and the CJEU, has been instrumental in the changing 
landscape of European criminal law and a greater emphasis on the 
examination of the impact of  EU intervention in the field on fun-
damental rights. The contribution of the Parliament under code-
cision to strengthening fundamental rights safeguards in dossiers 
such as the defence rights and the European Investigation Order 
Directives and its opposition to the Commission package on dig-
ital evidence are key examples in this context. As it will be seen 
below, the Court of Justice has also been instrumental in exam-
ining the constitutional implications of EU criminal law, most 
notably in the evolution of its case law on mutual recognition and 
the European Arrest Warrant.
The second element of constitutionalisation involves the clar-
ification and expansion of EU competences in the field of EU 
criminal law. Clarification of competences has been a request by 
the Working Group on the Area of Freedom, Security and Jus-
tice (AFSJ) at the Convention of the Future of Europe and has 
occurred in the Lisbon Treaty in the field of substantive criminal 
law in Article 83(2) TFEU. Here the Treaty introduced two types 
of criminal law harmonisation: securitised criminalisation (83(1)) 
and functional criminalisation (83(2)), the latter translating in 
Treaty terms the case law of the CJEU in the environmental crime 
and pollution at sea cases. 
The extent of the Union’s powers to criminalise and the overlap 
with other Treaty provisions (such as Article 325 TFEU) remain 
perhaps inevitably contested, but the criminalisation legal basis 
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has thus far been used selectively by the EU institutions. A key 
missed opportunity in this context has been to use the Article 
83 legal basis to amend EU law in order to decriminalise: a key 
example in this context is the legislation on the criminalisation of 
the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, where 
the Commission refused to bring forward amending   legislation   
to address the grave human rights issue of the criminalisation of 
humanitarianism and stigmatisation  of civil society and citizens 
that the broad scope of current criminalisation entails.
In addition to the clarification  of EU competence, the Lisbon 
treaty has expanded EU competence in the field of EU criminal 
law leading to the adoption of secondary legislation which has 
changed and has the potential to fundamentally   change further 
the landscape of EU criminal law. The first example is the intro-
duction of Article 82(2) TFEU, granting for the first time to the 
EU Express competence to legislate in a number of areas of crim-
inal procedure, including defence rights. While competence under 
Article 82(2) TFEU can be considered functional (it exists if it is 
necessary for the effective operation of mutual recognition) in 
practice it has resulted in wide range harmonisation   of defence 
rights legislation  across the  EU. The potential of these measures 
to grant effective protection  on the ground and to shift the focus 
in Europezn criminal Justice in uncritical enforcement to funda-
mental rights is enormous: many of these provisions have direct 
effect, the CJEU has already confirmed the application of the prin-
ciple of effectiveness in their implementation and it is remarkable 
that the EU has reached a point where it legislated, via secondary 
law, on human rights.
Another key area of expansion of EU competence has been the 
introduction of Article 86 TFEU which has led to the adoption   
for the first time of a Regulation establishing  the European Public 
Prosecutors Office (EPPO). Negotiations have been lengthy and 
at times tortuous. The need for  compromise under the spectre of 
enhanced cooperation and national sovereignty concerns have led 
to the adoption  of a complex and at times unwieldy piece of legis-
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lation which law generated a very complex legal structure for the 
EPPO and has left many matters to be regulated  by national law. 
In this manner, the EPPO Regulation generates a number of 
concerns regarding legal certainty and the protection of funda-
mental rights and the rule of law, especially in view of the limited 
avenues of a legal remedy before the CJEU. But if one wishes to 
view the glass as half full, it is certain that the very establishment 
of the EPPO with the participation of a great majority of Member 
States is an unprecedented and great leap forward for European 
criminal justice, as for the first time an EU agency with coercive 
powers and direct powers over national systems has been estab-
lished. It is for courts, national and European, to address the fun-
damental rights and rule of law challenges in the future.
The third and fourth elements of constitutionalisation are inex-
tricably linked and involve the application of general principles 
of EU law and fundamental rights in European criminal law. The 
CJEU has confirmed in a variety of cases the applicability in this 
sensitive field of principles including primacy and effectiveness of 
EU law as well as direct effect, including of Treaty provisions such 
as Article 325 TFEU. While as demonstrated in the Taricco judge-
ment saga these developments are not always readily accepted by 
national legal orders, the strength in the CJEU pronouncements 
and their impetus for the effective enforcement of European crim-
inal law cannot be underestimated. A particular enforcement role 
falls here to national courts, which are called to display national 
law, which hinders the effectiveness of EU law.
National courts have a key role to play also in upholding fun-
damental rights in Europe’s area of criminal justice. This is in par-
ticular after the eventual evolution and maturation of the CJEU 
approach to mutual recognition where post-Aranyosi ruling we 
have moved to a paradigm of ‘earned trust’ on the basis of effective 
protection of fundamental rights on the ground. It is for national 
courts, under a paradigm of dialogical pluralism, to ensure the 
effective protection of rights which at the same time will, serve to 
safeguard the very credibility of the system of  mutual recognition.
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3. Coming of Age: The Challenge of The Rule of Law in an 
Era of Globalization
This Chapter has demonstrated that European criminal law in the 
twenty years since Tampere has really come of age in terms of its 
content, direction and ambition. Challenges of reconciling inte-
gration in this sensitive field with national sovereignty and fun-
damental rights concerns will always remain but they have started 
to be addressed in a meaningful way. Being forward-looking, this 
Chapter would like to address two newer but key interrelated chal-
lenges for European criminal justice in the future: the challenge of 
upholding the rule of law and the challenge of upholding and pro-
moting  European values in the emergence of the EU as a global 
actor in an era of globalisation. 
In terms of upholding the rule of law: rule of law challenges 
have arisen in a number of areas of European criminal justice in 
recent years. Examples include rule of law concerns in the imple-
mentation of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) - with the very 
concept of judicial independence being challenged and in the 
process of redefinition by the CJEU- rule of law concerns in the 
implementation of the EPPO and rule of law concerns in the emer-
gence of an EU data-driven paradigm of operational cooperation, 
in particular, via the proliferation and expansion of databases and 
their interoperability. These developments raise the question of 
vigilance regarding both ex ante and ex post rule of law scrutiny 
urgent - there is a need to ensure and provide an effective remedy 
and transparency for individuals affected by secret and multi-level 
state enforcement.
These rule of law challenges are more acute in the face of glo-
balisation   and the blurred   boundaries data driven surveillance 
entails. The latter blurs  boundaries in four ways: between internal 
and external action; between  the public and the private; between 
migration and security; and between reactive and preventive jus-
tice. There is an urgent   need not to let this blurring of bounda-
ries undermine the very values upon which the Union is based, 
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including fundamental rights and the rule of law. Current embod-
iments of this blurring of boundaries such as the new EU interop-
erability framework and the current internal and external nego-
tiations on digital evidence in the shadow of the US Cloud Act 
render these challenges even more visible and acute. In view of 
globalisation, the challenge for the EU will not only to uphold but 
also to promote its values in the global scene, as its constitutional 
framework requires it to do.
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JUSTICE – FROM MUTUAL 
RECOGNITION TO COHERENCE
Dominik Brodowski
1. Introduction: European Criminal Justice – Mission 
Completed?
On the occasion of the 20-year anniversary of the groundbreaking 
Tampere Programme, can we say that European Criminal Justice1 
is, at least on a legislative level, a mission completed? Yes – and 
no. Yes, as much has been achieved in the quest for more effective 
criminal justice in the European Union, but also in the quest for a 
more just criminal justice.2 To highlight just a few aspects: (1) An 
extensive set of mutual recognition instruments is in operation,3 
and in particular the European Arrest Warrant has matured to a 
1  On European criminal policy since Mireille Delmas-Marty famous query “Quelle 
politique pénale pour l’Europe?” (Delmas-Marty, 1993), just see Vogel (2002); Vogel 
(2014), 644 ff.
2  On the acquis, just see the treatises on European Criminal Law, such as Klip (2016); 
Satzger (2018); Ambos (2018); and Mitsilegas (2016).
3  Most relevant are the European Arrest Warrant (Council of European Union, 2002), 
the mutual recognition of custodial sentences (Council of the European Union, 2008) 
and of financial penalties (Council of the European Union, 2005), the European In-
vestigation Order (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2014), 
and the – not yet operational – Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 on the mutual recognition 
of freezing orders and confiscation orders (European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, 2018c).
Table of Contents
226 PART IV - EU Criminal Justice Cooperation
successful tool for prosecutors and courts throughout the Union. 
(2) A set of Directives on procedural rights of suspected or accused 
persons,4 but also on victim rights,5 has been enacted. Once the 
dust has settled on the national level, the often-proclaimed mutual 
trust between member states6 will finally have a more solid nor-
mative basis. (3) Ever more often, the relevance of the Charter on 
Fundamental Rights is recognised, not only in relation to ne bis in 
idem (most recently, see the ECJ judgments of 20 March 2018 – 
C-524/15 (Menci), C-537/16 (Garlsson Real Estate) and C-596/16 
/ C-597/16 (Di Puma)), but also concerning the proportionality of 
criminal liability (most recently, see ECJ, decision of 12 July 2018 
– C-707/17 (Pinzaru und Cirstinoiu) and ECJ, decision of 30 Jan-
uary 2019 – C-335/18 and C-336/18 (AK))7 and the equal treat-
ment of all Union citizens by member states (see fundamentally 
ECJ, judgment of 6 September 2016 – C-182/15 (Petruhhin) and 
ECJ, judgment of 13 November 2018 – C-247/17 (Raugevicius)). 
(4) A framework for coordination of European Criminal Justice, 
in particular by Eurojust (European Parliament and Council of 
the European Union, 2018a) and Europol (European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union, 2016d), has been built. (5) 
And last but not least, the EPPO (Council of the European Union, 
2017)8 will soon commence operations.
4 Concerning interpretation and translation (European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, 2010), information (European Parliament and Council of the Eu-
ropean Union, 2012a), access to a lawyer (European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, 2013a), presumption of innocence and right to be present (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2016a), procedural safeguards for chil-
dren (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2016c), and legal aid 
(European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2016e).
5 Concerning compensation (Council of the European Union, 2004) and rights, support 
and protection (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2012b). See 
also the European Protection Order (European Parliament and Council of the Europe-
an Union, 2011) and its civil law complement (European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, 2013b).
6 In particular, the topic of mutual trust is more pronounced in the jurisprudence of the 
ECJ compared to legislative programmes (which often called for a strengthening of 
trust) or the Commission; just see Burchard (2019), 485 ff.
7 A further interesting preliminary question proceeding was removed from the register 
twice (ECJ, decision of 12 June 2019 – C-149/19 (R.B.) and ECJ, decision of 24 January 
2019 – C-510/17 (ML)).
8 On the EPPO Regulation, see an article-by-article commentary by Herrnfeld, Bro-
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Without doubt, these are great steps forward towards a truly 
European Criminal Justice. Owing to these laudable achieve-
ments, Europe is safer and more secure – not only in relation to 
crime, but also in relation to preserving freedoms of citizens via-
à-vis the state.
Yet, there is no time to rest, as the “mission” is far from com-
pleted. Not only regarding details – and one can easily speak hours 
and write monographs on specific provisions in the various Direc-
tives, Regulations and Framework Decisions, their interpretation, 
and their operation in practice. But also on a general, strategic 
level, the “mission” is also far from completed. There are clear 
and present dangers to the rule of law. Nationalism and calls for 
a re-nationalisation of criminal justice9 are on the rise. And the 
so-called “e-evidence” proposals (European Commission, 2018a, 
and European Commission, 2018b) unearth fault lines of mutual 
recognition.10
2. Aims and Means of European Criminal Justice
Once again, it is therefore necessary to re-think the aims and the 
means of European Criminal Justice, and to set future priorities in 
line with them. I am therefore very thankful to the organisers of 
this conference that they take such a future-looking approach, but 
still give the praise to the Tampere program it truly deserves.
2.1. Aims of European Criminal Justice
What are the aims of European Criminal Justice?11 From a norma-
tive birds-eye point of view, it is to build and to protect an Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (Art. 3 TEU; Art. 67 para 1 TFEU). 
Going beyond this mere headline, three more concrete aims can 
dowski and Burchard (2020).
9 Criticism in the UK against “Europe” before the Brexit referendum was pointed, among 
others, against the ECtHR (sic!) interfering with the UK criminal justice system.
10 See infra II.3. 
11 On the genesis, see supra note 1. 
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be discerned from Union primary law (see fundamentally Sieber, 
2009, 2 ff.):
Firstly, and this is central to the concept of mutual recognition 
(cf. Art. 82 para 1 lit a TFEU), European Criminal Justice seeks to 
empower national criminal justice systems to effectively prevent 
and address crime (cf. Art. 67 para 2 TFEU),12 in particular13 in 
cross-border situations:14 mutual recognition extends the powers 
and the reach of each national criminal justice system, which 
would otherwise be normatively limited and practically hindered 
by having to rely on class means of mutual legal assistance and 
extradition.
Secondly, European Criminal Justice focuses on cross-border 
crimes and crimes affecting EU interests (Sieber, 2009, 2 ff.). In 
particular, the Union extensively defines a minimum level of crim-
inalisation for “areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-
border dimension” (Art. 82 para 1 TFEU),15 to a lesser extent for 
areas subject to Union harmonisation (Art.  82 para  2 TFEU),16 
and sometimes relies on quasi-criminal or administrative modes 
of sanctioning.17 A further milestone will be when the EPPO com-
mences the investigation and prosecution of so-called PIF (protec-
tion of the Union’s financial interests) offences.18
12 Beyond mutual recognition, also Eurojust and Europol can be seen – as facilitators – to 
empower national criminal justice systems, same as the training mentioned in Art. 82 
para 1 lit c TFEU
13 Exceptions apply, such as when EC³ (located at Europol) assists national police forces 
in the forensic evaluation of digital evidence. 
14 Notably, this does not only apply to cross-border crime: it suffices if a victim travels 
abroad (European Protection Order), if evidence is located abroad (European Evidence 
Order), if a convicted person flees abroad (European Arrest Warrant), or merely has a 
bank account abroad (European Confiscation Order).
15 Recently, see the Directives on money laundering (European Parliament and Council 
of the European Union, 2018b) and on fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of 
payment (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2019).
16 Recently, see the PIF Directive (European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union, 2017).
17 See, for instance, the regulatory regime relating to the protection of personal data, in 
particular Art. 83 GDPR (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
2016b).
18 On the EPPO, see already supra note 8.
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Thirdly, suspected and accused persons, victims, but also bona 
fide third parties enjoy – at least19 – fundamental rights and free-
doms. Though oftentimes forgotten, European Criminal Justice 
also seeks to preserve and protect these freedoms (see again Sieber, 
2009, 2 ff.), not only in light of the transnational guarantee of ne 
bis in idem (Art.  50 ChFR). The important aim of “combating” 
crime does not always justify, or “trump”, the infringement of fun-
damental rights (see fundamentally the ECJ jurisprudence on data 
retention, most recently ECJ, judgment of 21 December 2016 – 
C-203/15 and C-698/15 (Tele2, Watson)).
2.2. Means of European Criminal Justice
On the means of European Criminal Justice, merely a short reminder 
of the theoretical framework (see extensively Sieber, 2009, 16 ff.): 
European Criminal Justice of today is neither a pure model of 
cooperation, nor a pure model of supranationalisation. Instead, 
it combines a strong, but not absolute level of cooperation (in 
particular mutual recognition with limited grounds for refusal20) 
with significant supranational elements (in particular the harmo-
nisation of criminal laws and procedural rights, a coordination of 
criminal justice by European bodies and agencies, and soon the 
EPPO as a supranational, yet hybrid investigatory and prosecuto-
rial body). Here is not the place to discern the evolvement of this 
“mixture model”, yet it seems evident that it has evolved mostly 
for political and practical reasons but not for scientific clarity. And 
as this “mixture model” is now codified on a constitutional level 
in Art. 82 ff. TFEU, it is unlikely to change fundamentally in the 
foreseeable future.21
19 It often makes sense, not only in liberal democracies, to provide more “spaces of free-
dom” and additional rights, and not only the bare minimum of liberties required by the 
constitution and/or by human and fundamental rights.
20 On the concept of mutual recognition in criminal justice, see originally Sieber (1991), 
962 f., and recently as well as extensively Burchard (2019).
21 However, once the EPPO is operational and a success story, the proposals to expand its 
material competence (for instance, also for cross-border cases of international terror-
ism) will gain more track.
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2.3. Challenges of the “mixture”
Yet, this mixture model leads to challenges, most of them well 
described in literature. To name a few: Mutual recognition is criti-
cised for its focus on nation states instead of the Union as a whole 
(cf. Klip, 2016, 528). Moreover, it relies too heavily on the issuing 
criminal justice system and its extensive jurisdiction: it determines 
what is criminalised, but also what crimes are prosecuted by which 
means and under what limitations (cf. again Klip, 2016, 531 ff.). 
Only exceptionally, the executing authorities may make use of 
grounds for refusal. 
In the e-evidence proposal (European Commission, 2018a, and 
European Commission, 2018b), there is almost no role for them to 
play at all. It seems doubtful whether sufficient mutual trust exists 
for such near-automatic mutual recognition, especially as the 
existing, highly specific procedural-rights related instruments22 do 
not address the questions at stake relating to e-evidence (such as 
judicial control or material limitations to investigation measures) 
and therefore cannot provide for a sufficient normative basis for 
such trust. 
Another common criticism describes mutual trust as “hypo-
thetical” or “presupposed” but non-existent in practice.23 Indeed, 
there are worrying, clear and present dangers to the rule of law; 
and some member states still struggle to evolve to modern Euro-
pean standards, and numerous court decisions can be pointed to 
as evidence for distrust between the states. 
Critics of European Criminal justice furthermore state that 
supranational elements encroach too heavily into the sovereignty 
of the member states (just see German Federal Constitutional 
Court, judgment of 30 June 2009 – 2 BvE 2/08 (“Lisbon Treaty”), 
paras. 252 f.). The same argument is also brought forward against 
mutual recognition (just see German Federal Constitutional 
Court, decision of 15 December 2015 – 2 BvR 2735/14 (“Identity 
22 See supra note 4.
23 See supra note 6 with further references.
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Control”), paras. 67 ff.), and nowadays in particular against the 
quasi-automatic recognition proposed for so-called e-evidence.
In my view, most of this criticism is off the point. Instead, the 
true challenge of the “mixture” of models of supranational and 
cooperation approaches lies in achieving coherence.24 As the Euro-
pean Criminal Policy Initiative has highlighted, such coherence 
requirements exist relating to substantive criminal law (European 
Criminal Policy Initiative, 2009) including sanctioning (just see 
Satzger, 2019) and to procedural law (European Criminal Policy 
Initiative, 2013). Coherence is, however, also required with regard 
to the aims of European Criminal Justice, which is not only about 
catching the criminal in another member state, but also about pro-
tecting and preserving freedom and justice. Let us think, in par-
ticular, about a person who is falsely suspected, or about a bona 
fide third party25: Does European Criminal Justice and in par-
ticular the current system of mutual recognition do them justice?
3. A More Coherent Approach to Mutual Recognition
From such a perspective, it becomes eminent that the strength-
ening and extension of national criminal justice systems (by means 
of mutual recognition) requires, at the same time, a coherent 
strategy of coordination, checks and constraints:26
By calling for constraining criminal justice, I do not wish to 
interfere with the legislative prerogative to determine the criminal 
24 See also the similar call by Liane Wörner for a complementary balancing act between 
effectiveness of Union criminal justice, and – in the absence of specific Union rules on 
the matter – national human and fundamental rights standards, Wörner (2018).
25 In relation to the e-evidence proposal, such a shift of perspective is of utmost rele-
vance. Most of the existing instruments of mutual recognition focus on the (assumed) 
perpetrator. Compared to the various forms of evidence available under the European 
Investigation Order (supra note 3), requests for e-evidence far more often relate (also) 
to bona fide third parties, to whom no “genuine link” to the issuing state may exist.
26 See additionally the – still noteworthy – suggestions by Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen and 
Surano (2008), such as “Approximate conditions for bringing an action”; “Approxi-
mate conditions for compensation”; “Facilitating the bringing of actions” (p. 28 f.), and 
the more recent study by Sellier and Weyembergh (2018); see furthermore European 
Criminal Bar Association (2018).
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laws and the configuration of the criminal justice system. Instead, 
I want to remind that criminal law cannot solve all conflicts in 
today’s societies. Often, criminal law is not the right or only choice. 
Going beyond this political perspective, there are eminent but also 
evolving constitutional constraints to criminal justice which must 
be taken seriously (for Germany, see, for instance, Jahn and Bro-
dowski, 2016). In this vein, the Union should finally live up to the 
requirement of Art. 6 TEU and accede to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (but see ECJ, opinion of 18 December 2014 
– 2/13); it is great to see that the Finnish presidency is taking steps 
in this regard (cf. Council of the European Union, 2019b). Then, 
the Union and its system of mutual recognition should strive to 
guarantee that the human rights standards are adhered to in all 
cases (in this sense, see the practical concordance approach by 
Burchard (2019), 514 ff., 569 ff., 619 ff.), and not only presuppose 
that they are.
Judicial checks should not only be seen as a hindrance to 
“combat” crime, but as a strength of an area of freedom, security 
and justice. To be worthy of their name, judicial checks must be 
easily accessible, thorough, and powerful. That requires not only 
a strong protection of the rule of law including judicial independ-
ence. It also requires us to re-think which forum can best assess the 
situation, and to consider whether sometimes two checks might be 
better than only one. Moreover, access to justice in cross-border 
situations requires enhancement (such as by providing for legal 
aid in both forums).
Coordination is required not only to avoid inefficient parallel 
proceedings and to prevent ne bis in idem situations. It is also 
required to set out clear, non-ambiguous standards to citizens on 
what freedoms they enjoy, what conduct is prohibited, and what 
punishment in what member state they will face in case of which 
violation. Resolving or at least reducing conflicts of jurisdiction ex 
ante27 (and not only ex post through ne bis in idem) can further-
27 Currently, Council of the European Union (2009) provides for a weak coordination 
mechanism facilitated by Eurojust (on its related casework, see recently Council of the 
European Union, 2019a). For alternative proposals, see exemplarily Bundesrechtsan-
waltskammer (2016), which I co-developed. See also Klip (2016), 531 ff.
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more enhance mutual trust: it can guarantee that criminal justice 
systems do not encroach too broadly into situations more closely 
linked to another member state.28
In my view, such a coherent strategy of coordination, checks 
and constraints is required to let European Criminal Justice in 
general and the system of mutual recognition in particular remain 
a success story –  and for the Union to live up to the expectation 
to form not only an area of cooperation in criminal matters, but a 
true Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
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18. ‘SCENES FROM A 
MARRIAGE’: TRUST, DISTRUST 
AND (RE)ASSURANCES IN THE 




In the twentieth anniversary of the famous Conclusions of the 
Tampere European Council, it might be interesting to revisit the 
notion of mutual trust as the proclaimed foundations of mutual 
recognition: back in 1999, was the ‘cornerstone’ built on solid 
grounds – or has it been floating, since then, over a romantic plan 
drawn by some bona fide architects? This Chapter will focus on 
trust and assurances and, especially, on the most recent jurispru-
dence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on 
the subject1.
1  CJEU, Judgment, Case C-220/18 PPU, ML / Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen, 25 July 
2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:589 (hereinafter, ML), and CJEU, Judgment, Case C-128/18, 
Dorobantu, 15 October 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:857 (hereinfter, Dorobantu).
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2. Context
For the past twenty years, mutual recognition has basically 
amounted to enhancing the effectiveness of judicial cooperation, 
or, to be more precise, it has worked as the driving belt of the crim-
inal policy of the issuing Member State(s), extending the reach of 
domestic decisions in criminal matters across the whole territory 
of the European Union. The lubricant used on that driving belt was 
mutual trust, more as a normative assumption than as an empiri-
cally ascertained situation. 
Up until 2016, several decisions of the CJEU have equated 
mutual recognition with maximal execution. To that purpose, they 
have built a system of judicial cooperation hermetically sealed vis-
à-vis the protection of human/fundamental rights not reflected in 
secondary law2 and have affirmed – obviously, within the scope of 
EU law – the prevalence of EU standards of protection over the 
ones provided for by national constitutions, even where the former 
were lower than the latter3.
However, the judgment in Aranyosi / Caldararu4 has brought 
an important change of perspective to the law and practice of 
judicial cooperation in the EU and, in particular, to the configu-
ration of mutual recognition. The Court has made clear that the 
principle of mutual recognition and the duties arising therefrom 
do not supersede the positive obligation to prevent inhuman or 
degrading treatment of the individual sought. 
Therefore, ‘where the judicial authority of the executing 
Member State is in possession of evidence of a real risk of inhuman 
or degrading treatment of individuals detained in the issuing 
Member State, (…) that judicial authority is bound to assess the 
2  See CJEU, Judgment, Case C-396/11, Radu, 29 January 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:39, 
para. 36: ‘the executing judicial authority may make the execution of a European arrest 
warrant subject solely to the conditions set out in Article 5 of that framework decision’.
3  CJEU, Judgment, Case C-399/11, Melloni, 26 February 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, 
esp. para. 55 f.
4  CJEU, Judgment, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi / Căldăraru, 5 
April 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198 (hereinafter Aranyosi).
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existence of that risk when it is called upon to decide on the sur-
render to the authorities of the issuing Member State of the indi-
vidual sought by a European arrest warrant. The consequence of 
the execution of such a warrant must not be that that individual 
suffers inhuman or degrading treatment’5. 
The judgment in the case ML led the Court to develop the 
second step of the test put forward in Aranyosi. The Court stated 
that, under Article 15 (2) of the Framework Decision on the Euro-
pean Arrest Warrant6 and the principle of sincere cooperation, ‘the 
executing judicial authority and the issuing judicial authority may, 
respectively, request information or give assurances concerning 
the actual and precise conditions in which the person concerned 
will be detained in the issuing Member State’7. 
As far as this author knows, it is the first time that the Court 
uses the concept of assurances / guarantees in the field of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters since the revocation, in 2009, of 
the former Article 5 (1) of the Framework Decision on the Euro-
pean Arrest Warrant8. In that context, the executing authority 
could ask for an assurance that the individual tried in absentia 
would have the right to request a new trial. Strictly speaking, it was 
not really an assurance, in the sense of a guarantee of future prac-
tice, but rather a request for certified information on the foreign 
legal system to be provided by a reliable source (the issuing judicial 
authority). In contrast, the notion of assurances in ML seems to 
correspond broadly to the one used in classic judicial cooperation, 
because the assurances refer to the way in which the surrendered 
person will be dealt with, in cases that presuppose, to some extent, 
a situation of distrust. This raises four questions. 
5  Ibid., para. 88.
6  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 
1 f.
7  ML, para. 110; in a similar vein, see Dorobantu, para. 67 f.
8  Article 2 (1) of the Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 
2009 amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 
2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, OJ 81, 27.3.2009, p. 24 f.
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3. The Questions
First question: should the judgments in ML and Dorobantu 
be interpreted in the sense that, in the said cases, the executing 
authorities are entitled to request from the issuing authorities guar-
antees that the detainee’s rights will be respected? 
Apparently, the answer should be in the negative. In ML, the 
Court said that the executing and the issuing authorities may, 
‘respectively, request information or give assurances’ (emphasis 
added). 
Nevertheless, in Dorobantu, the distinction is not as clear, and 
a dictum in the judgment suggests yet a different approach: ‘Last, 
it should be pointed out that, while it is open to the Member States 
to make provision in respect of their own prison system for min-
imum standards in terms of detention conditions that are higher 
than those resulting from Article 4 of the Charter and Article 3 of 
the ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, 
a Member State may nevertheless, as the executing Member State, 
make the surrender to the issuing Member State of the person con-
cerned by a European arrest warrant subject only to compliance with 
the latter requirements, and not with those resulting from its own 
national law’ (emphasis added)9. 
It is unclear whether the Court meant to rule that the exe-
cuting authorities can make surrender conditional on compliance 
(following guarantees) – a sort of resolutive condition that would 
allow for, eg., the revocation of the decision to surrender should 
the issuing Member State fail to honour the assurances10 – or 
9  Dorobantu, para. 79.
10  This was the stance taken by the Portuguese courts in the notorious case Abu-Salem: 
following a motion filed by the extradited individual after his extradition to India, the 
High Court of Lisbon found that the Republic of India had failed to fulfil the assur-
ances it had provided regarding, inter alia, the respect for the specialty rule, and has 
thus revoked the decision to extradite (Acórdão do Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa, proc. 
3880/03-3, 14 September 2011, available at www.dgsi.pt). The decision was upheld by 
the Portuguese Supreme Court, which found further that the presence of the individual 
in India is now ‘illegal’ (Acórdão do Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, proc. 111/11.7YFLSB, 
11-01-2012, available at www.dgsi.pt). Nevertheless, the Portuguese Government has 
not (yet) enforced the decision by requesting the return of the individual.
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simply meant to restate Melloni and stress that the standards with 
which the guarantees (if provided) must comply is the one set by 
European law.
 Be it as it may, since the Court has also ruled that guarantees 
of a certain kind must be relied upon by the executing authori-
ties, save for exceptional circumstances11, it is likely that providing 
them in these cases will become common practice. In this context, 
assurances are intended to restore the shaken confidence – or, bor-
rowing from Günther Jakobs’s doctrine, they are used to counter-
factually reaffirm the worthiness of trust. This is also in line with 
the argument according to which trust relates to the practice, to 
the empirical action of the authorities, not to the legal systems of 
the Member States12.
Let us now turn to the second question. In his Opinion, the 
Advocate General has justified the special relevance of the assur-
ances as follows: ‘as the expression of an obligation which has been 
formally assumed, if that commitment is breached, it may be relied 
on by the person sought before the judicial authority of the issuing 
Member State’13.
The Court agreed, in essence, with this reasoning, but has nev-
ertheless added a conditional clause that may change the meaning 
of the said assertion: ‘a failure to give effect to such an assurance, in 
so far as it may bind the entity that has given it, may be relied on as 
against that entity before the courts of the issuing Member State’14.
11  See infra.
12  P. Caeiro (2018), ‘Una nota sobre reconocimiento mutuo y armonización penal su-
stantiva en la Unión Europea’, in L. Arroyo Jiménez and A. Nieto Martín (eds.), El 
Reconocimiento Mutuo en el Derecho español y europeo (Marcial Pons), p. 305–310.
13  Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona, Case C-220/18 PPU, 4 July 
2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:547, para. 64. In the original language: ‘En cuanto expresión de 
una obligación asumida de manera formal, si se viera defraudada, podrá hacerse valer 
ante la autoridad judicial del Estado de emisión por la persona reclamada’.
14  Almost all of the linguistic versions that this author is able to understand concur with 
the English version: ‘la violation d’une telle assurance, en ce qu’elle est susceptible de lier 
son auteur, pourrait être invoquée à l’encontre de ce dernier devant les juridictions de 
l’État membre d’émission’; ‘könnte ein Verstoß gegen eine solche Zusicherung, soweit 
sie den Erklärenden bindet, diesem gegenüber vor den Gerichten des Ausstellungsmit-
gliedstaats geltend gemacht werden’; ‘la violazione di una simile garanzia, poiché è ido-
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Apparently, the AG has boldly affirmed the right of the indi-
vidual to avail him or herself of the guarantee before the issuing 
authorities, whereas the Court has taken a more cautious approach, 
according to which such right may be exercised if the guarantee is 
binding on the authorities of the issuing State. 
Both perspectives seem problematic. Neither of them identifies 
the source where such right is to be drawn from. Is it implicitly 
granted by EU law? If that is the case, a much deeper and more 
precise elaboration would be needed, in order to point out the 
principles and norms that generate that individual right. In the 
second place, the approach taken by the Court (‘in so far as it 
may bind the entity that has given it, may be relied on’) raises more 
questions than answers. As guarantees are generally binding in the 
horizontal relations (between States)15, the Court seems to refer to 
their binding effect in the vertical relations (between the State and 
the individual). However, the Court does not provide criteria in 
order to determine whether or when are the guarantees binding in 
the latter sense. 
True, the conditional clause might intend to refer the issue to 
the domestic legal order of the issuing Member State: the right 
may be exercised… as long as the respective national law provides 
for it. If that is the purpose of this jurisprudence, it does not really 
add much to the protection of the individual, since the Court has 
not made the duty to execute the EAW conditional on the actual 
ability of the assurance to generate individual rights under the 
respective domestic law. 
nea a vincolare il suo autore, potrebbe essere fatta valere, in caso di sua violazione, di-
nanzi alle autorità giudiziarie dello Stato membro emitente’; ‘el incumplimiento de esta 
garantía, en la medida en que puede vincular a quien la preste, podría invocarse contra 
este ante los órganos jurisdiccionales del Estado miembro emisor’ (emphasis added). 
The sole exception is the Portuguese version, which does not render the notion of con-
ditionality, but affirms that the commitment is binding on the entity that undertakes 
it and its breach can actually be relied upon by the sought individual before the courts 
of the issuing Member State, thereby keeping the exact meaning of the Opinion of the 
Advocate General: ‘a violação desse compromisso, que vincula o seu autor, poderá ser 
invocada contra ele perante os órgãos jurisdicionais do Estado-Membro de emissão’ 
(emphasis added).
15  On the binding nature of guarantees, as unilateral acts (promises), under international 
law, see C. Eckart (2012), Promises of States under International Law, Hart Publ.
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Finally, neither the Opinion nor the decisions establish to 
which effects may the individual avail himself or herself of the vio-
lation of the assurance. For instance: if the issuing State breaches 
its commitment not to incarcerate the individual in overpopulated 
prisons, may he or she resort to the respective courts with a view 
to obtain a judicial decision ordering that the competent authority 
respects the guarantee? Or does the violation (only) give rise to 
a right to compensation? Or – again – will the consequences be 
those provided for by the issuing State’s law (if any)? 
The last two issues contend with the relationship between the 
CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In 
principle, the latter will refrain from examining issues related to 
the protection of human rights when they fall within the compe-
tence of the EU, pursuant to the principle of equivalent protec-
tion16. Nevertheless, after the ‘warning’ in Pirozzi17, the ECtHR 
made clear, in Castaño18, that its jurisdiction over human rights 
violations is not precluded by the circumstance that such viola-
tions occur within the scope of application of EU law, in particular 
in the execution of a European arrest warrant.
The first question is the sufficiency of guarantees provided by 
judicial authorities. Relying on the Opinion of the Advocate-Gen-
eral in ML, the CJEU found that ‘When that assurance has been 
given, or at least endorsed, by the issuing judicial authority, (…) 
the executing judicial authority, in view of the mutual trust which 
must exist between the judicial authorities of the Member States 
and on which the European arrest warrant system is based, must 
rely on that assurance, at least in the absence of any specific indica-
tions that the detention conditions in a particular detention centre 
are in breach of Article 4 of the Charter’19. In contrast, as guaran-
tees provided by the Executive or by its members are ‘not given 
by a judicial authority’, they ‘must be evaluated by carrying out an 
16  ECtHR, Judgment, App. no. 45036/98, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turízm ve Tícaret 
Anoním Şírketí v. Ireland, 30 June 2005, esp. para 156 f. and 165.
17  ECtHR, Judgment, Req. no. 21055/11, Pirozzi c. Belgique, 17 April 2018.
18  ECtHR, Judgment, Req. no. 8351/17, Romeo Castaño c. Belgique, 9 July 2019.
19  ML, cit., para. 112.
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overall assessment of all the information available to the executing 
judicial authority’20 – in other words, they are only to be taken into 
consideration as a piece of relevant information.
The almost absolute obligation to execute an EAW when the 
assurances are given or endorsed by the issuing judicial authori-
ties is consistent with the paradigm underlying the EAW. However, 
one may wonder whether such guarantees satisfy the criteria of 
the ECtHR. The Strasbourg Court has consistently held that the 
guarantees provided by the office of judicial authorities such as 
the Public Prosecutor were not binding on the respective States 
and thus could not be accepted as a means of circumventing the 
obstacles to extradition arising from the risk of ill-treatment by the 
requesting State21. 
Against this background, the case-law of the CJEU seems para-
doxical. On the one hand, judicial authorities do not have the com-
petence to bind their states at the international level. On the other 
hand, the Court does not give particular relevance to the guaran-
tees provided by the bodies which usually have the competence to 
act in the international sphere and bind their state vis-à-vis other 
States. 
The picture that emerges from this reasoning is that trust 
within the EU has an institutional nature: every judicial act is to be 
fully trusted, but non-judicial acts are only to be taken into con-
sideration, even when they are issued by authorities who have the 
competence to take on international obligations. 
Nevertheless, it would not be surprising that the Strasbourg 
Court would apply the Bosphorus doctrine in this regard and come 
to the conclusion that guarantees in the execution of a EAW are an 
autonomous concept of EU law22, forming part of a sui generis pro-
20  ML, cit., para. 114.
21  ECtHR, Judgment, App. no. 14038/88, Soering v. The United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, 
para. 97 f.; ECtHR, Judgment, App. no. 2440/07, Soldatenko v. Ukraine, 23 Octo-
ber 2008, para. 73 f.; ECtHR, Judgment, App. no. 54131/08, Baysakov and Others v. 
Ukraine, 18 May 2010, para. 51.
22  This could well be one of the autonomous concepts ‘underpinning the system of mu-
tual recognition’: see V. Mitsilegas, ‘Autonomous Concepts, Diversity Management and 
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cedure in a sui generis political context23. As a consequence, they 
are not classic promises under public international law and do not 
have to bear the same features, as long as the system where they 
operate affords, as a whole, an equivalent protection to human 
rights. 
Concerning the scope of the duty to ensure the rights of the sur-
rendered person, the Court ruled that the executing authority does 
not have the obligation to check whether the whole prison system 
of the issuing Member State complies with fundamental rights, but 
only to assess the conditions of the prison where the individual 
will stay immediately after surrender and the facilities where he 
or she will presumably serve his / her sentence24. The pragmatic 
reasons underlying this decision are obvious. But – again – is this 
enough to comply with the criteria set by the ECtHR?
Arguably, the jurisprudence in ML and Dorobantu is hardly 
sufficient to provide an effective protection against ill-treatment, 
especially in cases which presuppose, by definition, systemic or 
generalised deficiencies of such protection. If the ECtHR faced 
a case where a non-EU State had provided reliable guarantees 
that the rights of the detainee would be respected (no torture, no 
ill-treatment) in some prisons, but not necessarily in other prisons 
to which he or she might be transferred in the course of the execu-
tion of the sentence, would the decision to extradite comply with 
the Convention? Arguably it would not, because the guarantees 
would not have effectively averted the risk of ill-treatment. 
Moreover, the compliance with the absolute obligation imposed 
by Article 4 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights cannot be weighed against the ‘excessive’ amount of work 
for the authorities involved, or with the ‘risk of impunity’, as sug-
Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice’, forthcoming in Common Market 
Law Review (publication expected in issue 1/2020); manuscript kindly made available 
by the author.
23  In this sense, the recognition of autonomous concepts of EU law by the ECtHR would 
be the dogmatic correlate of the institutional approach taken in Bosphorus.
24  ML, cit., para 77 f.; Dorobantu, cit., para 64 f.
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gested by the Court. There seems to be no place, in this respect, 
for the ‘EU exception’, grounded on the circumstance that the 
requesting/issuing state is a member of the EU. 
The convergence with the criteria set by the ECtHR can only be 
ensured if the CJEU allows the executing Member State to request 
from the issuing Member State comprehensive assurances that bind 
the latter to always comply with Article 4 of the Charter while 
dealing with that particular individual. Apparently, such requests 
already take place at an informal level, allowing for the execution 
of European arrest warrants in situations which otherwise could 
be problematic.
4. Conclusion
At first glance, the provision of guarantees does not bode well with 
cooperation mechanisms based on mutual trust. However, life 
changes overtime and this might affect trust. The very nature of the 
object of trust – the practice of the States – renders it vulnerable 
to departures more or less serious or frequent from the applicable 
pattern, even when the legal regulation lives up to irreprehensible 
levels of protection. In any case, after 20 years of marriage, it is 
better to renew the vows than to let distrust fester and contaminate 
the relationship.
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19. THE DYNAMIC EVOLUTION 




This Chapter emphasizes the need for more consistency in the field 
of EU Criminal Law and Justice. Arguably, this can be achieved 
by looking at new developments through the lens of past expe-
riences. Thereby, some examples from the wider field of EU Law 
and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Regulation are provided, 
illustrative of the evolution of EU law in general that might help 
us understand the development of EU criminal law and justice in 
particular. These examples of the rapid evolution of EU criminal 
law and justice have implications for the allocation of powers, and 
might therefore have wider European constitutional law implica-
tions posing both opportunities and challenges.
It is argued that EU legislative action entails both challenges and 
priorities, in particular in relation to the following four themes: 
1  This paper was presented at the Conference: “20 Year Anniversary of the Tampere 
Programme: Progress and Future Priorities of the EU Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice,” Part of Finland’s Presidency Calendar and Co-organised by CEPS, the Mi-
gration Policy Centre (MPC) and the LAW Department of the European University 
Institute (EUI), in cooperation with the Finish Permanent Representation to the EU, 
CEPS, Brussels, 3 and 4 October 2019. The paper builds on previous publications by the 
author some of which are referred to below. 
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Firstly, the securitisation of threats to the financial sector, trans-
national organised crime and terrorism financing, and evolving 
public and private collaboration. Secondly, challenges concerning 
the increasingly blurred divide between administrative and crim-
inal law provisions and sanctions, not least when it comes to 
differences in the protection of fundamental rights. Thirdly, the 
changing balance between mutual recognition and fundamental 
rights. Lastly, specific challenges connected to the theme of digi-
talisation, agency-to-agency cooperation and the free movement 
of information. 
All these specific themes with connected priorities and chal-
lenges are to some extent overlapping but can in many instances be 
discussed using past experiences from the field of EU Law and EU 
AML Regulation as illustrating examples. As a result, more con-
sistency can be achieved also in other areas of EU Criminal Law 
and Justice. 
2. Securitisation of Threats to the Financial Sector, 
Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism Financing, 
and the Evolving Public and Private Collaboration
Money laundering has been formulated as a chameleon threat that 
must be fought, since ‘it is perceived to facilitate drug trafficking 
(in the 1980s), organised crime (in the 1990s) and, post September 
11, terrorism’.2 Placed in the context of the securitisation of trans-
national criminality,3 it has been argued that the EU Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) framework constitutes a new paradigm of 
security governance.4 
2  Mitsilegas, V., Money Laundering Counter-Measures in the European Union: A New 
Paradigm of Security Governance versus Fundamental Legal Principles, Kluwer Law 
International, 2003, p. 186, with further reference to Mitsilegas, V. (2003), Countering 
the Chameleon Threat of Dirty Money: “Hard” and “Soft ” Law in the Emergence of a 
Global Regime against Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance”, in Edwards, A., and 
P. Gill (eds.), Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on Global Security, Rout-
ledge.
3  See e.g. Giraldo, J., and H. Trinkunas (2010), Transnational Crime, in Collins, A. (ed.), 
Contemporary Security Studies, 2nd ed., OUP.
4  Mitsilegas, V. (2003), Money Laundering Counter-Measures in the European Union: 
A New Paradigm of Security Governance versus Fundamental Legal Principles, Kluwer 
International Law.
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In brief, when an issue is being securitised, it is made critically 
important thereby requiring emergency actions beyond the state’s 
normal course of action. Within the understanding of the notion of 
securitisation,5 a specific speech act by a securitising actor elevates 
the issue to a matter of importance and security. In this respect, 
money laundering became an illustration of securitisation when it 
was portrayed as a security threat by the administration of George 
W. Bush, thus requiring (and legitimating) a security-oriented 
response. Since then, the fight against non-military threats such 
as drug trafficking, organised crime and terrorism has become a 
top political priority globally, and not least within the European 
Union. 
It has been argued that the securitisation of transnational 
organised crime and terrorism financing has been used to increase, 
or has at least led to an increase in EU competencies.6 This is most 
evident in the area of EU criminal law and police cooperation, 
where the handling of organised, serious crime and terrorism has 
been used to securitise single issues such as money laundering, 
as well as entire policy areas. Most notably, the terrorist attacks 
of 11 September 2001 accelerated the decision-making process in 
the European Union. Besides the adoption of the framework deci-
sion on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW),7 intensified AML 
regulations are the result of the securitisation of transnational 
criminality, and more recently, securitisation of terrorism as such. 
Both these threats demand action at the global, as well as the EU 
and regional levels. AML and financial freezing measures thereby 
5  In the international relations literature, securitisation refers to the classification of cer-
tain phenomena, persons or entities as existential threats requiring emergency mea-
sures. This process of securitisation was introduced by scholars working at the Conflict 
and Peace Research Institute (COPRI) in Copenhagen. These scholars, later known 
as the Copenhagen School, placed primary importance on determining how an issue 
becomes a security issue. The process of securitisation is explained by in Emmers, R. 
(2010), Securitization, in Collins, A. (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies, 2nd ed., 
OUP. This chapter also notes limitations with the concept. 
6  Bergström, M. (2013), The Place of Sanctions in the EU System for Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism, in Cameron, Iain, (red.) EU Sanctions: Law and Policy Issues 
Concerning Restrictive Measures, Intersentia, p. 110. 
7  2002/584/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, OJ 2002, L 190/1.
254 PART IV - EU Criminal Justice Cooperation
exemplify the shift towards securitisation of threats to the financial 
sector in general and transnational organised crime and terrorism 
financing in particular. 
In the legal understanding of the term, national security is 
often invoked to justify the exercise of state power against individ-
uals, but at the same time national security has implications for the 
division of powers between the different branches of government. 
Securitisation is thereby often seen as an attempt to shift policy 
making to a less accountable forum,8 something which has effects 
also on human rights.9
In the European Union, the securitisation process of money 
laundering has successively increased EU regulatory competence, 
which has resulted in a rigorous regulatory regime, putting strong 
demands on both public and private actors. Clearly, this shift with 
the reframing of money laundering as an existential threat linked 
to organised crime and terrorism has consequences for the division 
of power between the different branches of government on dif-
ferent levels, but also between public and private actors in this field 
that complicate the accountability dilemma even further. Hence, 
the shift towards securitisation of money laundering implies a shift 
of policy making to a less accountable forum, thereby not only 
including state actors on the national level. As a result, we need to 
talk about a new and mixed model of accountability, where a legal 
model of accountability is arguably emerging for for-profit actors 
entrusted with public tasks.10 Besides, the shift towards security 
governance challenges fundamental legal principles, such as prin-
ciples of criminal law and human rights.11 
8  Cameron, I. (2011), The Security Concept in the TEU and TFEU, unpublished manu-
script, Conference on EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, Faculty of Law, Uni-
versity of Uppsala.
9  Vestergaard, J. (2011), Terror Financing – Asset Freezing, Human Rights and the Eu-
ropean Legal Order, New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol. 2: 175–200.
10  Bergström, M. (2011), EU Anti-Money Laundering Regulation: Multilevel Cooper-
ation of Public and Private Actors, in Eckes, C., and Konstadinides, T. (eds.), Crime 
within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A European Public Order, CUP.
11  See for a comprehensives analysis of AML in this respect, Mitsilegas, V. (2003a), Mon-
ey Laundering Counter-Measures in the European Union: A New Paradigm of Secu-
rity Governance versus Fundamental Legal Principles, Kluwer Law International: The 
Hague. 
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Similar to the process of securitisation framed in the interna-
tional relations literature, the concept of risk, and risk manage-
ment, signals that an issue is put high on the business as well as 
the political agenda. To call something a risk is to call for action, 
risk assessment and risk management.12 The risk-based approach 
introduced by the revised FATF Recommendations13 and the 
now repealed third AML Directive,14 has been further developed 
towards a more targeted and focused risk-based approach using 
evidence-based decision-making, as well as guidance by European 
supervisory authorities. Most importantly, however, the AML 
Directives applies to a large number of private players whose par-
ticipation is no longer voluntary. 
As a result, the shift towards securitisation and the risk-based 
approach within the multi-level system of the European Union, 
have implications for the division of powers, balancing of inter-
ests and fundamental rights protection. To complicate regulatory 
action even further, within the fields of AML Regulation and EU 
Criminal Law, there are several challenges concerning the increas-
ingly blurred divide between administrative and criminal law pro-
visions and sanctions, not least when it comes to differences in 
fundamental rights protection. 
3. Blurred Divide Between Administrative and Criminal 
Law Provisions and Sanctions
When it comes to the so called ‘Euro-crimes’ based on Article 83(1) 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), minimum rules con-
cerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the 
areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension 
can be adopted. Amongst the most recently adopted, Directive 
12  Bergström, M., Svedberg Helgesson, K. and U Mörth (2011), A New Role for For-profit 
Actors? The Case of Anti-Money Laundering and Risk Management, Journal of Com-
mon Market Studies, Vol. 49: 1043–1064. 
13  The recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) are updated regular-
ly, most recently in June 2019. http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommenda-
tions/documents/fatf-recommendations.html#UPDATES 
14  Directive 2005/60/EC, OJ 2005, L309/15.
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(EU) 2018/1673 on combating money laundering by criminal law 
needs to be implemented by the member states by 3 December 
2020.15 This directive includes the definitions, scope and sanctions 
of money laundering offences, and affect cross-border police and 
judicial cooperation between national authorities as well as the 
exchange of information.
Far from being the first EU legislative measure on AML, the 
first criminal law initiative has many predecessors, although 
mainly regulating the administrative law dimensions of AML. 
The rationale for introducing the first AML Directive in 1991, was 
that the emergence of the European Single Market and the elimi-
nation of national borders demanded compensatory measures to 
delimit financial cross-border crimes. Hence, the purpose of the 
first Directive was to prevent the freedom of capital movement and 
freedom to provide financial services to be used for money laun-
dering purposes. This first Directive outlined a long list of actions 
to be considered an offence when committed intentionally, and 
that objective has since been expanded to also prevent organised 
crime and terrorist financing.
The Fourth AML Directive adopted in 2015 is, like its prede-
cessors, based mainly on Article 114 TFEU on the internal market. 
Its predominant purpose is rather to improve the conditions for 
the establishment and functioning of the internal market, than to 
define criminal law offences and sanctions. Yet, its main aim is still 
the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes 
of money laundering and terrorist financing. 
In the same year, the European Agenda on Security16 was 
published that called for additional measures in the area of ter-
rorist financing and money laundering. Soon thereafter, the 2016 
Action Plan to strengthen the fight against terrorist financing17 
highlighted the need to counter money laundering by means of 
15  Directive (EU) 2018/1673 on combating money laundering by criminal law, OJ 2018, 
L 284/22.
16  COM (2015)185 final.
17  COM (2015)185 final.
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criminal law and the need to ensure that criminals who fund ter-
rorism are deprived of their assets. Subsequently, on 30 May 2018 
the Fifth AML Directive was adopted that needs to be transposed 
by the member states by 10 January 2020.18 
The Criminal Law Directive implements international obliga-
tions in this area including the Warsaw Convention, and Recom-
mendation 3 (R3) of the FATF. Recommendation 1 (R1) in turn 
calls on countries to criminalise money laundering on the basis 
of the Vienna Convention of 1988, and the Palermo Convention 
of 2000. The regulatory field of AML thereby applies to a large 
number of private players whose participation is no longer volun-
tary with implications also for the field of criminal law and funda-
mental rights protection. 
Despite all assumptions that the current EU AML framework, 
i.e. before the EU Criminal Law Directive needs to be imple-
mented, is mainly administrative in character, there is a floating 
line between administrative and criminal law and sanctions, not 
least since national laws and EU law are intertwined. This may 
have detrimental effects concerning procedural safeguards and 
fundamental rights protection, for example if sanctions are in fact 
criminal rather than administrative in character, or if the different 
solutions chosen in different member states lead to variations in 
fundamental rights protection throughout the European Union.
So far, it is mainly the responsibility of the MS to ensure that 
the parallel systems of administrative and criminal law sanctions 
do not breach fundamental rights, the rules on privacy and data 
protection, and the principle of proportionality.19 EU Law meas-
ures, however, may in themselves infringe fundamental rights. 
Processing personal data collected for one purpose for another, 
completely unrelated purpose infringes the data protection prin-
ciple of purpose limitation and threatens the implementation of 
18  Directive (EU) 2018/843, OJ 2018, L 156/43, Article 4. 
19  See further Bergström, M. (2018), The Many Uses of Anti-Money Laundering Regu-
lation – Over time and into the future, in Herlin-Karnell, E. and E. De Busser, (eds.), 
Special Issue: EU Security Governance and Financial Crimes, German Law Journal, 
19(5): 1149-1167.
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the principle of proportionality. Hence, the increasingly blurred 
divide between administrative and criminal law provisions and 
sanctions entail a number of challenges, not least when it comes to 
differences in the protection of fundamental rights. Another con-
text where human rights challenges have been recognised, concern 
various instruments meant to be based on mutual recognition and 
mutual thrust. 
4. The Changing Balance Between Mutual Recognition 
and Fundamental Rights 
The principle of mutual recognition which requires the enforce-
ment of judicial decisions of one member state in another member 
state has so far always required the intervention of the competent 
authorities of the member state where the decision is executed, 
such as decisions relating to the investigation. Hence, when it 
comes to mutual recognition and Article 82(1) TFEU, important 
instruments such as the European Investigation Order, based on 
Article 82(1)a TFEU, the European Protection Order, based on 
Articles 82(1)a and d TFEU, and a recent proposal for EU Rules on 
European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evi-
dence in criminal matters have been adopted.20 This double-text 
proposal made by the Commission tries to strike ‘an extremely 
delicate balance between effective and efficient criminal investiga-
tions (for police and judicial authorities), legal certainty (for tech-
nology companies) and fundamental rights protection (of suspects 
20  Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 
regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, OJ 2014, L 130/1; Di-
rective 2011/99/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on the European protection order, OJ 2011, L 338/2; Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Pres-
ervation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters, COM(2018)225 final; 
and, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying 
down harmonized rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose 
of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings, COM(2018)226 final. The proposed 
legal basis for the directive is Articles 53 and 62 of the TFEU, which provide for the 
adoption of measures to coordinate the provisions laid down by law, regulation or ad-
ministrative action in Member States on establishing and providing services. European 
Commission, e-evidence, at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/
organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/e-evidence_en.
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and other users)’.21
The increasing importance of fundamental rights protection 
can be traced in the gradual developments of these instruments 
where the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has also been taking 
part of the law making process in developing new procedures con-
nected to possible grounds for refusal. 
So far, much has been written about the specific challenges that 
balancing mutual recognition and fundamental rights entails, not 
least in the context of novel CJEU cases involving mutual recog-
nition and fundamental rights protection in relation to the Euro-
pean Arrest Warrant, such as Aranyosi and Căldăraru, and more 
recently Celmer.22 For the purposes of this Chapter, it is enough to 
emphasise the increasing importance of fundamental rights pro-
tection both accentuated by the EU legislator when adopting new 
mutual recognition instruments and by the CJEU interpreting old, 
many times resulting in more elaborated tasks of national agencies 
thereby developing the principle of mutual recognition to a more 
sophisticated legal instrument than was originally anticipated, 
resulting in a higher level of protection of fundamental rights. Yet, 
when the level of protection is harmonised by the EU legislator, 
such as concerning the EAW, the main rule is still the prevalence 
of EU law over national law irrespective of applying national law 
would result in a higher level of protection.23 
21  Franssen, V. (2018), The European Commission’s E-evidence Proposal: Toward an EU-
wide Obligation for Service Providers to Cooperate with Law Enforcement? Europe-
an Law Blog, 12 October 2018, available at: https://europeanlawblog.eu/2018/10/12/
the-european-commissions-e-evidence-proposal-toward-an-eu-wide-obliga-
tion-for-service-providers-to-cooperate-with-law-enforcement/ 
22  Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru; Case C-216/18 
PPU, Celmer.
23  Case C399/11Melloni. See also Lenaerts, K. (2019),  Making the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights a Reality for All: 10th Anniversary of the Charter Becoming Legally Bind-
ing, Keynote Speech, 12 November 2019. High Level event jointly held by the European 
Commission, the Finnish Presidency of the Council of the EU and the EU Agency 
for Fundamental Rights, Concert Noble, Rue d’Arlon 84, Brussels, 12 November 2019, 
available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/charter_lenaerts12.11.19.pdf 
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5. Digitalisation, Agency-to-Agency Cooperation and the 
Free Movement of Information
Lastly, there are specific problems connected to the theme of digi-
talisation, agency-to-agency cooperation and the free movement of 
information that needs further investigation and research. Besides 
the above-mentioned challenges concerning rules of privacy and 
data protection, there are a number of specific challenges con-
nected to the increasing reliance of electronic reports, e-evidence, 
and other themes of digitalisation. Not least can it be difficult to 
identify who is responsible, where certain information including 
evidence is located, and which rules should apply at various stages 
of the different processes foreseen for handling such issues. This 
may have wider complications for agency-to-agency cooperation, 
the free movement of information and fundamental rights protec-
tion in a wider sense.24 
The cooperation between police and judicial authorities and 
companies providing information and communications services 
is, however, not new. Besides the involvement of private actors 
within the financial sector including AML, police and judicial 
authorities have been collaborating for decades with telecommu-
nications operators and providers. However, there is an increased 
use of online services and new information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) typically processed by private companies 
such as technology companies or service providers. Such data is 
often processed, transmitted and/or stored by foreign companies 
or service providers.25 This entails specific challenges for police 
and judicial authorities collecting electronic evidence in fighting 
crime committed by means of, or involving the use of such ICTs, 
since the information that criminals share or store by means of 
new ICTs thus processed by private companies, is not available 
24  See further the European Commission DG Justice funded project: JUD-IT – Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters and Electronic IT Data in the EU: Ensuring Efficient 
Cross-Border Co-operation and Mutual Trust, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
CEPS. 
25  Franssen 2018. Cf the involvement of private parties in the regulatory field of AML 
Regulation. 
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to public authorities without the cooperation of those private 
actors.26 Although involving new types of ICTs, the wide experi-
ence in public private cooperation from the field of AML Regula-
tion, can arguably be of great use here where obligations on private 
actors are moving beyond the sphere of financial regulation and 
telecommunications law. 
6. The Dynamic Evolution of EU Criminal Law and Justice
This Chapter has argued that EU legislative action entails both 
challenges and priorities, in particular in relation to the following 
four themes: Firstly, the securitisation of threats to the financial 
sector, transnational organised crime and terrorism financing, and 
evolving public and private collaboration. Secondly, challenges 
concerning the increasingly blurred divide between administrative 
and criminal law provisions and sanctions, not least when it comes 
to differences in the protection of fundamental rights. Thirdly, the 
changing balance between mutual recognition and fundamental 
rights, and lastly, specific problems connected to the theme of dig-
italisation, agency-to-agency cooperation and the free movement 
of information. 
All these specific themes are to some extent overlapping but 
have been discussed using past experiences. Some examples from 
the field of AML typical for the evolution of EU law in general, 
have been provided. These examples of the rapid evolution of EU 
criminal law and justice have implications for the allocation of 
powers, and might therefore have wider European constitutional 
law implications posing both opportunities and challenges. They 
might help us understand the development of EU criminal law 
and justice, hopefully resulting in more consistency within and 
between the areas of EU Criminal Law and Justice. 
26  See in particular Franssen, 2018. 
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20. INTERNAL SECURITY IN THE 





Operational police cooperation in the EU has developed signif-
icantly since the Tampere Council Conclusions in 1999. Most 
importantly, the year coincides with the becoming operational 
of Europol, which has since then developed into an EU agency 
(Europol Regulation 2016/794). Furthermore, Joint Investigation 
Teams (JITs) were established under Article 13 of the 2000 Mutual 
Legal Assistance Convention and today operate under the 2002 
Framework Decision on Joint Investigation Teams. The two strat-
egies shall be assessed here in light of police cooperation mecha-
nisms in their functions to facilitate international police interac-
tion, not because they are as such EU police cooperation measures.
The assessment is conducted from an international perspec-
tive. The first question in this regard is whether there is any inter-
national comparison to the two instruments (Europol and JITs) 
in any other part of the world. The second question is how these 
instruments are perceived internationally by third countries and 
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practitioners and whether they could even be used as a model for 
police cooperation in other parts of the world. 
The answer to the first question can be easily given. There is no 
other instrument in the world that resembles Europol. Its set-up is 
unique and neither modelled from any other international organi-
sation, such as Interpol, or federal organisations, e.g. federal police 
agencies. It sits between the two as it can on the one hand do more 
that Interpol in that its information exchange can, for example, 
include more sensitive data, but less than a federal agency as it 
does not have enforcement powers and cannot direct national 
police forces. The major difference to Interpol is that Europol has 
a legal basis and could therefore be said to have from the outset 
more legitimacy that Interpol or other regional police cooper-
ation initiatives. The latter is, however, not entirely true as there 
are other regional cooperation strategies, such as the Benelux and 
the Nordic Countries cooperation that are based on legal frame-
works. Be this as it may, in the international comparison, Europol 
is unique and while this finding does not include any value judge-
ment it could reflect on the specialisation of the agency to the EU 
situation which might make it uninteresting for the rest of the 
world to cooperate with.
Regarding JITs, they are less unique as an instrument. JITs are, 
for example, proposed as cooperation mechanism in some UN 
suppression conventions, such as Article 19 of the United Nations 
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the 
Council of Europe (CoE) MLA Convention, a European Union 
(EU) Framework Decision and numerous bilateral and multilat-
eral treaties. It could hence be discussed whether they are a valid 
model for other regions or even globally.
2. Europol
When looking at Europol it was at the time of its inception unthink-
able that it would become an EU agency, that it would participate 
in JITs and that it could one day request the initiation of investi-
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gations by member states. Europol had a difficult start, as practi-
tioners took a long time to accept the database (Hufnagel, 2013). 
Europol was initially established as a common data-exchange 
mechanism for the entire EU and as a Europol liaison officer net-
work. Unlike the Schengen Convention, the Europol Convention 
did not only provide a legal framework for certain forms of police 
cooperation, but set up an EU agency that can participate in, 
support and coordinate JITs (now Article 4(1)(d) and 4(1)(c)(ii) 
Europol Regulation). Under Article 6 of the Europol Regulation it 
can suggest to national police forces the initiation of cross-border 
investigations. Although the mandate and powers of Europol have 
historically been subject to debates amongst member states, in 
particular in relation to possible enforcement powers (Mitsilegas, 
2009: 165-166), the agency is by now an integral part of the EU 
architecture on police and law enforcement cooperation.
Objectives of Europol are the support and strengthening of 
‘action by the competent authorities of the Member States and 
their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating serious 
crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms 
of crime which affect a common interest’ (Article 3(1) Europol 
Regulation). To further this aim, Europol’s focus is the facilitation 
of information exchange between the member states. Europol has 
furthermore developed ‘products’, such as the European Crim-
inal Intelligence Model (ECIM) and the (Serious and) Organised 
Crime Threat Assessment ((S)OCTA) and it comprises expert 
groups focusing on specific types of crime, such as the European 
Cybercrime Centre (EC3), the European Migrant Smuggling 
Centre (EMSC) and the European Counter-Terrorism Centre 
(ECTC). These expert groups in particular are considered major 
improvements to the situation of information exchange at the time 
of its establishment.
Although it seems that the importance of Europol as an infor-
mation channel is still negligible compared to Interpol (with 
2,000,000 messages exchanged in 2008) (Interpol, 2009: 3-5, 11), 
since the introduction of the Secure Information Exchange Net-
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work Application (SIENA) in 2009, Europol’s exchange of opera-
tional messages has increased from 284,000 in 2008 to 732,070 in 
2014 and 870,000 messages in 2017 (Europol, 2015: 42; 2018: 7). 
The number of messages has nearly tripled since 2008, showing 
a growing use of the Europol channel. These numbers support 
the conclusion that acceptance of Europol by practitioners is 
increasing and that the Europol mechanisms add value to EU 
policing practice.
Europol is open to third country participation and could 
therefore even be seen as a global cooperation mechanism. It 
cooperates with a number of international and EU organisations 
(Europol, n.d.). Third party cooperation with Europol was, until 
the introduction of the 2016 Europol Regulation, possible through 
operational and strategic agreements. Decision 2000/C 106/1 
28 (replaced by Decision 2009/935) determined that the Director 
of Europol could enter into agreements with third countries and 
international organisations. Articles 23 and 25 of Regulation 
2016/794 now prescribe that Europol may establish and maintain 
cooperative relations with third countries and international organ-
isations, and conclude agreements with them which may concern 
the exchange of all information that may be relevant for the per-
formance of Europol’s task, including personal data. Article 71(2) 
sets out that this shall not affect the legal force of agreements con-
cluded by Europol as established by Decision 2009/371 before 13 
June 2016, or of agreements concluded by Europol as established 
by the Europol Convention before 1 January 2010. This means that 
the procedure for third party participation has changed with the 
Europol Regulation. While under the Europol Decision and Con-
vention Europol was not an independent agency, but an EU institu-
tion, the EU could conclude agreements through it. Since Europol 
became an agency it cannot anymore, similar to police agencies, 
conclude agreements that bind the 28 member states. It can, 
however, similar to national police agencies, conclude so-called 
‘working arrangements’ with third countries and international 
organisations. The new working arrangements are not divided up 
into ‘operational’ and ‘strategic’ but specify in their individual texts 
how far the working relationship will go (Europol, n.d.).
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Operational agreements have been established with non-EU 
member states with which there were long established working 
relationship. They have been established with Albania, Australia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Colombia, Georgia, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, North Macedonia, 
Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, Ukraine, United States, Eurojust, 
Frontex and Interpol (Ibid). As can be seen from this list, coun-
tries and organisations party to Europol operational agreements 
are closely linked to Europol due to their competences (Eurojust, 
Frontex and Interpol) or there is a need to exchange informa-
tion due to high cross-border activity (trade) and a related crime 
threat. Other than strategic agreements operational agreements 
include the sharing of personal data, which could either be a sign 
of trust or a specific need for closer cooperation. Strategic agree-
ments do not include the exchange of personal data. They have 
so far been established with China, Russia, Turkey, UAE, OLAF, 
the European Central Bank, the European Commission, ECDC, 
EMCDDA, CEPOL, ENISA, EUIPO, UNODC and the WCO 
(Ibid). Countries and organizations included in strategic agree-
ments have a working relationship with Europol. With all of them 
there is a need to exchange information due to high cross-border 
activity (trade, immigration) and a connected crime threat, but the 
cooperation is not so frequent that the exchange of personal data is 
perceived as needed or the criminal justice system in the country 
is not considered compatible for the exchange of personal data 
for other reasons. It is in this context interesting to note that the 
two ‘new’ working arrangements with Israel and Japan potentially 
include the exchange of personal data (Ibid). 
It can be concluded that Europol today is a global police coop-
eration strategy. While it is not open to all states in the same way, 
there are possibilities to exchange information with possibly all 
countries with which the EU has a vested immigration or trade 
relationship leading to heightened cross-border movements of 
persons and goods and potentially increased possibilities for 
transnational crime. It might hence not be an international police 
cooperation mechanism, but certainly a resource for international 
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policing that could be more widely used. Furthermore, despite 
being widely criticised for its lack of accountability, Europol does 
operate under a legal framework and is subject to the jurisdiction 
of the EU Court of Justice. Needless to say, cooperation through 
Europol is subject to the European human rights frameworks and 
in particular its data protection regime. Cooperation through 
Europol could hence be considered ‘safer’ than Interpol, war-
ranting the different levels of sensitivity of information that can 
(or should) be exchanged through them.
3. JITs
According to Article 13 of the 2000 Convention and Article 1 of 
the 2002 Framework Decision on JITs, a JIT is an ‘operational 
investigative team consisting of representatives of law enforcement 
and other authorities from different member states and possibly 
from other organisations like Europol and Eurojust’. The purpose 
of a JIT is jointly to investigate a criminal case; the teams are bi- or 
multi-national, likely operating from one location, possibly mul-
ti-disciplinary and are set up for a single investigation within an 
agreed timeframe. It also needs to be noted here that, similar to 
Europol, the strategy was initially not extensively applied in the 
EU. Between 2004 and 2009 approximately only 40 JITs have been 
operational (Block, 2011: 158). However, the numbers have sky-
rocketed since then. Already in 2010 Eurojust member desks par-
ticipated in 20 JITs and Eurojust funded 10 JITs (Eurojust, 2011: 
49-50). Numbers furthermore increased to 102 JITs supported by 
Eurojust in 2013 (Eurojust, 2014: 10), 120 in 2015 (Eurojust, 2016: 
12) to the dizzying number of 235 in 2018 (Eurojust, 2019: 16). It is 
clear that the measure is by now accepted as a useful tool for inter-
national police cooperation by practitioners and that the inclusion 
of Eurojust has led to a professionalisation of the measure. It also 
needs to be noted here that the numbers above only refer to JITs 
supported by Eurojust. The current numbers for all JITs conducted 
under the 2002 Framework Decision would be even higher.
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An important aspect of the introduction of JITs was their 
advantage compared to ‘traditional’ cross-border investigations, 
the so-called ‘parallel investigations’. Parallel investigations focus 
on cooperation through exchange of international letters of request 
(ILOR) in cross-border investigations, commonly based on the 
1959 Council of Europe Convention, but specified in bilateral and 
multilateral agreements (Articles 39 and 40 of the Schengen Con-
vention). When a parallel investigation is set up between two or 
more member states, investigation teams can work on the same 
case within their respective jurisdiction simultaneously. Informa-
tion exchange and the coordination of the investigation are con-
ducted through ILOR exchanges between the participating coun-
tries (Block, 2011: 152). In the best-case scenario, ILORs establish 
a legal basis for the direct and immediate exchange of intelligence 
and determine the preliminary measures necessary in the course 
of the investigation that can be taken. If particular investigative 
measures become necessary in one jurisdiction, such as communi-
cation interception, searches, interrogations or confiscation, addi-
tional ILORs can be issued (Ibid). 
What needs to be considered here is that cooperation in the 
form of JITs is not only possible under the 2002 Framework Deci-
sion, but in the context of the Brexit debate it has been confirmed 
that JITs between the UK and EU member states would also be 
possible under Article 20 of the Second Additional Protocol to the 
1959 MLA Convention (Carrera et al, 2018: ix). While the required 
legal basis for cooperation in the form of JITs is generally debated, 
the investigation into the downing of flight MH17 by a JIT formed 
of law enforcement agencies from the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Malaysia, Australia and Ukraine as well as Eurojust shows the 
numerous possibilities for non-EU member states to participate in 
the 2002 Framework Decision instrument. 
Flight MH17, on its way from the Netherlands to Malaysia, was 
shot down over eastern Ukraine on July 17th, 2014 and all 283 
people on board, including 193 Dutch nationals, 43 Malaysians, 
27 Australians, 12 Indonesians, 10 Britons, four Belgians, four 
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Germans, three Philippine nationals, one New Zealander and one 
Canadian,  were killed (BBC, 2019).  The interests of the parties 
investigating this case are clear. The Netherlands (who also coordi-
nated the team), Belgium, Malaysia and Australia had nationals on 
the plane, the airline was Malaysian and the flight was shot down 
over Ukraine. However, the ways in which the countries could join 
the team legally were uniquely different, with the exception of the 
EU member states (which are party to the 2002 Framework Deci-
sion). 
Including Ukraine as a team member was rather straight-
forward as it is a party to the Second Additional Protocol to the 
1959 CoE MLA Convention, which has the same wording as the 
Framework Decision. Australia could become a party to the JIT 
as it is a party to the UN Convention on Transnational Organized 
Crime. Article 19 of the Convention details that ‘the competent 
authorities concerned may establish joint investigative bodies’ and 
that ‘[i]n the absence of […] agreements or arrangements, joint 
investigations may be undertaken by agreement on a case-by-case 
basis.’ Australia consequently had to conclude an agreement with 
the other members to join the investigation team. However, as the 
requirements under UNTOC are different to both the 2002 Frame-
work Decision and the 1959 CoE Convention, Australia could not 
conclude an Agreement, but only a non-binding ‘arrangement’. 
This manifested itself in the resulting treaty in the form that the 
term ‘Agreement’ contains a footnote stating that ‘[i]n what con-
cerns Australia, the term agreement is to be construed as meaning 
“Arrangement” throughout the whole text’. Australia could there-
fore not become a ‘member’ of the team, but only a ‘participant’. 
The difference being that ‘members’ are automatically privy to all 
information included in the JIT, whereas ‘participants’ can only 
get access to files if there is agreement. The term ‘party’ therefore 
contains the footnote ‘in what concerns Australia, the term “Party 
to the Agreement” is to be construed as meaning “partner to the 
Arrangement” throughout the whole text’. Malaysian participation 
was more difficult as, before it could join the team, assurances had 
to be sought as to the non-application of the death penalty. The 
assurances were given and Malaysia could belatedly join the team. 
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Eurojust was also involved to supply legal support and provide 
funding for the JIT.
In the MH17 case a JIT was established mainly under the 2002 
Framework Decision (EU) on JITs as three of the participating 
members were EU member states. However, even non-EU coun-
tries, when no EU member state is at all involved, have the possi-
bility to establish JITs. As outlined above under the UN Conven-
tions section of the chapter, the 1988 United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances sets out the possibility to establish JITs. 
Furthermore, the United Nations 2000 Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and the United 
Nations 2003 Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) provide 
the possibility to form JITs and also make it possible for parties 
to join the 2002 Framework Decision and the Second Additional 
Protocol to the 1959 CoE MLA Convention agreements on JITs. 
The latter two UN conventions were ratified by all 28 EU Member 
States and by a large number of States both inside and outside 
of Europe. In 2003 the European Union signed agreements on 
mutual legal assistance with the United States of America, Norway 
and Iceland. When Article 13 of the 2000 EU MLA Convention 
was transposed in Article 20 of the 2001 Council of Europe Second 
Additional Protocol to the European Mutual Assistance Conven-
tion it was ratified by 31 States, 20 of which are EU Member States. 
So far, the Second Protocol has also been ratified by two States 
that are not members of the Council of Europe; Chile and Israel 
(Rijken and Vermeulen, 2006: 10-11).  Furthermore, Article 27 of 
the 2006 Police Cooperation Convention for South East Europe 
(PCC-SEE) is similar in wording to the 2002 Framework Decision 
(Article 1). The PCC-SEE Convention finds application in several 
Member States, like Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slo-
venia, and in Balkan countries like Albania, Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, FYROM, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia (Rebecchi, 2016: 
105).1 
1  Maria Cecilia Rebecchi, ‘Joint Investigation Teams: A Reachable Solution to Catch 
Unreachable Criminals’ (2016) 7 Queen Mary Law Review 105.
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While numerous instruments exist, the harmonisation of JITs 
is currently discussed at UN level (and has been for more than a 
decade) according to the 2002 Framework Decision model. The 
other JIT framework debated is bilateral US-Canada engagement, 
but as it lacks formality and does not apply between distinctly 
different jurisdictions, preference so far is given to the European 
model. It clearly follows that the EU has not only evolved signif-
icantly since Tampere with a view to JITs, but that they could be 
termed best (legal and actual) practice internationally.
4. Conclusion
This Chapter has provided a brief overview on two rather complex 
strategies of police cooperation. It is clear that the development 
since Tampere has been significant. This is important to stress in 
light of Brexit and other separatist movements in the EU. With a 
view to police cooperation, numerous EU strategies are global best 
practice, which is particularly remarkable considering the diver-
sity of jurisdictions involved. Many regions around the world look 
to the EU today to establish or improve their police cooperation.
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21. FROM TAMPERE OVER 
STOCKHOLM TO LUXEMBOURG 
AND BRUSSELS: WHERE ARE WE 
NOW? THE EVOLUTION OF AFSJ 
DATABASES – MEANDERING 
BETWEEN SECURITY AND DATA 
PROTECTION
Teresa Quintel 
1. Introduction: General Concerns Related to the 
Interoperability of EU Databases
At times, the different objectives that the European Union’s (EU) 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)1 should achieve 
are difficult to reconcile. The removal of the EU internal borders 
certainly brought more freedom and propelled the cooperation 
between Member States in both security and justice affairs. Nev-
ertheless, the views on how to achieve security while offering the 
highest standards of justice diverge. Consequently, the means of 
cooperation between competent authorities in the EU Member 
States differ as well, both in the area of border control, migration 
and asylum, but also in the field of police and judicial cooperation. 
1  The objectives for the AFSJ are laid down in Article 67 TFEU.
Table of Contents
280 PART V - POLICE COOPERATION
To compensate for the abolition of internal border controls in 
the Schengen Area, large-scale databases were set up at EU level 
to facilitate the information exchange between law enforcement 
authorities on the one hand and to improve the administration of 
visas, facilitate border checks and to better manage asylum appli-
cations on the other. Over time, the founding acts of those data-
bases, initially established for specific purposes and with strict 
access requirements, were revised in order to serve more purposes, 
retain additional categories of data and provide broader access to 
more authorities.
A number of immigration databases allow law enforcement 
authorities access for the purposes of the prevention, detection, and 
investigation of crime. This type of access is often met with critical 
acclaim, as such access risks to associate two undoubtedly different 
objectives - managing migration and combating crime (Vavoula, 
2020). Particularly during recent years, migration has become a 
fiercely debated element in the internal security discourse within 
the EU. In many EU Member States, the security-versus-privacy 
debate reached new dimensions during the aftermath of the arrival 
of great numbers of individuals seeking asylum in the EU in 2015.
In order to close the remaining information gap between EU 
databases, the EU Commission proposed, in December 20172, the 
Interoperability of EU large-scale IT-systems, which was adopted 
in April 2019.3 The Interoperability framework is supposed to 
connect six EU databases, half of which are currently operational, 
2  Proposal for a Regulation on establishing a framework for interoperability between 
EU information systems (police and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration) and 
Proposal for a Regulation on establishing a framework for interoperability between EU 
information systems (borders and visa) and amending Council Decision 2004/512/
EC, Regulation (EC) No 767/2008, Council Decision 2008/633/JHA, Regulation (EU) 
2016/399 and Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, COM(2017)793 and 794.
3  Regulation (EU) 2019/817 of 20 May 2019 on establishing a framework for interoper-
ability between EU information systems in the field of borders and visa and amending 
Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240, (EU) 
2018/1726 and (EU) 2018/1861 and Council Decisions 2004/512/EC and 2008/633/
JHA [2019] OJ L 135/27 and Regulation (EU) 2019/818 of 20 May 2019 on establishing 
a framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the field of po-
lice and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration and amending Regulations (EU) 
2018/1726, (EU) 2018/1862 and (EU) 2019/816 [2019] OJ L 135/85 (hereafter ‘Interop-
erability Regulations’).
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the other half foreseen to be established by 2023 (Luyten and Vor-
onova, 2019).4
Three general concerns may arise with the Interoperability 
regime: Firstly, the complexity of the anticipated system makes 
it increasingly difficult for individuals to grasp the processing 
operations, which may prevent them from exercising their data 
subject rights: understanding the interoperable system requires 
understanding the underlying databases as well as the different 
actors that are responsible for replying to access and rectification 
requests.
Secondly, beyond their primary purposes of border control, 
asylum, migration and the management of short-term visas, all 
underlying databases, including the Interoperability components, 
are supposed to contribute to the fight against serious crime, the 
detection of identity fraud and the identification of (unknown) 
suspects.5 In that vein, the Interoperability Regulations shall 
streamline law enforcement access to non-law enforcement data-
bases that hold information concerning third country nationals 
(TCNs). This means that not only the initial purpose of the under-
lying databases was changed from an immigration-related to a law 
enforcement purpose. That change of purpose also has an impact 
on the data protection regime that applies to the processing of per-
sonal data retrieved from the systems.
Thirdly, besides broadened access rights for national compe-
tent authorities, EU Agencies that play an increasingly prominent 
role in the area of border control and migration management were 
attributed more access possibilities to the databases. Hence, the 
number of authorities accessing and further processing the per-
sonal data from the different systems multiplied, which might not 
only affect the willingness of different authorities to share informa-
tion via the databases, but also impinge on the trust among those 
authorities. 
4  As stated in the proposals, the Commission aims to achieve interoperability by the end 
of 2023.
5  See Article 2 of the Interoperability Regulations.
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Furthermore, the new processing operations and the additional 
actors that will process the data in the complex systems will render 
supervision more difficult and require close cooperation between 
supervisory authorities. The work of national data protection 
authorities (DPAs) and the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) will be decisive not only for scrutinizing and, where nec-
essary, sanctioning data controllers, but also to ensure that indi-
viduals will be able to enjoy their right to effective administrative 
and judicial review.
2. From Immigration to Law Enforcement Databases and 
Interoperability
The operational databases - Eurodac6, the Schengen Informa-
tion System (SIS)7 and the Visa Information System (VIS)8, were 
established at different times, for different purposes and to be 
used by different actors. Whereas the Eurodac shall facilitate the 
determination of the first country of entry of asylum seekers, the 
VIS is supposed to support the issuance of short-term visas and 
6  Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of 26 June 2013 on the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for 
the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 
604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of 
the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for 
the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and 
Europol for law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 
establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT sys-
tems in the area of freedom, security and justice [2013] OJ L 180/1.
7  Regulation (EU) 2018/1860 of 28 November 2018 on the use of the Schengen Infor-
mation System for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals [2018] OJ L 
312/1; Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 of 28 November 2018 on the establishment, oper-
ation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border checks, 
and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, and amending 
and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 [2018] OJ L 312/14 and Regulation (EU) 
2018/1862 of 28 November 2018 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schen-
gen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooper-
ation in criminal matters, amending and repealing Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, 
and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006 and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU 
[2018] OJ L 312/56.
8  Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of 9 July 2008 concerning the Visa Information System 
(VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas (VIS Regu-
lation) [2008] OJ L 218/60.
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the SIS is a law enforcement database, which enables competent 
authorities to communicate and exchange information via secure 
channels. However, during the past years, all three databases have 
been revised, with the latest changes to the Eurodac9 and the VIS10 
currently pending, and three new SIS Regulations having been 
adopted in November 2018. All revisions are based on additional 
legal bases, adding new purposes to the existing ones. Beyond 
those new purposes, further categories of data shall be added, and 
the systems shall be rendered interoperable, together with three 
new databases for which legislation has recently been adopted.11 
In total, five (primarily) immigration systems and the SIS shall 
form the underlying databases that will build the Interoperability 
framework.
In a nutshell, Interoperability will connect the underlying sys-
tems by creating three new centralized databases12 and a search 
tool that will enable simultaneous queries in all databases. This will 
create new layers of complexity and thus, make it more difficult for 
individuals to understand who is processing their personal data 
and whom to contact to exercise their rights. Interoperability will 
also create new access possibilities for competent authorities and 
will obscure the steps in which data that were connected led to a 
final result.
9  Proposal for a Regulation on the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of 
fingerprints for the effective application of [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for exam-
ining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States 
by a third-country national or a stateless person], for identifying an illegally staying 
third-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with 
Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law en-
forcement purposes (recast) [2016] COM(2016) 272 final.
10  Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 767/2008, Regulation (EC) 
No 810/2009, Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, Regulation (EU) 2016/399, Regulation 
XX/2018 [Interoperability Regulation], and Decision 2004/512/EC and repealing 
Council Decision 2008/633/JHA [2018] COM(2018) 302 final.
11  The Entry-Exit System (EES), The European Travel Information and Authorization 
System (ETIAS) and the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS-
TCN).
12  A Common Identity Repository (CIR), a Biometric Matching Service (BMS) and a 
Multiple Identity Detector (MID) will store biometric and biographical data centrally. 
A European Search Portal (ESP) will enable competent authorities to search all systems 
simultaneously and to be granted access in accordance with the access rights under 
each individual system.
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What is remarkable is that, while the original setup of the oper-
ational databases did not grant access to law enforcement author-
ities, such access was added during the early revisions of their 
founding acts. Later on, law enforcement access became a default 
function for the recently adopted systems and the Interoperability 
components. Hence, the databases were transformed from serving 
exclusively immigration-related purposes to systems that may all 
be accessed by competent law enforcement authorities for the pre-
vention, detection and investigation of serious crime. Interoper-
ability pushes such repurposing of personal data even further, by 
abolishing the cascading system of prior checks in national data-
bases.
The consequences of such transformation are manifold and 
will not only lead to unnecessary processing operations but might 
encourage false suspicions against persons whose data are stored 
in the databases, to the detriment of data subject rights and an 
increased workload for competent authorities.
On the one hand, the abolition of mandatory checks in national 
databases prior to accessing the EU systems seems illogical with 
respect to criminal investigations: the question here would be why 
a national law enforcement authority should check an EU database 
such as Eurodac before checking a national police database for fin-
gerprints of a potential suspect or perpetrator? It seems likely that 
this reverse procedure would simply lead to additional processing 
operations, where competent authorities would have to search 
national databases after an unsuccessful query in the EU systems.
What is more, a hit during a search in the EU databases 
could lead to an inference that could have been clarified with a 
prior check in the national systems. Such inference may lead to 
an unnecessary suspicion against a person and could motivate a 
police officer to process personal data of that person within a data 
protection regime that would make it easier to limit the person’s 
rights. 
On the other hand, the checking of immigration databases for 
purposes of criminal investigations might be futile and lead to 
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additional work for competent authorities. Comparing the access 
requests by law enforcement authorities to the SIS and Eurodac, 
the different ratio is striking. While the SIS was accessed a total 
of 6.185.199.597 times by the sum of all Member States in 2018,13 
searches in Eurodac carried out by law enforcement authorities 
amounted to 296 by 10 Member States.14 Certainly, it should be 
taken into account that while Eurodac’s main purpose is related 
to asylum, the SIS is a law enforcement database that, obviously, 
is mainly searched by competent authorities. However, the above 
numbers demonstrate that law enforcement authorities do not 
make use of the access possibilities granted to them regarding 
Eurodac. Consequently, necessity and proportionality of such 
access rights are not attained.
Beyond standardizing law enforcement access to the under-
lying databases and streamlining it for the new interoperable 
system, the Interoperability Regulations shall authorize national 
police authorities to access one of the interoperability compo-
nents, the Common Identity Repository (CIR), for the purpose of 
identifying a person.
Under Article 20 of the Interoperability Regulations, national 
police authorities may search the CIR during identity checks with 
biometric data of TCNs. For each person whose data are stored in 
the CIR, the system shall create an individual file that separates the 
data according to the information system from which they origi-
nated.15 Moreover, the individual files shall include a reference to 
the actual record in the underlying databases to which the data 
belong16 and retain links that were generated during a so-called 
13  SIS II – 2018 annual statistics, 5; https://www.eulisa.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/
SIS%202018%20statistics.pdf (accessed on 30 October 2019).
14  Europol performed 10 category 5 searches, see: Eurodac – 2018 annual report, 14; 
https://www.eulisa.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/2018%20Eurodac%20Annual%20
Report.pdf. (accessed on 30 October 2019).
15  Article 18(1) of the Interoperability Regulations.
16  Article 18(4) of the Interoperability Regulations. Moreover, links from the multiple 
identity detection, to be carried out in another interoperability component, will be in-
cluded in each individual file in the CIR.
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multiple identity detection.17 Theoretically, a police officer could 
stop a person on the street to carry out a random identity check, 
querying the component with biometric data of that person. While 
the data stored in the CIR are essentially the same as on a conven-
tional passport and hence, do not reveal more information than a 
travel or ID document, the reference to the underlying databases 
and the links on multiple identities could prompt the querying 
officer to draw certain conclusions about a person.
In addition, a police officer (and Europol staff) may, under 
Article 22 of the Interoperability Regulations, access the CIR for 
the prevention, detection and investigation of serious criminal 
offences, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that con-
sultation of the databases would sustain a suspicion that personal 
data of a suspect or perpetrator are stored in the underlying sys-
tems.18
While random police checks in the Schengen Area are in 
line with the case law of both the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union (CJEU) and the European Court on Human Rights 
(Quintel, 2018), Article 20 identity checks are by far more intru-
sive from a privacy point of view and may lead to unjustified sus-
picions against individuals.
3. Access to EU Databases by EU Agencies 
Beyond the broadened access to the databases by national (law 
enforcement) authorities, access has also been widened for those 
EU Agencies that are involved in the management of migration 
at the external Schengen Borders, for instance during secondary 
security checks in the so-called hotspots.19
Europol, an EU Agency originally responsible to support 
17  Article 19(2) of the Interoperability Regulations. One of the interoperability compo-
nents, the Multiple Identity Detector, will store links that indicate whether a person 
used fraudulent identities to enter the Schengen Area.
18  Article 22(1) of the interoperability Regulations.
19  European Commission, Hotspot Approach, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/con-
tent/hotspot-approach_en. (accessed 19 October 2019).
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national law enforcement authorities in the fight against organized 
crime and terrorism, became increasingly involved in migration 
related investigations such as migrant smuggling or document 
fraud. All EU databases feature provisions granting Europol access 
to retained data for the purposes of fighting serious crime and ter-
rorism. Requirements for access by Europol staff are, inter alia, the 
existence of reasonable grounds to consider that the consultation 
of data in the systems may substantially contribute to the preven-
tion, detection or investigation of criminal offences, or, if consul-
tation is necessary to support and strengthen action by Member 
States within the mandate of Europol (Quintel, 2019). Similar 
conditions for Europol access apply regarding the Interoperability 
components.20 In addition, Europol data will be searchable via the 
European Search Portal21 and will be entered into a watch-list that 
will be included in one of the underlying databases.22 
The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCGA), ini-
tially established as supranational Agency tasked to assist the EU 
Member States with migration management and border control 
functions, developed into a powerful coordination hub between 
the Member States and other EU Agencies as well as third coun-
tries, progressively gaining operational competences in further 
areas related to migration. Under the new EBCGA Regulation23, 
the Agency’s activities will be significantly broadened by strength-
ening the EBCGA with a new mandate to protect the EU’s external 
20  Article 22 of the Interoperability Regulations.
21  Chapter II of the Interoperability Regulations.
22  The European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS) will contain a 
watchlist to which Europol shall add information on the basis of information related to 
terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences, see Article 34 (2) and (3) of Regu-
lation (EU) 2018/1240 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 September 
2018 establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) 
and amending Regulations (EU) No 1077/2011, (EU) No 515/2014, (EU) 2016/399, 
(EU) 2016/1624 and (EU) 2017/2226 [2017] OJ L 236/1.
23  Council of the European Union Press Release, ‘European Border and Coast 




Coast+Guard%3a+Council+adopts+revised+regulation. (accessed 10 November 
2019).
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borders, carry out returns more effectively, and to cooperate 
with third countries. In addition, the Regulation builds upon the 
increasing number of tasks and responsibilities of the EBCGA 
regarding irregular secondary movements and the Agency’s role 
in (forced) returns of TCNs.24
Both Agencies will play a central role with regard to the devel-
opment and operation of EU databases and Interoperability. While 
Europol’s databases will be connected to the interoperable system, 
the EBCGA will be responsible for the management of essential 
parts of the Interoperability regime.25 Evidently, both Agencies will 
feed the databases with information gathered during their deploy-
ment and will be granted access to the systems for the performance 
of their tasks. While the growing synergy between the tasks of the 
two Agencies may be seen as progress towards a more harmonized 
and integrated EU border management approach, the overlapping 
purposes for which they may exchange personal data may lead to 
concerns, as different data protection regimes apply, not only to 
the two Agencies, but also on national level.
4. Data Protection Concerns
4.1 Data Protection Concerns related to Law Enforcement Access
As mentioned above, a police officer checking data for identifica-
tion purposes in the CIR could discover links to a person in law 
enforcement databases and draw inferences that might lead to an 
unjustified suspicion against a person. While for data processing 
operations relating to immigration and asylum the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR)26 would be applicable, data pro-
24  Cf.: FRA Opinion 5/2018, The revised European Border and Coast Guard Regulation 
and its fundamental rights implications Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fun-
damental Rights, 17 (November 2018).
25  In relation to the processing of data in the Multiple Identity Detector, the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency shall be a data controller within the meaning of point 
(8) of Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, see Article 40(3)(a) of the Interoperabil-
ity Regulations.
26  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
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cessed for law enforcement purposes falls within the scope of 
Directive (EU)2016/68027, which is applicable for processing 
carried out in the area of police and criminal justice (Sajfert and 
Quintel, 2019). Evidently, in that area, data subject rights may be 
restricted more flexibly and transparency requirements are con-
siderably lower than under the GDPR, in order not to obstruct the 
work of law enforcement authorities. However, where migration is 
associated with security concerns, the unclear delineation between 
the Regulation and the Directive could easily lead to the applica-
tion of the wrong instrument and a lowering of data protection 
rights for individuals where a police officer applies the rules under 
the Directive instead of the Regulation (Quintel, 2018). Hence, 
that officer, basing a search in the CIR on a suspicion that a person 
could be a perpetrator or suspect, would be able to apply the rules 
under the Directive and restrict data subject rights more flexibly 
than if he would apply the GDPR to his processing activities.
4.2. Different Data Protection Regimes Applicable to different Data 
Controllers
Interoperability will multiply the access points to the different sys-
tems in the Member States. While the intention to improve coop-
eration between the national authorities is certainly commendable, 
it is doubtful whether those authorities would be willing to share 
certain data in the systems if they cannot be sure who will have 
access. Consequently, instead of improving the work of competent 
authorities, Interoperability could lead to mistrust and negatively 
impact the information exchanges between those authorities.
The increased involvement of EU Agencies poses yet other 
data protection concerns, as discrepancies may arise in the con-
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1.
27  Directive (EU) 2016/680 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes 
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA [2016] OJ L 119/89.
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text of interoperability where systematic data exchanges take 
place between actors that apply different data protection regimes. 
Against that background, concerns may arise where Europol staff 
is granted access to biometric data stored in EU databases and 
the interoperability components: Under the Europol Regulation, 
biometric data are not defined as special categories of data and 
may, therefore, be treated without the provision of additional safe-
guards.
In addition, the new EBCGA Regulation suggests strength-
ening the Agency with a new mandate and increased powers to 
protect the EU’s external borders, to carry out returns more effec-
tively, and to cooperate with third countries in the area of border 
protection. Moreover, the European Border Surveillance System 
(Eurosur), which will be integrated into the EBCGA under the 
new EBCGA Regulation, is mainly operated by national authori-
ties that apply either the GDPR or the Directive (EU)2016/680 to 
their processing activities, while processing by the EBCGA falls 
within the scope of Regulation (EU)2018/1725.28
With Interoperability, the number and levels of authorities 
required to input information into the underlying systems mul-
tiply and the possibilities for a straightforward identification of the 
initial source will be obscured. This will make it more difficult to 
determine the authorities responsible for inputting the data that 
led to an incorrect result. Not only would this negatively affect the 
individual who might be wrongfully accused, but also obstruct his 
or her possibilities to complain against a decision that was based 
on inaccurate data (Demkova and Quintel, 2020).
4.3. Supervision and Effective Review of Processing Operations
Data processing activities within the AFSJ are rather opaque, 
which makes it difficult for data subjects to ascertain who is pro-
cessing their personal data. Therefore, compliance with data pro-
28  Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (Text with EEA relevance) [2018] OJ L 
295/39.
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tection principles, clearly defined processing purposes and strict 
supervision are of utmost importance to ensure fundamental 
rights standards. However, with the blurred lines between migra-
tion and security and the dilution of responsibilities between dif-
ferent data controllers, it will be challenging for DPAs to obtain a 
concrete picture of processing activities and the risks involved for 
data subjects.
The new layers that Interoperability adds to the already com-
plex system of AFSJ databases make it extremely difficult to scruti-
nize the way in which data are collected, accessed and shared, and 
the new means to connect and link data within the Interoperability 
regime raise concerns regarding the review of processing opera-
tions.29
Supervisory authorities should be able to follow data flows 
across the different networks instead of looking at each specific 
controller separately. In order to achieve an effective supervision 
of the complex network of different processors, closer coopera-
tion between national DPAs and the EDPS to better understand 
the steps behind certain decision-making processes and to handle 
complaints effectively is, therefore, essential, since any unfair pro-
cessing can entail severe consequences for individuals.30
While on national level, access logs are to be kept for review by 
the national DPAs31, on EU level, the processing of personal data 
by EU Agencies is supervised by the EDPS. In order to achieve full 
supervision, cooperation should be reinforced between the DPAs 
on different levels. Such coordinated supervision has been codi-
fied in the legal instruments of some of the underlying databases. 
Additionally, Article 62(1) of Regulation (EU)2018/1725 puts for-
ward a harmonized model of coordinated supervision between the 
EDPS and the national DPAs to ensure an effective supervision of 
large-scale IT systems.32
29  Cf.: Ibid.
30  Ibid.
31  See: Article 25 of Directive (EU)2016/680.
32  See: EDPS, ‘Supervision Coordination’; https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/super-
vision-coordination_en. (accessed on 20 October 2019).
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5. Conclusion
While the proponents of Interoperability portrayed it as some type 
of panacea for the existing shortcomings of information sharing 
in the AFSJ, several caveats in the anticipated regime simply 
cannot be ignored. One of the most pressing questions should be 
whether the interoperable system is necessary and proportionate, 
and whether Interoperability will lead to an improved exchange of 
information. Where additional actors will be authorized to access 
the system, this might have an impact on the trust among authori-
ties, which might be reluctant to share information.
Moreover, there is no tangible proof that the broadened law 
enforcement access, which has been included in the amendments 
of the underlying databases during the past years and became a 
default feature for the CIR, will actually improve the work of com-
petent authorities. While recent terrorist attacks are often used as 
an arguments to extend law enforcement access to EU databases 
and to support Interoperability, the failure to prevent such attacks 
derived mainly from the lack of coordination on national level and 
the absence of data sharing between Member States.
With Interoperability, designated police officers may access the 
underlying immigration databases via the CIR without checking 
their national databases beforehand. Moreover, the CIR search 
shall include a reference to all EU information systems to which 
the data belong. Hence, during an identity check, a police officer 
could, by inference, make erroneous conclusions about a person, 
simply because his or her personal data are stored in one of the 
underlying databases. Consequently, Articles 20 and 22 of the 
Interoperability Regulations increase the risk of situations where 
TCNs as well as EU citizens could become subject to unfair or dis-
criminatory processing.
Ultimately, it remains to be seen whether Interoperability, once 
established, will indeed improve the scale of information sharing 
while ensuring effective oversight and safeguarding individuals’ 
rights.
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22. TARGETED SURVEILLANCE: 
CAN PRIVACY AND 
SURVEILLANCE BE 
RECONCILED?
Edoardo Celeste & Federico Fabbrini
1. Introduction
Striking the balance between the protection of fundamental rights 
and the need to protect national security has been a challenge for 
all liberal democracies in times of emergency. The same is true also 
for the European Union (EU). In fact, since the launch 20 years ago 
of the 1999 Tampere programme, implementing the 1997 Treaty of 
Amsterdam, the EU has developed a common policy in the area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), which led to the adop-
tion of important pieces of legislation also concerning the fight 
against crime and international terrorism. At the same time, how-
ever, since 2000, the EU has been endowed with an advanced and 
comprehensive Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was given 
full primary law status by the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. 
As a result, in the last decade, the European Court of Justice 
has been faced repeatedly with the question of how to reconcile 
security and justice, contributing to the constitutionalisation of 
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the AFSJ.1 This is particularly true in the field of privacy and data 
protection, where the ECJ has taken a leading role in reviewing 
EU and national legislation empowering law enforcement agencies 
to undertake surveillance. In fact, in comparative perspective, the 
ECJ has become the most important jurisdiction world-wide in 
limiting security overreach in the field of mass surveillance to ade-
quately protect human rights. Hence, it is not an overstatement to 
claim that in this field the ECJ has progressively become a “human 
rights court.”2 
This Chapter summarizes the ECJ case law prohibiting mass 
data collection and retention and discusses its legacy for the future. 
The contribution is structured as follows. Section 2 contextualises 
the emergence of mass surveillance in Europe in the early 2000s 
and maps the relevant legislation adopted by the EU. Section 3 
examines the ECJ’s decisions in Digital Rights Ireland and Schrems, 
explaining why the ECJ deemed EU surveillance measures to be 
incompatible with EU fundamental rights. Section 4 examines 
instead the ECJ’s decision in Tele2 Sverige & Watson, and explains 
how the case law of the ECJ reverberated on surveillance meas-
ures adopted at the national level. Finally, section 5 concludes by 
reflecting on the potential consequences of the ECJ jurisprudence 
on future cases.
2. The Emergence of Mass Surveillance in Europe
The first years of the twenty-first century were characterised by 
a radical revolution in terms of intelligence and law enforcement 
authorities’ practices. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
the urgent need to contrast international terrorism led to a tran-
sition to a system of pre-emptive security and mass surveillance.3 
1  See K. Lenaerts (2010), ‘The Contribution of the European Court of Justice to the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice’ 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 255.
2  F. Fabbrini (2015), ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Rights to Data 
Privacy: The EU Court of Justice as a Human Rights Court’ in S. de Vries, U. Bernitz 
and S. Weatherill (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a Binding Instrument 
(Hart).
3  See V. Mitsilegas (2014), ‘Transatlantic Counterterrorism Cooperation and European 
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Significant advancements in the technological sector offered for 
the first time the possibility to collect and process huge amount of 
data for speculative purposes.4
In Europe, several member states enacted legislation requiring 
internet and telephone service providers to retain and further 
make accessible to national law enforcement authorities electronic 
communications’ meta-data, i.e. information about the time, loca-
tion, source and addressees of phone calls, texts or emails.5 These 
statutes were adopted as derogations to EU data protection law, 
which allowed member states to introduce exceptions to data pro-
tection rules in, inter alia, the domains of public security, defence 
and criminal investigations.6 
In 2006, however, after the terrorist attacks in Madrid and 
London, the EU institutions saw a window of opportunity to 
advance legislation to harmonize member states’ action in the 
field. As a result, the Data Retention Directive, Directive 2006/24/
EC, was adopted to harmonise the patchwork of laws emerged in 
Europe. The Data Retention Directive did not require internet and 
service providers to retain the content of electronic communica-
tion, but allowed for the retention of all types of meta-data for a 
fixed period of time.7
In 2013, the entire world was shocked by the revelations of a 
former contractor of the US Central Intelligence Agency, Edward 
Snowden. In a series of interviews, Snowden disclosed the exist-
ence of various intelligence programmes pre-emptively collecting 
in bulk communications content and meta-data from major 
Values’ in D. Curtin and E. Fahey (eds), A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Per-
spectives on the Relationship between the EU and US Legal Orders (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press).
4  See Marieke de Goede, Speculative Security (Minnesota University Press 2012).
5  See F. Fabbrini (2015), ‘Human Rights in the Digital Age: The European Court of Jus-
tice Ruling in the Data Retention Case and Its Lessons for Privacy and Surveillance in 
the United States’ Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 28: 65-95.
6  Directive 2002/58/EC, Article 15; Directive 95/46/EC, Article 13.
7  See Fabbrini (2015).
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US telecommunications operators and internet companies.8 In 
Europe, this news received unprecedented attention both at insti-
tutional and civil society level. Data of millions of Europeans using 
US internet services providers had been affected. UK intelligence 
agencies were discovered to have been involved too.9 In March 
2014, a resolution of the European Parliament strongly condemned 
the systematic and indiscriminate collection of personal data car-
ried out by the intelligence programmes of the US National Secu-
rity Agency.10 However, less than a month later, in the case Digital 
Rights Ireland, the ECJ invalidated the EU Data Retention Direc-
tive for failing to limit the width of data collection involved.11 The 
EU, too, started removing the beam out of its own eye. 
3. EU Legislation and Fundamental Rights
The legal regime introduced by the Data Retention Directive had 
already been subject to judicial scrutiny at domestic level before 
Digital Rights Ireland. The constitutional courts of Romania, Czech 
Republic and Germany found the national statutes implementing 
the Directive in their respective countries to be incompatible with 
the respect of the right to privacy and data protection of individu-
als.12 However, it was only in Digital Rights Ireland that the validity 
of the Directive itself was called into question. 
In this case, the ECJ recognised that both the blanket collec-
8  D. Cole, F. Fabbrini and S.J. Schulhofer (eds.) (2017), Surveillance, Privacy, and Trans-
atlantic Relations, Hart Publishing.
9  See S. Schulhofer (2017), 'A Transatlantic Privacy Pact? A Sceptical View', in D. Cole, 
F. Fabbrini and S.J. Schulhofer (eds.), Surveillance, Privacy, and Transatlantic Relations, 
Hart Publishing.
10  European Parliament, Resolution on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveil-
lance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental 
rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, 12 March 2014, 
P7_TA(2014)0230.
11  Digital Rights Ireland [2014] ECJ Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
12  Curtea Constitutionala [Constitutional Court of Romania], decision No. 1258, 8 Oc-
tober 2009; Nález Ustavniho soudu ze dne 22.5.2011 [Decision of the Constitutional 
Court of the Czech Republic of 22 March 2011], Pl.U S24/10; Bundesverfassungs-
gericht [German Constitutional Court, 2 March 2010, 125 BVerfGE 261.
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tion of meta-data by internet and telephone service providers and 
the further access to those data operated by national law enforce-
ment authorities represented a “broad ranging” and “particularly 
serious” interference with the rights to privacy and to data pro-
tection, enshrined in Article 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights,13 since a similar system of data retention would 
enhance people’s feeling to be constantly under surveillance.14 
While the ECJ ruled that the Directive did not violate the essence 
of Articles 7 and 8, and that the regime put in place by the Direc-
tive met the first tier of the proportionality test, being suitable to 
pursue an objective of general interest, such as the fight against 
crime, the ECJ concluded that the Directive could not pass scru-
tiny under the necessity test.
In fact, according to the ECJ, the interference with the rights 
to privacy and data protection went beyond “what is strictly 
necessary”.15 The ECJ identified five main faults in the Directive, 
and in particular observed with concern that the Data Retention 
Directive “entail[ed] an interference with the fundamental rights 
of practically the entire European population”.16 The Directive 
did not require to retain exclusively meta-data of individuals who 
might have a link with a crime, but essentially affected “all persons 
using electronic communications services”.17 Moreover, the Direc-
tive did not set objective criteria to regulate the subsequent access 
and use of personal data by national authorities as well as did not 
foresee any prior mechanisms of judicial authorisation.18
In 2015, in the Schrems case, the ECJ reiterated its condemna-
tion of the model of blanket surveillance.19 In the aftermath of the 
Snowden revelations about the existence of US mass surveillance 
programmes, an Austrian activist, Max Schrems, filed a complaint 
13  Digital Rights Ireland (n 11) para 37.
14  Digital Rights Ireland (n 11) para 37.
15  Digital Rights Ireland (n 11) para 51 ff.
16  Digital Rights Ireland (n 11) para 56.
17  Digital Rights Ireland (n 11) para 58.
18  Digital Rights Ireland (n 11) para 62.
19  Schrems [2015] ECJ C-362/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.
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to the Irish Data Protection Commission. As a Facebook’s user, 
he was concerned about the possibility of his personal data being 
transferred from Ireland to the US, and potentially being accessed 
by US national security authorities with no form of scrutiny or 
remedy offered to European citizens. Article 25 of the Data Pro-
tection Directive allowed EU member states to transfer personal 
data only to third countries ensuring an “adequate level of protec-
tion”, which, as the ECJ explained, means a level that is “essentially 
equivalent to that guaranteed within the European Union”.20
Following a request for a preliminary ruling made by the Irish 
High Court, the ECJ analysed the compatibility with EU law of 
the so-called Safe Harbour regime, which allowed for the transfer 
of personal data from the EU to US corporations. Eventually, the 
ECJ ruled that the Commission adequacy Decision 2000/520/EC, 
which, pursuant to the Data Protection Directive, certified the 
adequacy of the level of safeguards offered by the Safe Harbour 
agreement, was invalid and struck it down. 
The ECJ did not directly examine US surveillance law nor did 
it explicitly affirm that the US do not offer an “adequate level of 
protection”. However, it pointed out that nothing in the Safe Har-
bour agreement prevented US national security agencies to access 
and use all EU personal data on a generalised basis, without estab-
lishing preliminarily and clearly the categories of data susceptible 
to be involved. The ECJ reiterated that a similar derogation to the 
protection of personal data is not limited to “what is strictly nec-
essary”.21 Moreover, the ECJ went further by affirming that such a 
model of bulk surveillance, which, in contrast to the case of Data 
Retention Directive, did not only involve meta-data, but all kinds 
of personal data, “must be regarded as compromising the essence 
of the fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed 
by Article 7 of the Charter”.22 The ruling of the ECJ therefore forced 
20  Schrems (n 19) para 73.
21  Schrems (n 19) para 93.
22  Schrems (n 19) para 94; on the point, see T. Ojanen (2017), 'Rights-Based Review 
of Electronic Surveillance after Digital Rights Ireland and Schrems in the European 
Union', in D. Cole, F. Fabbrini and S.J. Schulhofer (eds.), Surveillance, Privacy, and 
Transatlantic Relations, Hart Publishing.
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the EU to renegotiate an agreement with the US to allow transat-
lantic data transfer.
4. National Legislation and EU Fundamental Rights
Digital Rights Ireland and Schrems focused on two specific regimes, 
the Data Retention Directive and the Safe Harbour Agreement, 
both of which were adopted at EU level. Yet, the judgments had 
a lasting effect also on national legislation. In fact, as the ECJ had 
the chance to show in Tele2 Sverige & Watson, these judgments de 
facto established a series of general criteria to ensure the compat-
ibility of surveillance programmes with EU fundamental rights.23
In Tele2 Sverige & Watson, the ECJ examined the Swedish and 
British statutes implementing the Data Retention Directive. Such 
statutes had formally remained in place even after the invalida-
tion of the Directive. At that time, national legislators and courts 
were reluctant to interpret Digital Rights Ireland as if the ECJ had 
definitively banned the model of mass data retention and surveil-
lance.24 In Tele2 Sverige & Watson, however, the ECJ ruled that the 
Swedish and British statutes were implementing Article 15(1) of 
Directive 2002/58/EC, the so-called e-Privacy Directive, which 
allows member states to derogate from the obligation of confiden-
tiality of electronic communications if necessary to protect a series 
of interests, including public and national security.
The ECJ found that, in terms of scope, the domestic data reten-
tion statutes under consideration, by requiring a blanket retention 
of meta-data, essentially mirrored the EU Data Retention Direc-
tive.25 The ECJ observed that similar data retention systems not 
only represent an interference with Article 7 and 8 of the Charter 
23  Tele2 Sverige [2016] ECJ Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970; 
see E. Celeste (2019), ‘The Court of Justice and the Ban on Bulk Data Retention: Ex-
pansive Potential and Future Scenarios’ (European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 15: 
134. 
24  See Secretary of State for the Home Department v Davis MP & Ors [2015] EWCA Civ 
1185.
25  Tele2 Sverige (n 23) para 97.
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of Fundamental Rights, enshrining the rights to privacy and to 
data protection, but also with Article 11, protecting the right to 
freedom of expression, due to the potential chilling effects that a 
feeling of constant surveillance may generate on individual free 
speech.26
Following Digital Rights Ireland, the ECJ then reiterated that a 
data retention model requiring the collection of personal data in a 
generalised way, involving all users and any methods of commu-
nication, with no differentiation, goes beyond the limits of what 
can be considered as a necessary and justified interference with the 
fundamental rights of individuals.27
However, in Tele2 Sverige & Watson, the ECJ did not limit itself 
to certify the incompatibility of the bulk data retention models 
incorporated in the Swedish and British legislation with EU funda-
mental rights. The ECJ also offered national legislators a pragmatic 
solution to the issue of data retention. A bulk system of data reten-
tion could never be tolerable, even if paired with a set of stringent 
criteria regulating access by national authorities.28 However, the 
ECJ clearly pointed out that a targeted system of data retention and 
subsequent use of data by national authorities would represent an 
admissible compression of individual rights justified by the legiti-
mate interest of combating serious crimes and terrorism.29
The ECJ explained that surveillance should be “the exception”, 
and not “the rule”.30 For this reason, member states should limit 
the categories of data, means of communications and persons con-
cerned by data retention measures to “what is strictly necessary”.31 
The ECJ then stressed that national legislation should circumscribe 
the number of individuals affected by data retention programmes 
by requiring the presence of an objective link between the public 
26  Tele2 Sverige (n 23) paras 92–93.
27  Tele2 Sverige (n 23) para 105 ff.
28  Cf. Secretary of State for the Home Department v Davis MP & Ors (n 24) paras 48 and 
65.
29  Tele2 Sverige (n 23) para 108.
30  Tele2 Sverige (n 23) para 104.
31  Tele2 Sverige (n 23) para 108.
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concerned and the crime or risk to be prevented.32 Lastly, with 
high sense of pragmatism, the ECJ suggested that this condition 
could be fulfilled by a domestic legislation restricting data reten-
tion practices to one or more geographical areas with a significant 
level of risk.33 
5. Conclusion
The case law in Digital Rights Ireland, Schrems, and Tele2 Sverige 
& Watson shows that the ECJ has increasingly struck the balance 
between privacy and security in favour of data protection. Despite 
the efforts by EU and national authorities to adopt surveillance 
measures in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the ECJ 
has step by step invalidated measures such as the Data Retention 
Directive or national laws implementing it, which created a system 
of mass surveillance to the detriment of the protection of funda-
mental rights. Moreover, the ECJ has annulled the Safe Harbour 
Agreement since it allowed the transfer of data to the US in the 
absence of adequate privacy protection, and thus with no limits to 
the ability of US law enforcement authorities to access EU citizens’ 
data. As such, the ECJ has embraced a standard of human rights 
protection in the field of national security which is arguably the 
most advanced in comparative perspective, by holding that human 
rights cannot be sacrificed on the altar of national security.
On the one hand, this has relevance in the short term. A 
number of cases are in fact currently pending before the ECJ. In 
October 2017, in the case Privacy International, the UK Investiga-
tory Powers Tribunal, which is the British jurisdiction with com-
petence on cases of alleged human rights violations perpetrated by 
national law enforcement and intelligence agencies, has asked the 
ECJ to ascertain whether UK’s domestic legislation establishing 
a blanket system of data retention for national security purposes 
is compatible with the obligation of confidentiality of electronic 
32  Tele2 Sverige (n 23) para 110.
33  Tele2 Sverige (n 23) para 111.
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communications provided by the e-Privacy Directive.34 The pre-
liminary conclusion of the British Tribunal is that bulk collection 
and processing of data are an “essential necessity […] to protect 
national security”, and that the principles established in Tele 2 
Sverige & Watson would not be applicable.35 However, there seems 
to be no reason why the ECJ should depart from its approach and 
admit the compatibility of a bulk data retention regime with EU 
fundamental rights.
Moreover, in May 2018, in the so-called Schrems II case, the 
Irish High Court has referred to the ECJ a further question related 
to the data transfer between EU and US corporations.36 The orig-
inal complaint to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner was 
filed again by Mr Schrems, this time contesting Facebook Ireland’s 
practice of relying on standard contractual clauses to transfer per-
sonal data to its mother company in the US. Standard contractual 
clauses are one of the mechanisms for transferring EU personal 
data outside the EU, and consist of model contracts approved by 
the European Commission. In Schrems II, the ECJ will be asked to 
clarify if the use of these clauses to transfer data to the US is per-
mitted in light of US surveillance laws and practices. After the first 
Schrems case, in US law there have been limited improvements 
allowing for more transparency and accountability of intelligence 
and law enforcement authorities, in particular vis-à-vis foreign cit-
izens. Some critical points, however, still persist, making de facto 
very hard to ensure that EU personal data transferred to the US 
enjoy “essentially equivalent” safeguards.
34  Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Investigatory Powers Tribunal - London 
(United Kingdom) made on 31 October 2017 – Privacy International v Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Others (ECJ, Case C-623/17); see Privacy 
International v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Others 
[2017] UK IPT IPT/15/110/CH; Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs & Ors [2016] IPT/15/110/CH (UK IPT); see Celeste (n 23).
35  Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Investigatory Powers Tribunal - London 
(United Kingdom) made on 31 October 2017 – Privacy International v Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Others (n 34).
36  Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) made on 9 May 2018 – 
Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited, Maximillian Schrems (ECJ, 
Case C-311/18).
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On the other hand, the case law of the ECJ also has longer term 
implications. Twenty years ago, in Tampere, member states laid 
down the strategic objectives of a European area of freedom, secu-
rity and justice, where police and judicial authorities of different 
nations could cooperate in order to enhance the protection of 
individual rights. Achieving that objective required maintaining 
a high and even level of human rights protection across the EU. 
While many challenges in this area remain – including the 
threatening dynamics of rule of law backsliding in several member 
states, and not to mention the risks connected to Brexit (the UK 
decision to leave the EU) in this field – the ECJ has confirmed 
through its case law on mass surveillance and privacy that it will 
carefully police this space, to make sure that integration in the field 
of AFSJ does not result in a limitation of human rights.
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